Class Warfare 1988-2005 Over Top Individual Income Tax Rates: Teeter-Totter from Soak-the-Rich to Robin-Hood-in-Reverse by Lee, John W.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
2006
Class Warfare 1988-2005 Over Top Individual
Income Tax Rates: Teeter-Totter from Soak-the-
Rich to Robin-Hood-in-Reverse
John W. Lee
William & Mary Law School, jwleex@wm.edu
Copyright c 2006 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Lee, John W., "Class Warfare 1988-2005 Over Top Individual Income Tax Rates: Teeter-Totter from Soak-the-Rich to Robin-Hood-in-
Reverse" (2006). Faculty Publications. Paper 71.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/71
CLASS WARFARE 1988-2005 OVER TOP 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATES: 
TEETER-TOTTER FROM SOAK-THE-
RICH TO ROBIN-HOOD-IN-REVERSE 
John W Lee, IIr 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In an innovative 1955 Tax Policy Hearing before a Subcommittee 
chaired by Representative Wilbur Mills, conservative Arkansas Democrat 
(and soon to become legendary Chair of the House Ways and Means 
Committee), a New York Stock Exchange lobbyist suggested "facetiously" 
that "you might subject everybody's income by definition, to a capital 
gains rate, then we can start all over again. [Laughter]."' When just that 
came to pass in a teeter-totter fashion-from the equilibrium of ordinary 
* John William Lee, III, Professor of Law, College of William & Mary. B.A. 1965, 
University of North Carolina; LL.B. 1968, University of Virginia; LL.M. (Taxation) 1970, 
Georgetown University. The author is grateful for the generous financial support of the 
College of William & Mary School of Law and to John 0. Cox, student at College of 
William & Mary School of Law. 
I. The witness had just offered a first alternative of a scheduler income system: "you 
might consider having 5 or I 0 baskets, each of them labeled different things, each of them 
carrying a different rate." Hearings on Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and 
Stability Before the Subcomm. on Tax Policy of the Joint Comm. on the Economic Report, S. 
Rep. No. 84-1310 345-46 (1955) (statement of Jonathan Brown, representing New York 
Stock Exchange). That too came to pass under the 1986 Code. See infra note 120 and 
accompanying text. 
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income and capital gains rates at an earlier top capital gains rate, first the 
individual ordinary income rate was raised at top only, then capital gains 
rate cut, then ordinary rates "temporarily" cut disproportionately at top, and 
then capital gains and dividends rates "temporarily" cut at top to a sixty-
year low all over a seventeen-year period, 1986-2003-it was not funny at 
all to anyone caring about progressivity in Federal income taxation.2 
The 1986 Code had ended (albeit temporarily) the individual tax 
preference3 for capital gains income over services and any other ordinary 
income (such as portfolio income) by generally applying twenty-eight 
percent4 as the top individual tax rate for both individual capital gains and 
services income.5 A same top twenty-eight percent rate for individual 
capital gains and ordinary income could be expected to end or at least 
2. Dana Milbank & Jonathan Weisman, Middle Class Tax Share Set to Rise; Studies Say 
Burden of Rich to Decline, WASH. POST, June 4, 2003, at A1 (demonstrating that the biggest 
gains were set to go to the top 1% or so ($337,000+) and to low-income taxpayers; middle 
income taxpayers would have a higher tax burden because they do not qualify for targeted 
tax breaks to the poor or investment-related tax breaks to the wealthy); John S. Irons & John 
Podesta, A Tax Plan for Progressives; A Simpler and Fairer Tax Code-One That Rewards 
the Hard Work of the American Middle Class-Can Be Good Policy and Smart Politics, 
AMER. PROSPECT, Jun. 2005, at 52. 
3. David H. Safavian, Indexing Tax Attributes for Inflation: Dispelling Myths and 
Advocating Change, 1995 DET. C.L. REv. 109; David Nicklaus, Capital Gains Already Get 
Tax Breaks, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 11, 1994 at E1 ("The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
swept away the capital-gains preference. Democrats hailed that change as a victory for 
fairness, because capital gains accrue mainly to the rich."). 
4. That the twenty-eight percent rate had been the top individual capital gains rate (from 
1978 to 1981) was a coincidence. The target rate changed as revenue estimates progressed. 
JEFFREY BIRNBAUM & ALAN MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS, 
LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM 227, 245, 258, 271 (Random 
House, Inc. 1987) (arguing that President Ronald Reagan's "revenue neutral" mandate 
demanded targeted revenue offsets for any new revenue losses); accord Kenneth J. Kies, 
The Current Political, Budgetary, and Tax Policy Environment Suggests the Possibility of 
Major Federal Tax Legislation in the JOOth Congress, 35 TAX NOTES 179, 183 (1987). The 
same treatment of capital gains and ordinary income was required by the rule of 
distributional parity per income class, viz., the effective rate at the top could not be 
decreased as much as the top ordinary reduction from fifty percent to twenty-eight percent 
would produce without offsetting revenue increases aimed at the top, particularly capital 
gains preference and immediate end of individual tax shelters. I d. at 183-84 (describing 
"distributional acceptability" . . . "a per se politically unacceptable feature was that the 
percentage reduction in taxes for the highest income level of taxpayers exceeded that which 
would be received by middle-income taxpayers."). 
5. A not insignificant fly in the same top rate ointment was the "phantom" thirty-three 
percent rate on individual taxable income from a floor of$71,900 to a ceiling of$149,250 in 
1988 dollars (from $115,040 to $239,168 in 2004 dollars). BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra 
note 4, at 220 (story of origin). This tax on the near rich was also required by distributional 
acceptability. Kies, supra note 4, at 184. 
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decrease the serious violations of the tax policies of (a) vertical equity 
(ability to pay or progressivity), and (b) horizontal equity (like amounts of 
income should be taxed the same)6 theretofore wrought by preferential 
federal income tax treatment of individual capital gains realizations. These 
gains, taxes, and arguably economic benefits are concentrated in the hands 
of the top five percent and especially in the top half of the top one percent 
of individual taxpayers. 7 
During the first modem capital gains tax preference era from 1921-
1986, the federal tax law dipped deeply in large incomes through nominally 
progressive income tax rates, but for large incomes consisting mostly of 
capital gains (taxed at effective rates substantially below the maximum 
individual ordinary income rate) such dipping was done with a very coarse 
grained sieve.8 Highest income taxpayers with substantial capital gains 
realization enjoyed a Federal tax effective rate lower than that of taxpayers 
6. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, No. GA0-05-1009SP, UNDERSTANDING THE TAX 
REFORM DEBATE: BACKGROUND, CRITERIA, & QUESTIONS (2005) [hereinafter 
UNDERSTANDING THE TAX REFORM DEBATE), available at http://www.gao.gov/new. 
items/d051009sp.pdf; John W. Lee, Critique of Current Congressional Capital Gains 
Contentions, 15 VA. TAX REv. I, 4 (1995) [hereinafter Lee, Critique]; John W. Lee et al., 
Restating Capitalization Standards and Rules: The Case for Rough Justice Regulations 
(Part One), 23 OHION.U. L. REv. 631,676 n.161 (1997). 
7. Martin J. McMahon, The Mathew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REv. 993, 
1002-05 (2004); Deborah A. Geier, Incremental Versus Fundamental Tax Reform and the 
Top One Percent, 56 SMU L. Rev. 99, 110-16 (2003). For my earlier work using SOl 
studies and other sources to show concentration of capital gains realizations and business 
ownership at the top one percent level see Lee, Critique, supra note 6, at 40-42 nn.l48-49, 
43-44, 49 n.l73; and John W. Lee, A Populist Political Perspective of the Business Tax 
Entities Universe: "Hey the Stars Might Lie But the Numbers Never Do," 78 TEX. L. REv. 
885, 908-10 (2000); but see John W. Lee, Entity Classification and Integration: Publicly 
Traded Partnerships, Personal Service Corporations, and the Tax Legislative Process, 8 
VA. TAX REv. 57, 100-01 n.l69 (1988) [hereinafter Lee, Entity Classification and 
Integration] (demonstrating that SOl data reveals the concentration of reported income in a 
handful of very large corporations). 
8. HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A 
PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 68 (University of Chicago Press 1938) (describing the 
combination of high nominal individual ordinary income tax rates with a substantial 
individual capital gains preference as 
a grand scheme of deception, whereby enormous surtaxes are voted in exchange 
for promises that they will not be made effective .... Politicians may point with 
pride to the rates, while quietly reminding their wealthy constituents of the 
loopholes .... Congress ... [should] quit this ludicrous business of dipping deeply 
in large incomes with a sieve.). 
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with less income but where the income was wholly or mostly ordinary.9 
Vertical equity or progressivity was a farce during this era. 10 
The matured pattern under the 1954 Code, from at least the 1960s on, 
was that perhaps a quarter of high income individuals did not regularly 
recognize substantial capital gains, which produced great horizontal 
disparities in effective income tax rates at the level of the top one percent or 
so of individual tax return filers. 11 High services-income-only individuals 
were therefore hammered as compared with high income individual 
taxpayers with equivalent amounts of capital gains income, 12 a departure 
from horizontal equity. 
9. Leandra Lederman & Stephen W. Mazza, Addressing Imperfections in the Tax System: 
Procedural or Substantive Reform, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1423, 1425 n.7 (2005); US Moves-
Quietly- Toward a Flat Tax, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 1, 2003, at 13 (describing how 
the super-rich pay proportionately less federal income tax than the merely rich. In 2000, the 
400 richest taxpayers (reporting average $173 million) paid an effective tax rate more than 
five percentage points lower than those making $1.5 million to $5 million. The disparity 
will greatly increase as the capital gains rate was lowered from twenty percent to fifteen 
percent, and extended to dividends in 2003.). 
10. John W. Lee, III, The Capital Gains "Sieve" and the "Farce" ofProgressivity 1921-
1986, I HASTINGS Bus. L. J. I, 33-5, 47-8, 64, 67-9, 80 (2005) [hereinafter Lee, The Capital 
Gains "Sieve"]; Robert J. Samuelson, Opinion, Tax Reform R.l.P, WASH. POST, May 12, 
2004 at A23 (describing the capital gains preference as the biggest break for the wealthy in 
2004: worth $82 billion). From the beginning, populists were aware that preferences such 
as the reorganization provisions (and especially the capital gains preference) allowed high 
income individuals to evade progressivity. See 57 CONG. REc. S828-29 (daily ed. December 
23, 1918) (statement of Sen. LaFollette). Professor Bank maintains that the majority in 
Congress really was only seeking to offiet the impact of regressive consumption taxes with 
somewhat progressive income taxes aimed only at upper class taxpayers. Steven A. Bank, 
Origins of a Flat Tax, 73 DENY. U. L. REv. 329, 333 (1996) (indicating that the 1913 
amendment reflected a more than fifty year struggle to replace the regressive tax system 
with a proportional, not progressive, system). Populists, however, sought a progressive 
system. Id. Fairness also encompasses horizontal equity, i.e., taxing similarly taxpayers 
with the same amounts of income, as by eliminating the capital gains preference and 
especially tax shelters; Hearings on Impact, Effectiveness, and Fairness of the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986 Before the House Ways & Means Comm., 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 172 (1990) 
(statement of James Holden, ABA Section of Taxation); !d. at 254 (statement of Rep. 
Gephardt); Id. at 525 (statement of Chair Rostenkowski). Fairness also includes 
"progressivity." Id. at 22. Here, the 1986 Act looked good only when compared to the 
early 1980's. 1d. at 124, 135-36 (Statements of Aaron and Pechman); see also Marjorie E. 
Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male 
Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REv. 465 (1987) (arguing that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 took a 
large structural step away from progressivity and towards a flat tax.). 
II. Lee, The Capital Gains "Sieve", supra note 10, at 33-35, 47-48. 
12. Id. at 33. 
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The distribution per percentiles of individual income classes of 
individual taxpayers of such capital gains tax preference benefit has always 
been skewed sharply to the top income reporters. 13 That skewed 
distribution follows from the extreme concentration of individual 
ownership of capital assets and especially of realizations at the higher 
individual income levels; 14 pooling at the top half of one percent (who 
currently report more than fifty percent of stock gains reported in most 
years15), astonishingly so in the case of the top 400 individual taxpayers-
13. In the "Roaring Twenties" when, according to J.F. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 88 (Univ. of Wis. Press 1985), the "standing 
joke was that three Presidents had served under [Treasury Secretary] Andrew Mellon, fewer 
than 10,000 individual taxpayers with $100,000 or more [$1 ,070,286 in 2004 purchasing 
power] in annual income paid about 50 percent of the individual income taxes and received 
almost 90 percent of the benefits of the flat capital gains rate." Lee, The Capital Gains 
"Sieve", supra note 10, at 8, 12. In 1959, as the percentage of capital gains made up of 
stock dropped from earlier 85% to below 50%, the percentage of capital gains reported by 
taxpayers with reported income in excess of $50,000 [$322,000 in 2004 dollars or about top 
1 %] dropped to 35.9%. !d. at 30-32. 
14. See Lee A. Sheppard, The Rentier Society, 108 TAX NOTES 176 (2005) ("The top 1 
percent owns 34 percent of all shares and half of all securities and business assets."). The 
meaning of high income varies with the speaker's rhetoric. The term ranges from top 
twenty percent at its broadest scope to more commonly top five percent or top one percent at 
its narrowest scope of taxpayers by household income (usually joint return anyway), 
sometimes expressed by percentage of households, and sometimes by a dollar floor. 
Average household "comprehensive" income for 2000 for the top twenty percent was 
$202,000; top five percent, $446,400; and last, but by no means least, top one percent, 
$1,326,900. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTIVE FEDERAL TAX RATES UNDER CURRENT LAW, 
2001 TO 2014 16 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/57xx/doc5746/08-13-
EffectiveFedTaxRates.pdf; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HISTORICAL EFFECTIVE FEDERAL TAX 
RATES: 1979 TO 2002 4 Table 1 (2005), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/6lxx/ 
doc6133/03-0l-EffectiveTaxRates.pdf (for 2002, $175,900, $350,700, and $938,1 00). The 
decline primarily reflects the bursting of the stock market bubble. See infra notes 177-78 
and accompanying text. CBO uses "adjusted pretax comprehensive" household income, 
which includes all cash income (both taxable and tax-exempt), taxes paid by businesses 
(which are imputed to individuals, as noted above), employee contributions to 40l(k) 
retirement plans, and the value of income received in kind from various sources (including 
employer-paid health insurance premiums, Medicare and Medicaid benefits, and food 
stamps, among others). The calculations use the Census Bureau's fungible value measure to 
determine the cash equivalent of in-kind government transfers. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
HISTORICAL EFFECTIVE FEDERAL TAX RATES: 1979 TO 2002 at 2-3. 
15. Historically the top one percent has annually reported fifty percent or more of capital 
gains realizations. Lee, Critique, supra note 6, at 64 n.231. In 1999, the top two percent 
reported seventy-three percent of capital gains. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No. RL31562, AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL LOSSES (2002), available at 
http://www.thememoryhole.org/crs/ RL31562.pdf; Lee, The Capital Gains "Sieve", supra 
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the "fortunate 400."16 Both the percentage of benefit of any capital gains 
preference by an income class and in an income class flows to the 
wealthiest individual tax payers. The greater the individual's income, the 
greater the percentage of their income, tends on the average, to consist of 
capital gains. 17 The result, as Professor Lawrence Zelenak points out, was 
that: 
In 2000 the minimum AGI required for membership in the "Fortunate 
400" was $86.63 million, and the average AGI for the 400 was $173.9 
million. The average tax rate for these 400 returns in 2000 (as a 
percentage of AGI) was 22.29 percent. The New York Times has 
calculated that current law (reflecting the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts), if 
applied to the 2000 incomes of the Fortunate 400, would produce an 
average tax rate of only 17.5 percent. Based on average pretax income of 
$173.9 million, the effect ofthe rate reduction from 22.29 percent to 17.5 
percent would be to increase after-tax income by 6.2 percent. 18 
A colleague familiar with my work in this area once asked what was 
novel about the story of the 1989-2005 rate wars. That the rich get richer 
and the poor get poorer is not a new story. Professor Marty McMahon has 
called it the "Matthew Effect," based upon a story told in the New 
Testament Gospel. 19 What is new about the 1988-2005 rate wars and 
reinstitution of a substantial capital gains preference? 
Part IV discusses the most distinctive feature of the 2001 and 2003 
Acts' tax cuts: income redistribution from middle and lower income 
note 10, at 80 (showing that the top one percent to two percent reported sixty-nine percent 
of capital gains in 1985). 
16. Lawrence Zelenak, Framing the Distributional Effects of the Bush Tax Cuts, 105 TAX 
NOTES 83 (2004); Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: The Rich Get Soaked While the 
Super Rich Slide, 101 TAX NOTES 581 (2003); see also David Cay Johnston, Richest Are 
Leaving Even the Rich Far Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 5, 2005 at AI (indicating that the share 
of income of the top 0.1% of taxpayers, about 145,000 taxpayers, each with at least $1.6 
million in income (average income $3 million) "more than doubled since 1980, to 7.4 
percent in 2002. The share of income earned by the rest of the top 10 percent rose far less, 
and the share earned by the bottom 90 percent fell."). 
17. Zelenak, supra note 16, at 93 (realized capital gains was the largest component of 
AGI of Fortunate 400, and a five-fold increase in capital gains was a large factor in the 
increased share of AGI between 1995-2000); Leonard E. Burman & Deborah I. Kobes, 
Composition of Income Reported on Tax Returns, 101 TAX NOTES 783 (2003) (top 400 
taxpayers reported more than 71% of income as capital gains; less than 17% as wages); Lee, 
The Capital Gains "Sieve", supra note 10, at 80 (top 1 %'s capital gains income increased 
171% from 1978 to 1990). 
18. Zelenak, supra note 16, at 86. The net effect of tax reductions and spending cuts 
necessitated by the 2001 and 2003 tax reductions again appears to favor the rich at the 
expense of other taxpayers. /d. at 94-95. 
19. Matthew 25:29; McMahon, supra note 7, at 994. 
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households to top income households-"Robin Hood in reverse."20 The 
excess of wage tax revenues over current outlays for social security 
benefits is used to buy special Treasury securities held in "trust funds. "21 
(Wage taxes are heavier than income taxes for eighty percent of individual 
taxpayers and are especially regressive with a capped base limited to 
earned income and impose a flat-rate without deductions or exemptions). 
Federal Reserve Board Chair Alan Greenspan and the Congressional 
Budget Office agree that without taxes being raised to unacceptable levels, 
the Treasury will not be able to meet these obligations when Social 
Security must redeem them in order to meet current benefit obligations.22 
This very fiscal inability to pay promised Social Security benefits to baby 
boomers when the ratio of workers to retirees drops substantially in the 
future is why the wage taxes were increased almost twenty-five years ago 
to generate trust funds. 23 The income redistribution in the event of such 
inability of the Treasury to pay its debt to Social Security may be readily 
appreciated from the similar magnitude of the tax cuts to the rich and the 
amounts Treasury will owe to Social Security. The Congressional Budget 
Office ("CBO") estimates that revenue cost of making all of the 2001 and 
2003 Bush II tax cuts permanent (which disproportionately benefit the top 
income households) would be $1.5 trillion (including interest) over the ten-
year period following their scheduled sunsets.24 That amount is roughly 
equal to the amounts the Treasury will have borrowed from the Social 
Security funds (plus interest) over the same period.25 Similarly, if 
President George W. Bush's tax cuts benefiting the top one percent of 
households were made permanent (as the President and the Republican 
majorities in Congress intend), instead of "sunsetting" or terminating 
pursuant to their own terms, the lost revenue over the next seventy-five 
years would be roughly equal to the actuarial shortfall in Social Security 
estimates in its benefit program over the same period (exclusive of the 
amounts the Treasury owes the trust funds). 26 
Part V examines the evidence that another goal of the ideologues 
advocating tax cuts (which disproportionately benefited the rich) was to 
force the Government to shrink by reducing its revenues. 
20. See infra notes 343-67 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra notes 350-53 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra note 367. 
23. See infra note 362 and accompanying text. 
24. See infra note 354 and accompanying text. 
25. See infra note 353 and accompanying text. 
26. See infra notes 358-59 and accompanying text. 
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Part III discusses the unmasking of the real interest groups which 
proponents of capital gains rate cuts seek to benefit. Previously, 
proponents tended to emphasize the interests of small business, farmers and 
timber interests (and homeowners). 27 This time the target is more clearly 
the stock market where high income individuals (the contributing class) 
play such a large role in the individual investor category, and to a lesser 
extent middle income investor class. 28 
Part II reveals the role of the Administrations in raising and lowering 
top individual income tax rates and the circumstantial evidence suggesting 
that at least initially a powerful current was tit-for-tat antagonism between 
the major players. 
II. THE UNDOING OF THE 1986 CODE PARITY OFT AXA TION OF ORDINARY 
INCOME AND CAPITAL GAINS 
From the fresh start in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 of taxing top 
individual and capital gains and ordinary income to the same twenty-eight 
percent, Congress unfortunately did start all over, again fashioning special 
rates not available as a practical matter to all individual taxpayers.29 How 
did the Great Compromise ofthe 1986 Code come undone? 
A. BUSH I ADMINISTRATION "PUSHED, PUSHED, PUSHED, PUSHED, 
PUSHED" FOR A CAPITAL GAINS PREFERENCE WITH No INCREASE IN 
ORDINARY INCOME RATES 1988-1992 
President George H. W. Bush campaigned for a renewed capital gains 
preference without raising the ordinary rate beginning in his 1988 
presidential campaign and continuing throughout his 1992 reelection bid. 30 
27. See Lee, Critique, supra note 6, at 13, 23-34. 
28. See infra notes 294-307 and accompanying text. 
29. The Bush I 1990 thirty-one percent (exclusive of phase outs) top individual ordinary 
rate versus the twenty-eight percent top individual capital gains rate did not effect much of a 
preference (9.68%); under Clinton's OBRA 1993, a 39.6% top individual ordinary rate 
versus a twenty-eight percent top individual capital gains rate created more of a capital gains 
preference (29.29%); even more so with his OBRA 1997 (capital gains cut to twenty percent 
for most capital assets (50.50%)). The Bush II "temporary" top rate of thirty-five percent 
and top capital gains rate of fifteen percent (2001 and 2003, respectively) for most capital 
assets resulted in effect in a 57.1% capital gains preference. 
30. A Talk with Bush: "People Won't Want to Gamble," Bus. WK., Aug 22, 1988, at 30 
("The Administration has been unwilling to open up the tax code for various reasons. Fine, 
I've been a part of this Administration. We're going to change in 1989. I will open up the 
tax code."); Tim Grey, Bush,"! Will Open Up the Tax Code," 40 TAX NOTES 744 (1988) 
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Senator Bill Bradley (D-N.J.), if not the father, at least the uncle31 of the 
1986 Code (having acted as its chief congressional policy entreprene~2 
for Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy Stanley Surrey's "large idea" of 
lowering income rates through broadening the income tax base), described 
(explaining that in his 1988 Presidential Campaign George H.W. Bush called for lowering 
the maximum individual capital gains rate to fifteen percent, claiming such a cut would 
generate additional revenue- a supply side argument); 134 CONG. REc. S3959 (daily ed. 
Apr. 14, 1988) (statement of Senator Bumpers); see also Elizabeth Wehr, Bush's Capital 
Gains Plan Revives Old Debate, 47 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 369 (1989) ("A Joint Taxation 
analysis released Feb. 23 found that the plan would produce $3.3 biJJion in revenue in fiscal 
1990, but that it would result in an overall loss of $24.2 billion for fiscal 1989-94."). On 
August 18, 1988, Vice President Bush, in accepting the nomination as the Republican 
presidential candidate, took the pledge, "Read my lips-no new taxes." Paul Taylor, Bush's 
Vivid Self-Portrait, WASH. POST, Aug. 19, 1988, at A27; Tom Redburn, Bush Plans Daily 
Sessions on Deficit; Budget: He Is Eager to Strike a Deal Before Congress' August 
Vacation; Top Lawmakers Are Skeptical It Can Be Done That Quickly, L.A. TiMES, Jul. 24, 
1990, at A13 (arguing that the Bush Administration insists on a capital gains tax cut, but 
unwilling to accept Democrat demand as a quid pro quo for higher income tax rates for 
upper brackets). In the 1990 House Hearings on Fairness, populist Democrats repeatedly 
pointed out that a renewed revenue losing capital gains preference, without a rate increase, 
inherently breached the 1986 compact of low rates paid for by a broad base. House 
Hearings on Fairness, supra note 10, at 12-13, 21 (statements of Reps. Dorgan and Pease). 
The charge seldom arose, however, in either the 1989 or 1990 Floor Debates. House 
Democrats Have a Better Idea? Offer Counterproposal to Capital Gains Cut, 89 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 194-2 (1989). 
31. I owe this delightful phrase to Ed Cohen who once modestly rejoined with this quip 
when l described him as the father of the 1954 ALI-ABA proposed Subchapter C. He's 
right, he was one of four: Stanley Surrey, Alvin Warren and Tomas Tarleau. Bill Bradley 
was more the godfather of the great compromise, politically popularizing Surrey's big idea 
of lowering rates through eliminating or restricting tax preferences, e.g., lowering the 
individual top ordinary income rate and eliminating the individual capital gains preference. 
The Dean of the Senate, Senator Pat Moynihan, pointed this out in the 1993 floor debate. 
139 CONG. REc. S5985 (daily ed. May 18, 1993) (statement of Sen. Moynihan). 
32. The policy entrepreneurship model of legislation "borrows" from the "garbage can" 
model, suggesting that enactment of a Jaw requires the convergence of "streams" consisting 
of "problem recognition," "policy proposals," and "politics," together with an 
"entrepreneur" to guide the law's passage through Congress. JoHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, 
ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 88-94, 122-23 (2d ed. 1995) (defining "garbage can" 
theory, first designed to explain the "organized anarchy" of universities, as applying where 
the participants do not clearly know or define their goals and participation in decisions is 
fluid and unpredictable); John W. Lee & Eugene Seago, Policy Entrepreneurship, Public 
Choice, and Symbolic Reform Analysis of Section 198, the Brownfields Tax Incentive: 
Carrot or Stick or Just Never Mind?, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 613 (2002) 
(citing Michael Cohen et al., A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, 17 ADMIN. 
Sci. Q. 1-25 (1972)); Paul J. Culhane, NEPA 's Effect on Agency Decision Making: Article: 
NEPA 's impacts on Federal Agencies, Anticipated and Unanticipated, 20 ENVTL. L. 681, 
683 (1990). 
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on the Senate floor in 1992 the process of unraveling the great compromise 
of lowering the individual tax rates by broadening the tax base:33 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 cut rates by giving up various loopholes 
including capital gains. Half of the witnesses coming before the Finance 
Committee were willing to give up the capital gains preferences if the top 
rate were cut to about 28 percent, but the "other half of them said that 
even if you get the rate down to 12, we still want a capital gains 
differential." So the pragmatists won, the ideologues lost. ... Before the 
ink was dry, people started coming in saying, "[Twenty-eight] percent is 
not enough. We want a lower rate on capital gains." When they would 
come in, I would say to them, "Well, you know you keep going down this 
road and what is going to happen is, rates are going to go back up, rates 
are going to go back up." They kept going down this road and this 
Congress spent from 1988 to 1992 debating the question of whether we 
should have a capital gains differential or not. Instead of leaving the rates 
low and not having a differential, the people who wanted to [have a] 
special capital gains rate came in and pushed, pushed, pushed, pushed, 
pushed. And what we are seeing today is the inevitable result of that: 
Rates going up, up, up, up, up until we are almost back to the old 
system.34 
33. Senator Bill Bradley (D-N.J.) identified in the early 1980s the political problem of 
high rates and big preferences eroding the effective rate at the top. Joseph J. Minarik, How 
Tax Reform Came About, 37 TAX NOTES 1359, 1364-66 (1987). Senator Bradley's efforts 
here nicely illustrate policy entrepreneurship. Just as this theory calls for, Senator Bradley 
identified the problem, then effectively popularized politically Surrey's large tax policy idea 
of radically lowering federal income tax rates and paying for (offsetting) the otherwise 
revenue loss by base broadening (through eliminating or at least curbing preferences--such 
as identified by Stanley Surrey). Also consistent with policy entrepreneurship scholarship, 
Senator Bradley's popularizing of rate lowering through base broadening was so successful 
that it became identified at least politically as his tax policy issue, having substantial impact 
on the Tax Reform Act of 1986. See e.g., 132 CONG. REc. SI3782 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1986) 
(statement of Chair Packwood). A Boolean search of"Bradley w/25 reform" for September 
1986 in the Congressional Record brings up references to him as an "early leader" in tax 
reform, advocating tax reform for four to five years, and a moving force of tax reform. See 
generally BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 4, at 165-66, 1370; THOMAS J. CONLAND ET 
AL., TAXING CHOICES 37-38, 143-46, 164 (1990). 
34. 139 CONG. REc. S76992-3 (daily ed. Jun. 23, 1993) (statement of Sen. Bradley) 
(emphasis supplied) (arguing against a Democratic-proposed small business corporation 
capital gains preference). Surely this was an oblique reference, as the Senate rules require, 
to President George H.W. Bush's obsessive push for a capital gains preference. See Ronald 
D. Elving, Spotlight Turns to the Senate for Action on Capital Gains, 47 CONG. Q. WKLY. 
REP. 2533 (1989) 
(Gephardt also invoked the spirit of the 1986 tax bill, saying it achieved a 50-year 
goal of tax reformers to tax capital gains as ordinary income in exchange for lower 
rates. 'Now before the ink is fairly dry, the president comes back and says, 'Let's 
break the deal," to quote Gephardt. That may have been the line that prompted 
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Just as Senator Bradley warned, ordinary rates went back up in 
President Bill Clinton's first tax act, OBRA 1993.35 This Act passed each 
Chamber of Congress with a paper-thin Democratic majority, raising36 
ordinary rates at the top only,37 e.g., the Millionaire's Surtax (39.6 percent 
Bush, in a post-vote phone call to Archer, to single out Gephardt for criticism: 'I 
tell you, I'm displeased with Gephardt, the way he made it so really kind of 
personal. ... '). 
I guess that truth hurts. The threat of President George H.W. Bush's capital gains proposal 
to the Tax Reform Act of 1986's "level playing field" was perceived from the beginning. 
Lawrence Haas, Slippery Slope, 21 NAT'L J. 583 (Mar. II, 1989); Ronald D. Elving, Capital 
Gains Cut May Trigger Dismantling of 1986 Bill, 47 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2246 (1989). 
35. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 
(1993). Budget Reconciliation Acts obviate Senate supermajority rules for tax increasing 
acts. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No. RL33030, THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION PROCESS: 
HOUSE AND SENATE PROCEDURES (2005); Elizabeth Garrett, Federalism in the 21st Century: 
States in a Federal System: Enhancing the Political Safeguards of Federalism? The 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 KAN. L. REv. 1113, 1166 n.232 (1997); 
Andrew Taylor, When It Comes to Budget Rules, Congress Can Just Waive Goodbye, 62 
CONG. Q. WKLY. 692 (2004). Clinton's tax act was derived from the 1992 "footnote" tax 
bills passed by Congress, which had provided some capital gains preferences (targeted away 
from high income individuals), but they were vetoed by President George H.W. Bush 
because they raised individual rates at the top. Cf. Adam Clymer, Senate's Tax Bill Wraps 
Up a Bouquet of Trial Balloons, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1992, at A30. ("The reason for these 
seemingly fruitless efforts is to pave the way for future action. Mr. Moynihan calls the 
practice a 'footnote.' If a provision has been passed once, even if fails to be enacted, it 
seems less controversial the next time around."). 
36. Clinton's Democratic support was hard-won and rarely certain. George Hager & 
David S. Cloud, Democrats Tie Their Fate to Clinton's Budget Bill, 51 CONG. Q. WKLY. 
REP. 2122 (1993) 
(Plainly worried and reluctant to take the leap, the House voted 218-216 on Aug. 5 
to pass the $496 billion, five-year deficit-reduction package, as close as the vote 
could get without going the other way. Fully 41 Democrats voted no; one more 
would have killed the plan. (Vote 406, p. 2200). Twenty-four hours later in the 
Senate, it took Vice President AI Gore to break a tie and make the final tally 51-
50.); 
1993 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 36-C. 
37. E.g., 139 CONG. REc. H2988 (daily ed. May 27, 1993) (statement of House Ways & 
Means Committee Chair Rostenkowski) (bill focused on upper-income taxpayers); !d. at 
H2953 (daily ed. May 27, 1993) (statement of Rep. Derrick) (seventy-five percent of taxes 
in the bill fall on households with incomes over $1 00,000-top six percent ($131 ,000 in 2004 
dollars); sixty-three percent on households with over $200,000 in income); !d. at H3003 
(daily ed. May 27, 1993) (statement of Rep. Rangel) (class warfare rhetoric translates as 
"they can not tax the rich"); 139 CONG. REc. S7674 (daily ed. June 23, 1993) (statement of 
Sen. Pryor) (78% paid with incomes over $200,000.). 
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bracket) touched the top one percent only;38 and making no change in the 
twenty-eight percent ceiling on capital gains. Incidentally, "Clinton started 
out with a program of economic stimulus, social investment, job creation, 
universal health insurance and tax and campaign-finance reforms aimed at 
putting big money interest in its place. But after a few bruising defeats, 
Clinton backed off."39 Consequently, the increased revenue from the rate 
hikes at the top was used for deficit reduction which resulted in the Federal 
Reserve lowering interest rates, 40 which had a far greater effect on the 
economy than any presidential initiative would have had.41 
B. PUSH AND SHOVE BACK 
On another level, President Bill Clinton's 1993 raising ofthe individual 
ordinary income rates can be traced back to a personal conflict starting in 
38. 139 CoNG. REc. S7685 (daily ed. June 23, 1993) (colloquy between Sen. Kent 
Conrad, (D-N.D.), and Sen. Jim Sasser, (D-Tenn.), regarding the tax breakdown by income 
class). 
39. Robert Kuttner, Divided, We Stand a Chance, WASH. POST, Jul. 23, 1995, at C9; 
Marshall Ingwerson, A Tale of Chaos Shadows Clinton, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Jun. 30, 
1994, at 14. In the case of the budget bill, "Blue Dogs" [conservative Southern Democrats 
in the House] forced more spending cuts in 1993 than Clinton had proposed. Eric Pianin & 
Ruth Marcus, Clinton Grasps for Votes in Budget Showdown; Conservative House 
Democrats Win Pact to Curb Entitlements, WASH. POST, May 27, 1993, at AI; DavidS. 
Broder, Blue Dogs to the Rescue, WASH. POST, March 5, 1993, at A21; Dan Carey, As 
Hostilities Rage on the Hill, Partisan-Vote Rate Soars, 54 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 199, 201 
(1996). The Senate filibustered the economic stimulus part of the Administration's package. 
103 CONG. REc. Sl1609 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1993) (statement of Sen. Byrd); Adam Clymer, 
The House Hands a Budget to an Ungrateful Senate, N.Y. TiMES, May 30, 1993, at A4; 
Steve Mufson, Clinton Willingness to Cut "Stimulus" Plan Casts Doubt on Its Value, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 1993, at Fl. Clinton always was lucky. Richard Gwyn, Lucky 
Clinton May Ride Wave of Recovery, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 15, 1992, at B3. 
40. Ingwerson, supra note 39 
(After the election, it became increasingly clear that the deficit was bigger than 
previously believed and that the strongest impact Clinton's first budget would 
make on the economy was the direction it pushed long-term interest rates. To spur 
business expansion, home buying, and car sales, Clinton needed to show the 
Federal Reserve chairman and the bond market that he would seriously reduce the 
deficit. Then interest rates would drop.). 
Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan lowered interest rates to banks to historic lows not 
seen in decades contributing to consumer confidence which helped continue the recovery. 
More importantly, Greenspan kept the interest rates low when neither inflation nor wages 
rose by the fifth and sixth years of the recovery as they traditionally did by that age of a 
recovery. Louis Uchitelle, Outlook '97: Economy & Industry; The Link Grows Cloudy 
Between Jobs and Prices, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1997, at C7. 
41. Clay Chandler, Control Freaks; Despite All Their Boasting, Politicians Don't Much 
Affect the Economy, WASH. POST, May 5, 1996, at C2. 
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1989 between President George H.W. Bush and House Ways & Means 
Chair Dan Rostenkowski (D-Ill.) over the ordinary income-capital gains 
parity. Chair Rostenkowski had made his reputation by passing, in 
partnership with Republican President Ronald Regan, the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986, a key feature of which taxed high income individual capital gains 
at the same maximum twenty-eight percent rate as ordinary income.42 As 
Vice President, George H.W. Bush had rarely been involved in the tax 
reform debate which resulted in the 1986 Code.43 
1. Rostenkowski' s Misstep 
In 1989, Rostenkowski began negotiatiOns with the First Bush 
Administration over a compromise for indexing the cost basis of selected 
individually held capital assets (designed to please both Democrats and 
Republicans but in fact displeasing both).44 Probably not coincidental to 
Rostenkowski's proffer, Bush (known for annually posting tens of 
thousands of handwritten "stroke notes',45) and Rostenkowski ("well-
known for his long memory and eagerness to wreak revenge"46) had served 
together on the House Ways and Means Committee at the time of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969.47 
42. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 4, at 103,223, 227, 276. 
43. /d. at 94 ("[In] one of his rare involvements in the tax-reform debate ... [Bush] 
argued that the oil and gas industry was essential to the nation's security."). 
44. Pat Jones, Stuck on Capital Gains, Ways and Means Action Slows to a Crawl, 44 TAX 
NOTES 479 (1989) (arguing that the original Rostenkowski proposal would have provided 
indexing only for future purchases of capital assets, thus encouraging sales of existing 
investments; the compromise would allow Democrats to claim no rate reductions and 
Republicans to claim practical effect of rate reductions). Democrats opposed it because it 
was the functional equivalent of a capital gains deduction and reduced revenues. See STAFF 
OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, NO. JCX-43-89, DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECT OF CHAIRMAN 
ROSTENKOWSKI'S CAPITAL GAINS PROPOSAL (1989) (demonstrating that 75% of benefit went 
to taxpayers making more than $100,000 ($152,000 in 2004 dollars)). Republicans may 
have opposed it because their capital gains constituencies (timber, livestock and private 
firms) had scant or no basis to adjust or did not hold the assets (public stock) long enough 
for inflation to have a significant effect. Lee, Critique, supra note 6, at 33. 
45. George F. Will, The Pastel President, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 24, 1989, at 86 ("[The] Bush 
presidency rests on 60,000 thank-you notes, aptly called 'stroke notes.' It is politeness in 
lieu ofpolitical purpose."); Richard Cohen, Breeding Will Tell, WASH. POST, Oct. 17. 1992, 
at A23. ("George Bush ... writes endless thank-you notes and ... amassed a Christmas 
card list that, in 1986, contained a mere 30,000 names."). 
46. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 4, at 105 (Trent Lott, then a House leader, told a 
colleague, "If you cross Rostenkowski, he'll get your ass."). 
47. Ronald D. Elving, Democrats Pursue Consensus on Capital Gains Cut, 47 CONG. Q. 
WKLY. REP. 2299 (1989) 
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Once Rostenkowski had breached the dyke of the unified House 
Democratic leadership opposition to any renewed capital gains preference 
(at least if ordinary income rates were not increased),48 a coalition of House 
conservatives (mostly Republicans and conservative, largely southern or 
border-state Democrats49) proposed a generic capital gains cut including 
timber and real estate with no ordinary income rate increase.50 President 
George H.W. Bush quickly switched vehicles and jumped aboard the 
conservative coalition's proposaV' thereby infuriating Rostenkowski.52 
The conservative coalition's capital gains tax cut proposal passed both the 
House Ways & Means Committee and then the entire House53 over the 
(Rostenkowski and Bush have been friends since they served together on Ways 
and Means more than 20 years ago. Bush has made a cut in capital gains taxes his 
top priority in tax policy. And despite his longstanding opposition to lower taxes 
for capital gains, Rostenkowski had seemed at least marginally more amenable to 
the idea as late as midsummer.); 
Pat Jones, Taxwriters Moving Slowly but Surely on Capital Gains, 44 TAX NOTES 623 
(1989); Lee, The Capital Gains "Sieve," supra note 10, at 43. Accordingly, I surmise that 
Rostenkowski felt betrayed by an old friend. 
48. Rob Bennett, The Mapo Kid and the Reverse Toaster Theory, 45 TAX NOTES 1625, 
1626 (1989); 45 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 114 (1989). 
49. See Lee, The Capital Gains "Sieve", supra note 10, at 16 n.75 (indicating that the 
block has now disappeared with the Southern Succession of Democrats by Republicans). 
50. 45 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 114 (1989). Conservative Coalition on the Ways & Means 
Committee consisted of all Republican Members and Reps. Ed Jenkins. (D-Ga.), Andy 
Jacobs, Jr. (D-Ind.), Ronnie Flippo (D-Ala.), and J.J. Pickle (D-Tex.). 
51. Elving, supra note 34 ("House Republicans, bolstered by Southern and timber-district 
Democrats, trounced the Democratic leadership September 28 with a nearly fifty-vote 
margin in favor of cutting the tax on capital gains. The 190-239 vote against the 
leadership's alternative plan moved the capital gains battle to the Senate .... "); Tom 
Red bum, News Analysis; Not Always Easy to Get a Bill out of the Woods; In a Typical 
Case, Capital Gains Measure Had to Be Steered Though Forest of Timber Interests, L.A. 
TiMES, Oct. 6, 1989, at 22; Dale Russakoff, They're All Tree-Huggers Now, WASH. PosT, 
Oct. 5, 1989, at A29. 
52. Pat Jones, Ways and Means on Capital Gains: Through the Looking Glass, 45 TAX 
NOTES 1303-04 (1989). 
53. The July 1989 Rostenkowski approach contained an elective two-step "exclusion" 
alternative to indexing reminiscent of earlier House Ways and Means predilections for 
complex capital gains provisions for assets held five to ten years: additional basis equal to 
twenty-five percent of the sales price, after ten years additional basis equal to fifty percent 
of sales price. Pat Jones, Taxwriters Moving Slowly but Surely on Capital Gains, 44 TAX 
NOTES 623-25 (1989); see Lee, The Capital Gains "Sieve", supra note I 0, at 29 (1963), 56 
(1978). Rollcall vote No. 253, defeated Chair Rostenkowski's IRA plus rate increase to 
thirty-three percent above the "bubble" substitute for the JAF capital gains package 239 to 
190, 3 not voting. 135 CONG. REc. H6313-14 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1989). Fifty-three out of 
the sixty-seven Democrats voting nay to the Rostenkowski amendment were Southern; all 
House Republicans voting (172) voted nay. Thus, the Conservative Coalition was 172 
Republicans and 67 Democrats. A no vote was the rough functional equivalent of a yes vote 
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scathing objections of Chair Rostenkowski.54 Senate Majority Leader 
George Mitchell was able to keep capital gains out of the Senate bill only 
through parliamentary leger-de-main. 55 The House capital gains cut died in 
Conference. 56 
The 1989 House floor debate in effect distilled, sometimes down to 
trace quantities, the themes and rhetoric of 1960s and 1970s capital gains 
debate (again calling up JFK' s 1963 capital gains proposals57). 58 Capital 
for the capital gains provision but also yes for a rate increase at the top. The final House 
vote on the 1989 Omnibus Reconciliation Act was 333 yeas to 91 nays. Id. at H6727 (daily 
ed. Oct. 5, 1989) (Rollcall vote No. 274). 
54. See Jones, supra note 52. 
55. Ronald D. Elving, What's in a Rule?, 47 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2616 (1989) 
(Proponents of using the Byrd rule noted that the capital gains tax cut that received 
10 votes in the Senate Finance Committee was estimated to gain revenue in its 
first two years but lose revenue thereafter. Thus, in their view, a point of order 
based on the Byrd rule, if upheld by the chair (the senator presiding, who rules on 
the advice of the Senate parliamentarian), would require 60 votes to waive.); 
Mitchell Rips GOP Tax Tactic, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 27, 1989, at Al9 (stating 
that they did not have sixty votes needed to cut off debate); see generally CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., No. RL30458, THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION PROCESS: THE SENATE'S BYRD RULE 
(2004), available at http://www.house.gov/rules!RL30862.pdf; CONG. RESEARCH SERV., No. 
RL33030, THE BUDGET RECONCILIATION PROCESS: HOUSE AND SENATE PROCEDURES, 
(2005). 
56. 45 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 109 (1989). History repeats itself. In 1963-1964, the House 
passed JFK's capital gains quid of an additional capital gains preference but not his quo of 
taxation of unrealized capital appreciation at death, and the Senate and Conference rejected 
the House provision. See Lee, The Capital Gains "Sieve," supra note 10, at 35-36. 
57. 135 CONG. REc. H6276 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1989) (statement of Rep. Archer). 
Representative Tom Downey (D-N.Y.), an opponent of the Committee's capital gains 
provision, responded that "one of the first political axioms must be that when conservative 
Republicans invoke President Kennedy's name that we had all better beware." Id. at H6278. 
For JFK's 1963 proposal, see Lee, The Capital Gains "Sieve," supra note 10, at 27-30 
(arguing that capital gains rate cut more than paid for by taxation of unrealized capital 
appreciation at death (spurring earlier realizations) and paring away 1940s and 1950s special 
interest add-ons). 
58. See Lee, The Capital Gains "Sieve", supra note 10, at 45, 47, 52-53, 59-63; Lee, 
Critique, supra note 6, at 10-83; Elving, supra note 34 
(Beyond the timberline lay yet another field of votes for Jenkins-Archer: members 
interested in encouraging growth investment, in general, and high-tech 
entrepreneurs in particular. Such concerns appeared to cost the leadership half the 
Democratic votes from Maryland, several in California (including Rep. Norman 
Y. Mineta, whose district includes part of the high- tech Silicon Valley) and a 
smattering from the Northeast as well. Finally, the pro-cut coalition included 
Democrats who had seen small investors lose to taxes much of the reward from a 
lifetime investment. ... [T]he main line of attack was that the cut would be overly 
generous to the rich .... The Joint Committee on Taxation has said 60 percent of 
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gains royalties from timber played the preeminent role,59 probably because 
President George H.W. Bush's original proposal included neither such 
statutory capital assets nor depreciable real estate.6° Clearly, George H.W. 
Bush's real target for capital gains relief was corporate stock. 
2. Rostenkowski's Response to Bush I 
The next step in this apparent tit-for-tat approach to tax legislation was 
Rostenkowski' s 1990 direction to the Ways & Means committee staff to do 
the spadework on the failure of trickle down economics.61 Their studies 
the dollar benefits of the Jenkins-Archer plan would go to those families with 
more than $200,000 in annual income. But Republicans counterattacked by saying 
70 percent of those receiving at least some benefit from the cut were families with 
earned income of $50,000 or less.). 
59. 45 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 115 (1989). See 135 CONG. REc. H6290 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 
1989) (statement of Rep. Wolpe) (discussing the "extraordinary influence of some 
individual contributors and some special interests, nothing more and nothing less."); Id. at 
H6277 (statement of Rep. Rangel) ("[T]imber becomes the issue rather than the social needs 
of our country."); see also Michael Kinsley, Fat Cats with Claws Out, LONDON TiMES, Oct 
7, 1989 
(Capital gains is a classic special-interest lobbying issue, in which the 
beneficiaries are few, but well organized, while the losers are many but diffuse 
and largely ignorant." People contacting congressmen may mistakenly see a 
capital gains tax cut as a recipe for economic growth or are not a cross-section of 
America. Rep. Ben Jones (D-Ga.) said that people he had been hearing from were 
"small farmers, timber interests and people with a little bit of real estate."); 
Charles Krauthammer, Stealing from the Future, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1989, at 
A31 (timber sales preferentially treated "[b]ecause the key congressmen needed to 
get the capital gains cut passed are timber-state Democrats (mostly from the 
South.)). 
60. Pat Jones, Depreciable Asset Exclusion Complicates Debate on Bush Capital Gains 
Plan, 42 TAX NOTES 1288 (1989) (describing that cut would apply to the sale of stock and 
nondepreciable assets). 
61. This data had not been developed in the 1988 Presidential Campaign. KEVIN P. 
PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR 9-14, 46-47 (Random House 1990) (arguing the 
data was not yet fully developed and "Democrats laid little groundwork for any serious 
critique in 1988"); Id. at 5, 30 (indicating that Dukakis was uncomfortable with populism 
due to upper-middle-class "civic religion"), 42, 50-51 (showing that Dukakis out drew other 
Democratic candidates in contributions from business people, lawyers and financiers and 
relied on competence not ideology), and 84 (demonstrating that tax issues were ignored in 
1988 as in 1928). Lee Attwood, a key Republican strategist, stated that the way to win a 
presidential race against the Republicans was to stir up "class warfare." Id. at 30-31; 
accord, WILLIAM GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL THE PEOPLE 274 (Simon & Schuster 1992). 
Gov. Bill Clinton did just this in his 1992 Presidential Campaign. John Lee, "Death and 
Taxes" and Hypocrisy, 60 TAX NOTES 1393, 1397 (1993) ("The voters most strongly 
supporting Clinton were those who both were concerned about the future economy and that 
that their standard ofliving was slipping."). 
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showed the 1980s had been a decade of at best pre-tax income stagnation 
for all but the high income taxpayers (whose income doubled at the top one 
percent level).62 This economic pattern was doubly exacerbated by (1) a 
nearly twenty-five percent drop from 1977 to 1990 in the effective Federal 
rate of taxation for the top one percent (from thirty-five percent to twenty-
seven percent) due to ordinary income and capital gains rate cuts; and (b) a 
2.6 percent and 6.6 percent increase in the effective tax rates of the lowest 
and next lowest quintile taxpayer, respectively (bottom forty percent of 
households by income), due to wage tax increases, whose pre-tax income 
adjusted for inflation in turn had fallen 11.8 percent and 2. 7 percent, 
respectively.63 
The decrease in effective rates at the top reflected the combination of 
cuts in tax rates at the top in 1978 and 1981 (and frozen in place by the 
1986 Code) and growth in capital gains and executive compensation.64 The 
inequitable increase in effective Federal tax rates at the bottom forty 
percent was due primarily to increases in the early 1980s in the regressive 
wage tax rate and an increase in the dollar amount of the wage base ceiling 
for computing wage taxes.65 
62. See McMahon, supra note 7. 
63. STAFF OF HOUSE WAYS & MEANS COMM., TAX PROGRESSMTY AND INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION, lOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (Comm. Print 1991); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, TAX POLICY AND THE MACROECONOMY: STABILIZATION, GROWTH AND 
DISTRIBUTION, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (Comm. Print 1991). Additionally, the 
Republican Administrations decreased the level of transfer payments to lower income 
individuals over this period. KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR 86-89, 
204-05 (Random House 1990). Furthermore, "[ o ]ver the 1980's, [middle class] families on 
the surface appeared to be keeping up, but only because more and more women went into 
the work force producing second earners for many American families." 136 CONG. REC. 
H8699-700 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Obey); see DavidS. Cloud, The Cry 
for Middle-Class Cuts: Looking Behind the Rhetoric, 50 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 105, 108 
(1992). 
64. Lee, The Capital Gains "Sieve", supra note 10, at 79. 
65. See supra note 64. The Congressional Budget Office reports that bottom twenty 
percent, next twenty percent, and top one percent, respectively had the following effective 
t fi F d I . 1980 d 1985 . I ra es or e era taxes m an , respective•' : 
All Individual Wage All Individual Wage 
federal income taxes federal income taxes 
taxes taxes taxes taxes 
Lowest 8.0 0.2 5.3 9.8 0.5 6.6 
20% 
Next20% 14.1 4.5 7.6 14.8 4.0 8.8 
Top 1% 34.6 22.3 1.0 27.0 18.9 1.3 
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Chair Rostenkowski, armed with these statistics on ( 1) the failure of 
trickle down, as evidenced by the rich getting richer and paying a lower 
effective tax rate and the poor getting poorer (adjusted for inflation) and 
paying a higher effective tax rate (due to wage tax increases); and (2) 
regressivity of excise taxes in his pocket, 66 challenged President Geroge 
H.W. Bush in 1990 to reduce an otherwise increase in the National Deficit 
by $511 billion over a five-year budget window, 1990-95.67 President 
George H.W. Bush took up the challenge, perhaps a politically ill-advised 
move. 
3. Bush I' s Misstep 
In 1990, President George H.W. Bush initially seemed to waiver on 
exchanging a rate increase on upper income individuals for a renewed 
capital gains preference,68 but then strengthened his opponents' case69 by 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTIVE FEDERAL INCOME TAX RATES 1979-2001 (2004), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=5324&sequence=O. 
66. Taxes on cigarettes and alcohol are regressive with the former being more regressive. 
CBO Releases List of Deficit Reduction Options, 90 TAX NOTES TODAY 37-3 (1990) (citing 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF AN INCREASE IN SELECTED 
FEDERAL EXCISE TAXES (1987)). Senator George Mitchell (D-Me.), relying on this study, 
pointed out that every $1 billion increase in excise taxes would offset from nine to thirteen 
percent of the average tax relief provided by the 1986 Act to families with less than $10,000 
in income. In contrast, he pointed out, the same excise tax increase would offset from 0.5 to 
two percent of the average tax relief provided to families in the above $100,000 income 
groups. 133 CONG. REc. Sl1782-83 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987). The Congressional Budget 
Office, supra note 66, reports that the bottom twenty percent, the next twenty percent, and 
the top one percent, respectively, had the following effective rates for excise taxes in 1980 
an d 1985 . I , respectively: 
Excise taxes 1980 Excise taxes 1985 
Lowest20% 1.4 2.2 
Next20% 1.1 1.4 
Top 1% 0.6 0.7 
67. Rotenkowski Outlines Deficit Reduction Plan, 90 TAX NOTES TODAY 55-5 (1990); Pat 
Jones, Spotlight on the Rosty Challenge: Deficit Plan Takes the Hill by Storm, 46 TAX 
NOTES 1351, 1352 (1990). 
68. George Hager, Recapping the Budget Struggle, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3478 (1990) 
(On October 9, President George H.W. Bush said he would accept a boost in top ordinary 
rate in exchange for a capital gains cut; Aides to the Senate Finance Committee revealed 
that afternoon that the Committee was considering raising the top ordinary rate to thirty-
three percent and cutting capital gains rate to twenty-three percent; On October 11, Rep. Bill 
Archer (R-Tex) said Bush would accept a top rate of thirty-one percent in exchange for 
cutting the capital gains rate to fifteen percent, but later Bush said Democrats would not 
accept a fifteen percent capital gains rate so do not even offer.); see also George Hager, 
Parties Angle for Advantage as White House Falters, 28 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3391 (1990) 
Winter 2006] CLASS WARFARE 65 
pushing "obsessively"70 for inclusion of a capital gains cut (or its rough 
distributional equivalent)71 without an ordinary income rate increase in the 
closed door negotiations between members of his Administration and 
selected leaders of the Congress (deliberately excluding Chair 
Rostenkowski), producing the ill-fated "parliamentary"-like72 Budget 
(arguing that back-to-back flip-flops on ordinary rate increase in exchange for capital gains 
cuts delighted Democrats and embarrassed GOP); 136 CONG. REc. Sl5860 (daily ed. Oct 
18, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kohl); I d. at H8923 (daily ed. Oct 4, 1990) (statement of Rep. 
Moody); Tim Gray, Ways and Means Democrats Forge Tax Package: Stage Set for Battle 
over Tax Rate Increases, 49 TAX NOTES 255, 257 (1990). President George H.W. Bush's 
wavering on rate increases as the quid pro quo for a capital gains tax cut had actually begun 
back in late June 1990, as evidenced by his written announcement. 46 CoNG. Q. ALMANAC 
131 (1990). The Bush I Administration subsequently attempted to rewrite this history. Dan 
Balz, "No New Taxes" Revisited; Quayle Latest to Try to Explain Away Pledge, WASH. 
POST, July 24, 1992, at A16. 
69. 136 CONG. REc. Hl0285 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1990) (statement of Rep. Downey) ("For 
10 years we have attempted to get the public's attention about the basic unfairness of the 
Republican package, and George Bush has finally handed it to us. He has decided that he 
would rather shut down the Government of the United States than to tax the wealthy."); 
accord Thomas B. Edsall & E.J. Dionne Jr., Democracy at Work: The Tax Revolt Of the 
Masses, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1990, at Cl. See generally E.J. DIONNE, WHY AMERICANS 
HATE POLITICS 320 (Simon & Schuster 1991) ("Simultaneously, George Bush threw away 
the Republicans' advantage on the tax issue and painted his party as the friend of the rich."). 
In the 1990 House Hearings on Fairness, Populist Democrats repeatedly pointed out that a 
renewed, revenue losing capital gains preference without a rate increase inherently breached 
the 1986 compact oflow rates paid for by a broad base. House Hearings on Fairness, supra 
note 10, at 12-13, 21 (statements of Reps. Dorgan and Pease). 
70. E.g., 136 CONG. R.Ec. H8052 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep. Hertel); Id. 
(daily ed. Sept. 25, 1990) (statement of Rep. Pease) (threatening "Armageddon" because of 
the President's "pigheaded" insistence on a capital gains cut, which would reduce the 
effective rate at the top by 4 percentage points). See generally Robert J. Samuelson, 
Opinion, The Capital Gains Obsession, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1990 at A25; George F. Will, 
Opinion, It's Not Modesty, It's Arrogance, WASH. PosT, Oct. 12, 1990, at A21 (indicating 
that Bush I's capital-gains obsession dissipating Reagan's "appeal to those blue-collar 
Democrats who for a while stopped seeing Republicans as 'the rich."'). 
71. The last minute substitution by President George H.W. Bush of "Growth Incentives" 
for small business, including a targeted capital gains preference plus an upfront deduction 
for such investments (at a revenue cost of $11.5 billion, deliberately equal to his proposed 
capital gains preference), presented an even broader target for class warfare rhetoric. David 
Wessel & Jeffery H. Birnbaum, Consolation Prize: Tax Shelters for Rich Could Return in 
Plan to Aid Small Business, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 1990, at A6; Andrew Hoerner, Small 
Business Incentives: An Eight-Fold Path to Who Knows Where?, 49 TAX NOTES 133 (1990); 
Budget Summit Agreement 17, 21-4 (Sept. 30, 1990), reprinted by Prentice Hall 
Information Services. 
72. 136 CONG. REc. H8921 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1990) (statement of Rep. Boxer); accord, id. 
at H9959 (Oct. 16, 1990) (statement of Chair Rostenkowski) (who had not been invited.); 
Robert W. Merry, CQ Roundtable: The Budget Summit's Assault on Congress, 48 CoN G. Q. 
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Accord of 1990 attempt to meet Rosty's challenge of reducing projected 
growth in the Deficit by $511 billion over five years. It relied heavily on 
regressive excise taxes (e.g., gasoline, alcohol, and cigarettes)73 and user 
fees (e.g., Medicare premiums). The Budget Accord's increases fell much 
heavier on lower income taxpayers, especially as to sin (cigarettes and 
alcohol) and gasoline tax increases-"Jill and Joe Six-pack."74 
Adding insult to injury, Members of Congress in the Budget Summit at 
Andrews Air Force base, just outside of the Beltway, drew out plums 75 
from the tax expenditure pie so their own constituencies could avoid some 
of the pain of increasing revenues. 76 This posture provided an ideal 
WKLY. REP. 3266 (1990) (discussing an assault on committee system and coalition 
building); David E. Rosenbaum, The Budget Agreement: Selling the Deal; White House and 
Top Democrats Take Budget Accord to Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1990, at A23 (noting 
that Chair Rostenkowski could not take on House Leadership, but "he gave his followers a 
free hand."). 
73. 136 CONG. REc. H8818 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1990) (statement of Rep. Dellums) (stating 
that consumption tax increases are harder on the poor since they spend a larger portion of 
income on goods affected); Robert D. Hershey Jr., The Budget Agreement: Who Will Pay; 
Tax Burden Expected to Fall On People of Moderate Means, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1990, at 
A24 
([T]axpayers in the income ranges of $30,000 to $40,000 and $40,000 to $50,000 
would be hit hardest, paying an average 3.3 percent more under the plan. Those in 
the range of $20,000 to $30,000 would pay three percent more while those in the 
ranges of $50,000 to $75,000 and $75,000 to $100,000 would see their total tax 
bills rise two percent. ... Taxpayers with incomes of $100,000 to $200,000 are to 
pay 1.5 percent more and those with $200,000 and more are expected to pay an 
extra three-tenths of 1 percent .... ); 
see supra note 67. 
74. Thomas B. Edsall & E.J. Dionne Jr., Democracy at Work: The Tax Revolt Of the 
Masses, WASH. PosT, Oct. 14, 1990, at C1 (demonstrating that the accord called for the 
greatest sacrifice from "Jill and Joe Six-pack," who had not shared in the prosperity of the 
prior decade but had been key to national election outcomes for the previous 20 years and 
critical to GOP success in five out of the last six presidential elections.). 
75. Little "Jack" Horner's plum was a deed to church property in a pie which Horner, as 
chief steward to the last Abbot of Glastonbury, delivered to Henry VIII in an unsuccessful 
ploy to avoid dissolution of the Abbot's monasteries. J Power, All About Henry VIII, Jack 
Horner and Plum Pudding, COURIER-MAIL (Dec. 11, 1985). See generally Jennifer Howard, 
The Realities Behind the Rhymes; History According to Mother Goose, WASH. POST, June 
11, 1997, at H 1. Thomas Horner acquired Mells the year of the deliveries to the King and 
was on the jury that condemned the last Abbot to death. 
76. 136 CONG. REc. S15450, 15468 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1990)(statement of Sen. Hollings) 
(They have been out there at Andrews eating so much ice cream that they all 
gained weight; they got fat out there .... They took good care of pleasure boats 
[Sen. George Mitchell (D-Me.)], ... of the private airplanes [Senator Bob Dole 
(R-Kan.)]. They got all the little loopholes for oil exploration, and they fed the 
Japanese lobbyists by exempting electronics. And then they had the gall to come 
on the floor and cry: Pain; hard, tough choices; tough choices.). 
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opening for populist opponents of a capital gains preference, now armed 
with failure of trickle down data, to successfully hone class 
warfare/fairness rhetoric. As one legislator put it, "Now what we are 
saying is that we have our 28 percent [paid for in part by repeal of the 
capital gains preference77] but we want more .... Where does the greed 
end?"78 
Similarly, supporters of the subsequent House Democratic alternative 
of piercing79 the "bubble," i.e., continuing the 33 percent rate after about 
$185,000 (2004's $268,250) in taxable joint return income, declaimed that 
they were making the rich pay for the party of the 1980s.80 They crowed 
77. Lee, The Capital Gains "Sieve", supra note 10, at 78-79. 
78. See House Hearings on Fairness, supra note 10, at 341 (statement of Rep. Russo). 
79. This is tax jargon for continuing the thirty-three percent "rate," then applicable to 
joint return taxable income (family of four) from $78,401 to $185,730 in joint taxable 
income, above such cap instead of dropping back to twenty-eight percent, the same rate that 
applied just below the $78,400 joint taxable income level (the taxable income brackets at 
which the rates began were indexed and the stated figures are the 1990 income level 
amounts). Because the twenty-eight percent rate applied below and above the higher thirty-
three percent rate, the income subject to the higher range was called the "bubble," which 
was enacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 as still another trade off for lowering the top 
rate to twenty-eight percent. See Kies, supra note 4. Because the practical effect of 
piercing the bubble was to continue the same top marginal rate for the rich as applied to the 
near rich, this proposal enjoyed considerable political appeal, even in 1986. See 132 CoNG. 
REc. S 13898 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1986) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller); House Hearings on 
Fairness, supra note 10, at 78 (statement of Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy Gideon) 
("[B]ubble bursting proposals ... are nothing more than simply increasing the tax on these 
folks from 28 to 33 percent."); id. at 19, 260, 266 (statements of Sen. Bradley and Chair 
Rostenkowski) (demonstrating that Senate Finance Chair Bob Packwood insisted on the 
"bubble" in order to keep two "permanent" rates and raise revenues in order to provide more 
relief for middle-income individuals). Ways and Means Chair Rostenkowski pointed out 
that the House bill in 1985 had retained a capital gains preference, but it also had a top 
individual rate of thirty-eight percent-a not so veiled hint that a revived capital gains 
preference would require a higher rate. /d. at 12-13; accord id. at 274 (statement of Rep. 
Pease); id. at 341 (statement of Rep. Russo). Robert Mcintyre, a public interest lobbyist 
opposing any capital gains preference, asserted that under revenue neutrality the 
Administration's 1990 capital gains proposal (or indexing) would require a top rate in the 
1940s. /d. at 163. 
80. 136 CONG. REC. H10117 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1990) (statement ofRep. Lehman); id. at 
Sl5753-54 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin) ("We are asking those who 
can least afford it to pay for the mess left by the rich who had the party [of excesses] in the 
1980's. I say let us make the rich pay for their own party they had during the last decade."); 
id. at H8829 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1990) (statement of Rep. Owens); id. at H3599 (daily ed. June 
14, 1990) (statement of Rep. Kennedy) (S&L crisis source of party metaphor). 
Interestingly, essentially the same rhetoric was used by Democrat critics of Secretary of the 
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that Reagan's 1981 "Riverboat Gamble"81 of reducing taxes at the top to a 
maximum of fifty percent, resulting as well in a cut in the maximum 
individual capital gains rate to twenty percent due to retention of the sixty 
percent deduction of individual long term capital gains (while increasing 
defense spending), had tripled the deficit rather than reaching a balanced 
budget as promised, benefiting only the top high income individuals.82 
Their opponents cried class warfare. 83 These populist fairness arguments 
not only helped defeat the 1990 Budget Accord in the House,84 but also 
Treasury Mellon's tax cut plan in 1924. 65 CoNG. REc. (Part 4) 3332-33 (daily ed. Feb. 29, 
1924) (statement of Rep. Crosser). 
81. 136 CoNG. REc. H9115 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1990) (statement of Rep. Obey). Then 
Senate Republican Floor Leader Howard Baker, R-Tenn, called President Reagan's 1981 
tax a ''riverboat gamble," which Obey had not taken. See 139 CONG. REc. S4182 (daily ed. 
Apr. I, 1993) (statement of Sen. Sasser) (stating that the riverboat gamble of 1981 reduced 
Federal revenues by 20% and Congress had the foolishness to try to pay for that by 
increasing military spending by about 33%; quadrupling the national debt in 12 years). Fool 
me once shame on you; fool me twice shame on me. Michael Kinsley, Commentary, Fool 
Me Twice, Shame on Me, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005, at M5; Editorial, Administration 
Mislead Congress on Medicare; Whether or Not Any Laws Were Broken, Medicare Officials 
Deliberately Lied to Congress About the Cost of Last Year's Prescription Drug Bill, Which 
Barely Passed, DENVER POST, Jul. 9, 2004, at B6. 
82. See supra notes 59-61. 
83. 
[They] start a class warfare saying this is only going to benefit the wealthy, as if 
by bringing down the wealthy that it will help the middle class .... You cannot do 
that. The Soviet Union has tried it. Many of the Communist countries have tried 
it. Their capital structure is in shambles. 
135 CONG. REc. H6282 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1989) (statement of Rep. Shaw). 
84. George Hager, Parties Angle for Advantage As White House Falters, 48 CONG. Q. 
WKLY. REP. 3391 (1990) ("Republicans signaled that they had had enough of the relentless 
Democratic charges that the GOP favors the rich, and even conservatives began backing 
away from their implacable opposition to new taxes. 'They beat us to death with this rich 
and poor thing,' conceded Rep. Bill Frenzel, R-Minn."); Bailey Morris, Democrats Use 
Common Touch to Set the Agenda, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Dec. 30, 1990, at 7 
(explaining that with soak the rich strategy, Democrats defeated George H.W. Bush's 
campaign for capital gains tax cut benefiting the wealthy, set terms of a budget summit 
agreement to reduce the record Deficit, and took the high ground during mid-term election 
campaign by vowing to narrow growing gap between rich and poor. 
The results of the mid-term elections are bolstered by data from the US Census 
Bureau, the Congressional Budget Office and the House Democratic Study Group, 
which revealed the growing income gaps between rich and poor. During recent 
Congressional testimony, it was disclosed that income for Americans in the top I 
per cent bracket rose by 75 per cent between 1980 and 1990 to an average of more 
than $500,000. The largest increases for these 2.5 million families resulted from 
capital gains, which made their income equal to the total earned by the poorest 20 
per cent of US families accounting for 50 million people. In addition, the 
perceived gains by the middle class during the 1980s were largely illusory as they 
resulted from the entry of married mothers into the workforce to stop family 
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triggered discussion in the media, 85 and began to resonate in the 
electorate. 86 
A bi-partisan coalition of House liberals and conservatives Republicans 
rejected the 1990 Budget Accord: Republicans 105 to 71; Democrats, 149 
to 108.87 When the House then voted to further extend a "continuing 
resolution" to fund the government (to keep the pressure on Congress to 
effect a budget agreement), President George H.W. Bush angrily vetoed the 
incomes falling. The Congressional Budget Office also reported that taxes ate a 
larger share of the incomes of the poor and the middle class than of the rich.); 
see also Jason DeParle, Poor Families Gain under Tax Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1990, 
at A20. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE CHANGING DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL TAXES: 
1975-1990 (1987), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/62xx/doc6208/doc 18b-
Entire.pdf; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE CHANGING DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL TAXES: A 
CLOSER LOOK AT 1980 (1988), available at http://www.cbo. 
gov/ftpdocs/49xx/ doc4954/doc I 0-Entire.pdf. 
85. Karen Pennar, The Widening Tax Gap, Bus. WK., Jan. 15, 1990, at 16; Tom Redburn, 
Lots of Tax Talk, No Big Change; Despite Tinkering With Rates, What People End Up 
Paying as a Portion of Income Has Stayed About the Same for Decades; The System Hasn't 
Redistributed Wealth Either, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1990, at AI; John Waggoner, Sizing Up 
Tax Reform; Tax Debate Centers on Fairness, USA TODAY, Apr. 17, 1990, at B1; David 
Rosenbaum, Decisions on Taxes? Forget Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1990, at 1-8; 
Stanley Meisler & Sam Fulwood III, Economic Gap Bodes Ill for US.; A Full-time Paycheck 
May Not Keep the Wolf From the Door in Today 's Economy. Working or Not, Many 
Americans Are Unable to Make Ends Meet, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 1990, at AI; Marshall 
lngwerson, Taxes Take Roller-Coaster Ride, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 10, 1990, at 6; 
Reo M. Christenson, America's Gross Inequalities, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 17, 1990, at C17. 
86. Robert Shogan, Poll Finds Rising Cynicism Eroding 2 Parties' Support; Politics: 
Times Mirror Survey Indicates It Is More Difficult for Democrats or GOP to Win a 
Majority, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1990, at AI, A16, corrected L.A TIMES, Oct. 13, 1990, at 
A2 (asking "what does it mean to be a Republican," twenty-one percent of those 
interviewed volunteered "rich, powerful, monied interest" compared with eighteen per cent 
in 1987. The original story said fifty-one percent due to a computational error). But a year 
later a WASHINGTON POST poll revealed that "nearly half---48 percent-said Bush cares 
more about serving upper-income people, up from 35 percent in a Post-ABC survey in 
February 1990." DavidS. Broder & Richard Morin, Economic Worries Eroding Support for 
Reelection of Bush, Poll Finds, WASH. POST, Oct. 23, 1991, at AI. See also Kevin Phillips, 
Opinion, Class Warfare Brings Disarray to GOP Coalition, L.A TIMES, Jan. 26, 1992, at 
Ml ("Throughout American history, eras of GOP presidential control have always started 
with a broad middle-class appeal, but eventually they tilt toward the economic elite."). 
87. Roll call vote No. 421. 136 CONG. REc. H8996-97 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1990); 46 CONG. 
Q. ALMANAC 137, 136-H (1990) (demonstrating that Liberals opposed it for its renewal of a 
capital gains preference by increasing ordinary rate above capital gains rate; conservatives, 
for raising the individual income tax rate at the top, however small.). See George Hager, 
Defiant House Rebukes Leaders; New Round of Fights Begins, 48 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 
3183 (1990). 
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continuing resolution. 88 With awful political timing, the government began 
to shut down nonessential services just as the three-day Columbus Day 
weekend (which most Federal employees had off) began.89 This ploy 
backfired and House Democrats gleefully charged-using often venomous 
class warfare rhetoric-that President George H.W. Bush would rather 
shut down the government than give up on his plan for granting more tax 
breaks to the rich in the form of a resuscitated capital gains preference, 90 
and the Budget Accord's "Growth Incentives" further rewarded the rich for 
having made more money in the 1980s than ever before.91 More 
importantly, polls showed that Republicans were blamed for the shut 
down.92 
The House passed--on a strictly partisan basis--ordinary income rate 
increases at the top only, coupled with a cleverly designed capital gains cut 
providing more of its benefits to the middle income class93 than under the 
Bush plan. The 1990 Conference bill dropped the House's "middle class" 
capital gain preference (which Chair Rostenkowski reportedly never 
88. William J. Eaton, Officials Face Dwindling Options for Dealing with Budget 
Impasse; Deficit: Significant Actions Are Stymied by Fears of Voter Backlash or a 
Presidential Veto. Few Easy Choices Remain, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1990, at A24. 
89. 48 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 134 (1990). 
90. Budget Adopted After Long Battle, 48 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 137 (1990). If the 
Congress and the President could not agree to waive the Gramm-Rudman deficit target by 
the start of the new fiscal year, October I, 1990, sequestration was to kick in. !d. at 111 and 
132-33. Once the 1990 Budget Accord was negotiated, Congress extended this date to 
October 5 in a "continuing resolution" (to keep the pressure on Congress to effect an 
agreement). !d. at 136. Since the Budget Accord had hung up for so long on George H.W. 
Bush's demand for a capital gains cut, Democrats seized on "shut down the Government" 
rhetoric. !d. at 134. See generally Robert J. Samuelson, The Capital Gains Obsession, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 1990, at A25. 
91. 136 CONG. REc. H884l (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1990) (statement of Rep. Dorgan); 136 
CoNG. REc. at H7991 (daily ed. Sept 25, 1990) (statement of Rep. Schroeder); id. at H9942 
(daily ed. Oct. 16, 1990) (statement of Rep. Alexander) ("[W]e are here today because the 
chickens [S&L crisis, HUD, Borrowing, national debt, deficits, etc] have come home to 
roost. The chickens of Reaganomics have brought us here today."). 
92. Peter G. Gosselin, Tax Issue Bedevils Budget Talks; Bush Position Still Unclear, 
BosTON GLOBE, Oct. 11, 1990, at I. The Republicans did not learn their lesson. Michael 
Weisskopf & David Maraniss, Stung and Beset, Speaker Break Down and Weeps, WASH. 
PosT, Jan. 18, 1996, at Al (explaining that House Majority Whip Tom "Hammer" DeLay 
sauntered up to Vice President Gore and said, 'You have to realize we're serious. We'll 
shut down the government if we have to balance the budget.' 'Our polls show you guys lose 
if the government shuts down,' Gore responded."). Gore was so right. 
93. The House Bill provided a lifetime $200,000 cap on capital gains for which a fifty 
percent deduction could be taken and deliberately excluded public stock. See generally 
Pamela Fessler, Democrats Shape Tax Debate Following Summit Failure, 48 CONG. 
Q.WKLY. REP. 3400 (1990). 
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intended to press anyway94), thus making no change in the extstmg 
maximum individual twenty-eight percent capital gains rate,95 but keeping 
most of its high income individual rate increase (thirty-one percent starting 
at $78,400 joint return taxable income and a Mini-Bubble phasing out 
personal exemptions at two percent per each $2,500 in income from 
$150,000 to $250,000 joint taxable income). The individual Alternate 
Minimum Tax rate was increased from twenty-one percent to twenty-four 
percent,96 and the new exemption phase-out "bubble" was reduced to a 
"Mini-Bubble" just phasing out the taxpayer's personal exemptions (at two 
percent for each $2,500 of joint return income from $150,000 to 
$275,000).97 These were compromise substitutes for piercing the bubble 
since they in effect added on the average two percentage points at the top to 
94. Rosty Threatens Combat with Bush over Top Rate Increase, 90 TAX NOTES TODAY 
212-13 (1990). Rostenkowski merely mentioned "new incentives for middle class 
America." 136 CoNG. REc. H10296 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1990). The "legislative history" is 
unusually sparse as to the middle class capital gains cuts. MAJORITY STAFF OF THE HousE. 
COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, lOlST CONG., 2d Sess., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF WAYS AND 
MEANS DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE 12 (Comm. Print 1990). The mostly Southern 
Democrats on the Ways & Means Committee who usually intensely trumpeted timber, small 
businesses, farmers, and homeowners for a capital gains preference at issue did not do so 
this time. Of those members, only Rep. Ed Jenkins (D-Ga.) spoke in the debate, and he 
failed to mention the capital gains provision, stating only that the Democratic Alternative 
was balanced. 136 CoNG. REc. Hl0289 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1990). See generally Tim Gray, 
House Guts Summit Agreement in Reconciliation Bill, Shifts Revenue Burden to the 
Wealthy, 49 TAX NOTES 375 (1990) ("[L]awmakers mostly ignored the mechanics of the 
[last-minute Democratic capital gains] measure, and even of deficit reduction."). 
95. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, §11101, 104 STAT. 
1388, 1388-403 (1990). Many incorrectly claimed that the 1990 act cut the maximum 
capital gains rate from the 31 percent that would otherwise have applied to 28 percent. E.g., 
Phil Gailey, Can Democrats Fairly Claim "Fairness" Issue?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 
28, 1990, at A4 ("[I]n 'soaking'the rich, the Democrats added a little bubble-bath oil to the 
water ... in the form of a 3 percent[ age points] cut in the top rate on capital gains, from 31 
percent to 28 percent."); John E. Yang, Budget Deal Appears at Hand; Surtax Dropped; 
Bush to Sign Bill Keeping Government Open, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 1990, at AI. Actually 
the twenty-eight percent cap on individual capital gains rate was in the 1986 Code ab initio. 
See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2218 (providing new §l(j) 
with a twenty-eight percent cap on the capital gains rate). "The current statutory structure 
for capital gains is retained in the Code to facilitate reinstatement of a capital gains rate 
differential if there is a future tax rate increase." H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 99-842, at 106 
(1986). 
96. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-508, §11102, 104 STAT. 
1388, 1388-406 (1990). 
97. Jd. §11104, 104 STAT. 1388-407. 
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the new thirty-one percent rate for a total of the Democrats' three percent 
target. 98 
4. 1992: Polishing Democratic Rhetoric and Proposals 
After a truce in 1991, tax fairness took on an added edge in 1992, a 
Presidential election year, as the economy stubbornly refused to recover 
from the 1990-1991 recession,99 leading to a drop in the president's opinion 
poll numbers. 100 President George H.W. Bush's January 28, 1992 State of 
the Union Address called again for a generic cut in the top capital gains 
rate (from twenty-eight percent to 15.8 percent for all capital assets, except 
"collectibles," held 3 years or longer, with lesser cuts after a two-year and a 
98. Yang, supra note 96; Deficit Reduction Bill Has New Taxes, 46 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 
167, 169 (1990); Andrew Hoerner, "Pease Plan" Emerges as Key Issue in Debate over Tax 
Progressivity, 49 TAX NOTES 498, 499 ( 1990) ("[N]eedless complication in the tax code, 
motivated by a strictly political desire to increase the top marginal rates while avoiding the 
appearance of a tax increase"); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, OVERVIEW OF 
PRESENT LAW AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS RELATING TO MARGINAL TAX RATES AND THE 
PRESIDENT'S INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RATE PROPOSALS 13-5 (JCX-06-01) (Comm. Print 
2001), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-6-0I.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2005); Cf 
Glenn E. Coven, Congress as Indian-Giver: "Phasing-Out" Tax Allowances Under the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 6 VA. TAX REv. 505, 506-26 (1987) ("The phasing out of 
tax allowances is indeed a characteristic feature of the 1986 Code .... Put harshly, but not 
entirely inaccurately, the purpose that underlies these phase-outs was political deceit."). The 
Congressional Budget Office, supra note 66, reports that bottom twenty percent, next 
twenty percent, and top one percent, respectively had the following effective rates for all 
federal taxes, individual income taxes, wage taxes and excise taxes in 1991 (after 1990 
chang_es were effective): 
All Federal Income taxes Wage taxes Excise Taxes 
Taxes 
Bottom 20% 8.4 -1.6 7.3 2.0 
Next20% 14.2 2.9 9.3 1.3 
Top 1% 29.9 20.6 1.5 0.6 
99. S. G. Gwynne, The Long Haul, TIME, Sept. 28, 1992, at 34 (explaining that, due to 
hangovers from 1980's excesses, the slump was the longest sustained weakness since the 
Great Depression: "the job drought, the debt hangover, the defense-industry contraction, the 
savings and loan collapse, the real estate depression, the health-care cost explosion and the 
runaway federal deficit."). 
100. Art Pine & William J. Eaton, '92 Political Perspective; Ripe Year for a Shake-up in 
the House; Economic Woes, Gridlock and the Chamber's Own Scandals Are Among Forces 
Driving Some of the Most Hotly Contested Races, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1992, at AS; Lou 
Cannon, Bush Loses Grip on GOP Cushion and California Campaign Is Sinking, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 10, 1992, at Al2 ; Thomas B. Edsall, & David S. Broder, As Economic Woes 
Persist, Bush's Base Erodes; Crossover Democrats Are Torn, But Lean Heavily to Clinton, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1992, at AI. 
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one-year holding period-a repeat of the 1990 mini-sliding scale ). 101 
President George H.W. Bush asked Congress to put this and six other 
"growth initiatives" on a fast track to be enacted by March 20, 1992, or else 
the battle would be joined.102 This set the stage in the 1992 Presidential 
election year for the same fairness/class warfare rhetoric by the opponents 
to a generic capital gains deduction as in 1990, i.e., it provided deficit-
financed disproportionate benefits for high-income individuals. 103 
In 1992, top Joint Committee Staffers crafted for Senate Finance 
Committee Chair Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex.) "progressive" bills implementing 
generic capital gains rates with decreasing percentages of nominal gain 
exclusions as an individual's top marginal bracket rose. 104 President 
George H.W. Bush vetoed the two 1992 tax bills, 105 setting the stage for the 
101. Michael Arndt, Democrats Lay Trap for Bush on Capital Gains Cuts, CHI. TRIB., 
Feb. 18, 1992, at 1 ("[L]ower rate would persuade Americans to cash in old holdings and 
pour money into new investments that would get the stalled economy rolling again and 
create jobs."); Jerry Roberts, Why Bush Lost, S. F. CHRON., Nov. 5, 1992, at AI (indicating 
that President's touted bold plan for the economy "merely reflected Bush's basic view that 
markets, not government, should shape the economy."). Estimated revenue costs of 
President George H.W. Bush's 1992 capital gains package were $15.4 billion over 1992-
1997. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, SUMMARY OF REVENUE PROPOSALS IN THE 
PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 1993 BUDGET (JCX-1-92 ) (Comm. Print 1992) (demonstrating 
that 62.2% of benefits would go to taxpayers reporting more than $200,000 ($267 ,000 in 
2004 dollars) and 15.15%, to taxpayers reporting between $100,000 and $200,000); 
Preliminary Distributional Effect of the President's Budget Proposal for Capital Gains, as 
contained in H.R. 4200 (D-92-5-026 Feb. 13, 1992). Treasury's estimates for Bush I's 1990 
proposed capital gains cut showed a $12.5 billion revenue gain for the budget period while 
the Joint Committee's estimates (which at the time Congress had to follow) showed an 
$11.4 billion revenue loss. Lee, Critique, supra note 6, at 69 n.251; David Rosenbaum, 
Decisions on Taxes? Forget Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1990, at 1-8. 
102. 138 CONG. REc. H405 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1992) (statement of Rep. Gephardt) ("The 
President's allies tell us the March 20 deadline was a gambit--designed as a hurdle the 
House and Senate could not climlr-to set up this institution for yet another round of 
Congress-bashing."). See Eric Pianin, Senate Kills Bush's "Economic Growth" Package; 
Effect of Defecit Cited; President Vows to Veto Any Alternative Involving a Tax Increase, 
WASH. PosT, Mar. 12, 1992, at A6 (capital gains cut centerpiece); Chuck Alston, Bush 's 
Economic Recovery Plan Finds Few Democratic Buyers, 50 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 217, 218 
(1992); Susan Page, He Had Lost Before He Ran; Bush Never Focused on Home Front, 
NEWSDAY, Nov. 5, 1992, at 26 ("Bush never seemed to push for it very hard, anyway. He 
set a March 20 deadline for Congress to act, then seemed content to let it pass with little 
notice."). 
103. 138 CONG. REc. H626 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1992) (statement of Chair Rostenkowski). 
104. Highlights of Senate, House Tax Bills, 50 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 520 (1992). 
105. DavidS. Cloud, Democratic Leaders Drive Tax Bill Through Senate, 52 CONG. Q. 
WKLY. REP. 606 (1992); DavidS. Cloud, Final Push Clears Tax Bill; Bush Announces Veto, 
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best piece of the famous Bentsen political humor in the political theatre of 
the 1992 revenue acts. 106 
C. FIRST COMPLETED STEPS IN UNRAVELING PARITY 
1. Clinton's 1993 Hiking Rates on Rich Without Increasing the Capital 
Gains Preference 
The first completed substantial step in the unraveling of the great base 
broadening paying for lower rates 1986 Tax Reform107 was taken by 
52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. at 712 (1992); Read Bush's Veto Pen: No New Tax Bill, 52 CONG. 
Q. WKLY. REP. at 3556 (1992). 
106. President George H.W. Bush, in his news conference vetoing the first 1992 Tax Bill, 
stated that he did not take this step lightly. "No president has vetoed a major tax bill since 
Harry Truman did it in 1948." Bush Attacks Democrats As He Vetoes Tax Bill, 50 CONG. Q. 
WKLY. REP. 831 (1992). Senate Finance Chair Bentsen's riposted in the live telecast of 
Democratic Congressional Leadership news conference an hour later: 
I heard him [President George H.W. Bush] a moment ago referring to Harry 
Truman. What he'd like to do is follow the pattern of a feisty Harry Truman and 
run against, as he did, a Republican, do-nothing Congress. [He paused a beat and 
slowly grinned. As I watched this live on television, I knew what was coming.] 
But I knew Harry Truman. And I worked with Harry Truman. And George Bush 
is a decent man, but he is no Harry Truman. 
!d. at 834. This quip was of course patterned on Vice Presidential Candidate Lloyd 
Bentsen's devastating rebuke of Vice Presidential Candidate Dan Quayle's comparison of 
himself to John F. Kennedy. "I knew Jack Kennedy. Senator, you're no Jack Kennedy." 
Karen Tumulty, The 1988 National Election; In Losing, Bentsen Became a Big Winner and 
Party Folk Hero, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1988, at 1-24. Ironically, Truman's two vetoes of 
tax acts were overridden by a conservative coalition, whereas Bush's two vetoes were 
sustained by a conservative coalition. Equally ironically, Quayle had been a hardworking 
senator, unlike Kennedy. 
107. Technically, the first step was President George H.W. Bush's OBRA 1990. A 
corollary to funding the 1986 Code individual tax effective rate cuts on a pay-go basis was 
that all special interests should equally bear the pain of losing at least a part of their favored 
tax preferences. BIRNBAUM & MURRAY, supra note 4, at 226, 229; see also Lee A. 
Sheppard, A Nation of Shopkeepers: Finance Explores Accounting Issues, 30 TAX NOTES 
1314 (1986) 
(The House bill would take some $11 billion out of the hides of timber and oil. 
Finance Chairman Bob Packwood, R-Ore., therefore, has decided to play hardball 
with Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, D-111., by proposing to take a 
like amount from retailers, keeping in mind that the country's largest retailer, Sears 
Roebuck & Company, is headquartered in Chicago. These are the bargaining chips 
for conference.). 
Each individual income class in the aggregate had to share pro rata (as a percentage 
reduction in the average effective rate of that income class) in the largess of the projected 
five percent or so average effective household income tax rate reductions. Kies, supra note 
4. A paradigm of the 1986 Code compact oflower rates in exchange for a broader base was 
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President Bill Clinton's Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 
1993.108 The tax provisions of OBRA 1993 raised the top individual rates 
to thirty-six percent and the Millionaire's Surtax (39.6 percent bracket) 
touched the top one percent only, 109 while providing no additional 
preference to capital gains beyond maintaining the twenty-eight percent cap 
for individual gain on realization of capital gains. Clinton based the 1993 
tax act rate provisions on the vetoed 1992 Democratic tax acts, but lowered 
the beginning breakpoints for the top individual rates considerably in order 
to generate revenue to support his pet targets: grow the economy, generate 
good sound bites, and implement tax cuts and other programs. 110 
President Clinton expressly based this increase at the top on the failure 
of trickle down economics 111 during the twelve Reagan-Bush years: 112 
the same maximum (permanent) twenty-eight percent rate for individual ordinary income 
and capital gains-a reduction of twenty-two percentage points for ordinary income and an 
increase of eight percentage points for capital gains. 
l 08. See supra note 35. 
l 09. 139 CONG. REc. S7685 (daily ed. June 23, 1993) (statement of Sen. Conrad and Sen. 
Sasser) (in colloquy; breakdown by income class); e.g., 139 CoNG. REc. H2988 (daily ed. 
May 27, 1993) (statement of House Ways & Means Committee Chair. Rostenkowski) (bill 
focuses on upper-income taxpayers); id. at H2953 (daily ed. May 27, 1993) (statement of 
Rep. Derrick) (explaining that seventy-five percent of taxes in the bill fall on households 
with incomes over $100,000 ($132,000 in 2004 dollars)-the top six percent; sixty-three 
percent on households with over $200,000 ($264,000 in 2004 dollars); id. at H3003 (daily 
ed. May 27, 1993) (statement of Rep. Rangel) (espousing that class warfare rhetoric means 
"they can not tax the rich"); 139 CONG. REc. S7674 (daily ed. June 23, 1993) (statement of 
Sen. Pryor) (seventy-eight percent paid with incomes over $200,000.). 
110. For the fate of these spending provisions, see supra note 39. 
Ill. 139 CoNG. REc. H3004 (daily ed. May 18, 1993) (Statement of Rep. Slaughter); E. J. 
Dionne Jr., Beneath the Rhetoric, an Old Question; Bush-Clinton Debate Frames Classic 
Choice: How Much Government? WASH. POST, Aug. 1992, at AI ("Clinton scored the 
'wrongheaded Republican notion that prosperity will trickle down if we just make the rich 
even richer and get the government out of the way."'). Accord, David E. Rosenbaum, The 
1992 Campaign: News Analysis; One Economy, 2 Visions, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 23, 1992, at I-
I; Ronald Brownstein, Right and Left Both Get Poor Marks for House Vote on Clinton 
Exam Plan, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1997, at A7; Alan Cowell, Off the Shelf; An Ivory Tower 
Embrace of Views in the Streets, N.Y. TiMES, Jun. 9, 2002, at 3-6 (describing how Professor 
Joseph Stiglitz, Columbia Nobel Laureate economist, criticizes the "Washington Consensus 
. . . that poverty is eased by the trickle-down effect of prosperity for the elite and that 
governments should not get in the way of markets." He contends that "I.M.F. and the 
United States Treasury ... pursue the interests of the big investment banks rather than the 
poor most directly affected by their macroeconomic solutions."). 
112. BILL CLINTON, PUTIING PEOPLE FIRST 1-2 (1992). See also Statement by President 
Bill Clinton at the Dedication Ceremony for Taylor, Michigan, City Hall, FED. NEWS SERV. 
(Mar. 4, 1996): 
76 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:1 
While the rich cashed in, the forgotten middle class-those people who 
work hard and play by the rules-took it on the chin."113 Clinton's 
"conclusion was right-as the poverty rate shows-but the reasoning is 
wrong. To Clinton, the Reagan-Bush taxing and spending policies 
favored the rich at the expense of the poor. In fact, these were at most a 
modest cause of widening inequality. What really went wrong is that the 
usual relationship between an expanding economy and better incomes 
broke down." 114 
Many accurately noted that the 1993 ordinary income rate increases 
would only restore part of the upper income cut in effective rates 115 granted 
It [economic growth] is about the idea of fundamental fairness in this country-that 
we are not a people who object to others being successful, we do not resent people 
amassing their own wealth fairly won in the free enterprise system; only thing we 
resent is when every American who's doing the right thing and working hard and 
playing by the rules doesn't have a chance to be treated fairly. 
113. PurriNG PEOPLE FIRST, supra note 113, at 1-2; James Risen, News Analysis; History 
May Judge Reaganomics Very Harshly; Economy: Lower Taxes and Deregulation Were 
Expected to Raise Government Revenues. Debt Soared Instead, L.A TIMES, Nov. 8, 1992, at 
D1 
([J]ob growth was largely due to deep-seated demographic shifts, most notably 
because more women entered the work force." Reaganomics was a failure, 
producing big political dividends for the Republicans (and may have contributed 
to rapid economic growth during the 1980s although real wages failed to 
improve), but was based on a deeply flawed economic notion: "tax cuts, especially 
large tax cuts for the rich, would not worsen the government's budget deficit. ... 
Bill Clinton rode to the White House on a platform of economic change, 
campaigning as much against the 'trickle-down' policies of Ronald Reagan as 
against those of George Bush.). 
114. Robert J. Samuelson, Opinion, Clinton Needs "Trickle Down Economics," WASH. 
POST, Dec. 9, 1992, at A23 
(The good news for Bill Clinton is that the economic recovery seems firmly 
established. The bad news is that it won't automatically cure the worst problems 
of poverty and low incomes .... It is not that living standards for all Americans 
are receding. But people in the top half of the income distribution are gaining only 
slowly while others are losing. . . . The rich got richer, the poor got poorer, and 
people in between drifted in one direction or the other. Until the 1970s, the steady 
rise of wages pulled more and more people out of poverty. Now, a job by itself is 
no longer necessarily adequate. Declining wages at the bottom frustrate upward 
mobility.). 
See infra note 386 and accompanying text. 
115. 139 CONG. REc. S7664 (daily ed. June 23, 1993) (statement of Sen. Boren); id. at 
S6498 (daily ed. May 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Daschle) (asserting that he had "[N]ot 
seen progressivity for last 12 years."). The issue of class mobility is discussed in a work-in-
progress-Selling of Bush II Income Tax Cuts. The Congressional Budget Office, supra 
note 66, reports that the bottom twenty percent, next twenty percent, and top one percent, 
respectively had the following effective rates for all Federal taxes, individual income taxes, 
wage taxes and excise taxes in 1993 (OBRA 1993 rate changes were effective retroactively 
to the first of the year.): 
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by Reagan's first American tax revolution. 116 Conversely, opponents 
complained that since so many deductions had been eliminated or curtailed, 
the rate increases would produce much higher effective rates. 117 In fact, 
CBO reveals that the increases in effective federal income tax rates at the 
top one percent for 1992 through 1996 were a modest ten percent or so 
increase-from 21.2 percent, to 23.2 percent, 23 percent, 23.7 percent, and 
24.2 percent, respectively. 118 
All Federal Income taxes Wage taxes Excise Taxes 
Taxes 
Bottom 20% 8.0 -2.3 7.2 2.5 
Next 20% 13.5 2.5 8.8 1.6 
Top 1% 34.5 23.2 2.1 0.7 
116. Ed1tonal, Clmton's Restructurmg, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 21, 1993, at 66 ("[T]ax 
revolution worked by President Reagan and Congress in 1981 was notable for backing away 
from the principle of high progressivity that had characterized the system for 50 years"); 
Sylvia Nasar, Nobel Economics: Spending the Check, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1999, at 3-1 
(discussing the supply-side tax revolution during the Reagan presidency). 
117. 139 CONG. REc. H2711 (daily ed. May 24, 1993) (statement of Rep. Hancock). 
118. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTIVE FEDERAL INCOME TAX RATES 1979-2001, supra 
note 66. 
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2. Clinton's 1997 Capital Gain Rate Cut as a Sop to GOP: "(Y]ou think I 
raised your taxes too much. It might surprise you to know that I think I 
raised them too much, too."119 
In 1997, in order to obtain cooperation by the Republican-controlled 
Congress as to tax and balanced budget bills, President Clinton cut the top 
capital gains rate generally back to twenty percent, eighteen percent after 
an eighteen month holding period, 120 thus ceding away part of 
Rostenkowski's victory. The 1997 capital gains story started off (and 
finished) differently than 1993-1996: Congressional Republicans and the 
Clinton Administration appeared to want to strike a balanced budget 
119. Transcript, Statement by President Clinton at Presidential Gala Dinner Westin 
Galleria Hotel (Fed. News Service Oct. 17, 1995). For the Record-Clinton Now Thinks '93 
Act Went Too Far, 69 TAX NOTES 393 (1995); Ann McFeatters, Not So Golden Words From 
on High, NEWSDA Y (New York), Dec. 26, 1995, at A33 
(Clinton made his biggest faux pas of the year when he said it might surprise his 
audience (rich Texans) to know that he thought he raised their taxes too much in 
1993. This infuriated Democrats who took a political risk to support his tax plan 
(not one Republican voted for it). He tried to put the raging genie back into the 
bottle by saying that his mother told him never to make speeches after 7 p.m., the 
implication being that he's prone to mistakes at night.). 
But with hindsight there may have been a tactical element. Todd S. Purdum, Who's Sorry 
Now?; Stalwart in Defense of His Shrinking Turf, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.IO, 1995, at 4-1 
(When Republicans won control of Congress last year promising tax cuts and 
leaner Government, Mr. Clinton revived his own call for middle-class tax relief 
and renewed his efforts to 're-invent' Government. When Republicans said that 
Mr. Clinton was resisting balancing the budget, he said he wanted to, too--but 
insisted it would take 10 years. Finally, last month, to restart the Government 
after it was halted by a stalemate over a temporary spending bill, Mr. Clinton 
agreed to the Republicans' call for balancing the budget in seven years but only in 
exchange for language to protect popular programs for health, education and the 
environment that the White House thinks could be key to the President's re-
election.) 
See also Christopher Swope, Clinton and the GOP Congress: A Rough Road to Agreement, 
55 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1002, 1004 (1997). 
120. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, §311, 111 Stat. 831-2 ( 1997) 
(amending I.R.C. § 1(h)) (noting, additionally, collectibles were taxed at twenty-eight 
percent; depreciation recapture, twenty-five percent). 
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deal. 121 A sharp downward trend in the projected deficit over the next five 
years122 permitted more moderate spending cuts, allowing the 
121. New factors were (l) better numbers, 143 CONG. REc. H4686 (daily ed. Jun. 26, 
1997) (statement of Rep. Spratt) ("[T]he only reason we are standing here debating a tax 
bill, or debating a balanced budget bill yesterday, is that CBO came up with $225 billion in 
additional revenues." Corporate income tax revenues went up by $72 billion or over 
seventy percent since 1992); see David R. Francis, Budget Relief Coming at Faster Clip, 
CHRISTIAN Set. MONITOR, Aug. 13, 1997, at 8 (noting that unemployment was at modem 
lows and the stock market at record highs generating higher tax revenues); (2) settled 
politics (viz., continued divided government with the Republicans in control of Congress 
and President Clinton re-elected), George Hager, Clinton Budget "Alive on Arrival" But 
GOP Wary of Fine Print, 55 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 327, 328 (1997); (3) lessons from two 
years of budget negotiations (gentler rhetoric and awareness of the other side's bottom lines, 
Eric Black Sharon Schmickle & Tom Hamburger, Healthy Economy Helped Congress Float 
Budget Bill; The New Budget Agreement Is a Gamble of Sorts: Congress Gave Tax Breaks 
and Avoided Cutting Programs by Betting the Economy Would Remain Healthy, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), Aug. 3, 1997, at Al7 (Clinton got college-tuition tax breaks, expansion of 
the child tax credit to the working poor, rollback of parts of welfare overhaul, and health 
coverage for several million more children; Republicans got first tax cut in sixteen years, 
capital-gains tax break after more than a decade of fighting for one, estate tax relief, $500-a-
child tax credit as sought in the Contract with America, and expanded Individual Retirement 
Accounts); (4) Clinton and Republicans needed a legislative win, Alison Mitchell, Return of 
Partisanship to Capitol Hill, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 14, 1997, at Al (without a Democratic 
Congress, President Clinton pledged to build a "vital center;" Republicans, equally 
chastened by failure to capture the White House, vowed to find common ground); (5) new 
leaders (Sen. Trent Lott (R-Miss.) and Ways & Means Chair Bill Archer (R-Tex.)); and (6) 
everyone wanted tax cuts. Alissa J. Rubin, House Man of the Hour Archer Says He's Ready 
to Deal, 55 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 480 (1997) (House Ways & Means Committee Chair Bill 
Archer's star rises as Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich's wanes). Also, both 
Congressional Republicans and the Clinton Administration wanted a big legislative 
achievement to draw public attention away from political and other scandals. George 
Hager, As Each Side Moves to Center, Plan is Almost a "Done Deal," 55 CONG. Q. WKLY. 
REP. 1179, 1181 (1997); George Hager, White House, GOP Make Quiet Start In Search of a 
Deal, 55 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 527 (1997). Estate tax cuts early emerged as an issue with 
bipartisan support. Alissa J. Rubin, Estate Tax Cut Gets New Backers As Hill Mulls Budget 
Strategy, 55 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 687 (1997). 
122. William G. Gale, Opinion, The Budget Deal: An Opportunity Lost ... , WASH. POST, 
Aug. 1, 1997, at A21 
(Fortuitous events, sound monetary policy and responsible fiscal actions in 1993 
have produced a large tax windfall for the government;" misspent on Republican 
priority of twenty-five percent cut to investors whose assets have trebled in value 
in three years and Democratic priority of subsidizing middle class kids to attend 
college which they mostly would have anyway.); 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 1999-2008 
(1998), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/3xx/doc316/e&b0 l-98.pdf. The 
"numbers" got even better, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REVISED BASELINE BUDGET PROJECTIONS 
FOR FISCAL YEARS 1999-2008 (1998), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/3xx/ 
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Administration to spend money on key priorities in education, welfare and 
health care, and the Republicans to obtain larger tax cuts than earlier 
proposed by President Clinton-particularly as to capital gains, on which 
he earlier announced flexibility. 123 An earlier portent of the 1997 capital 
gains cut may be seen in President Clinton's statement in late 1995 that he 
raised taxes on the rich too much in 1993.124 The end result of this first 
stage of the individual income tax rate wars favored the Democrats: much 
higher ordinary rates than they first sought and not as low a capital gain 
rate as the Republicans first sought. 
The CBO reported that Federal effective Federal income tax rates at the 
top one percent for 1997 through 2000 were 23.8 percent, 23.4 percent, 24 
percent, and 24.2 percent, respectively. 125 
3. 1999: Dress Rehearsal for 21st Century Rate Wars 
Just as the Democratic Congress' veto-friendly tax acts in 1992 
presaged Clinton's 1993 ordinary rate hike, 126 the Republican-controlled 
Congress very narrowly passed in August 1999 a similarly veto-friendly 
individual tax cut which would have lowered the tax on five income tax 
brackets by one percentage point over 10 years, cut the capital gains tax for 
individuals, phased out the estate tax and eliminated the "marriage penalty" 
doc356/base0398.pdf; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, LETTER TO THE HONORABLE JOHN R. KASICH 
ACCOMPANYING THE MONTHLY BUDGET REVIEW DATED MAY 6, 1998 ( 1998) 
([S]urplus for 1998 is likely to be $43 billion to $63 billion-$35 billion to $55 
billion larger than the $8 billion projected in March. In addition, the strength of 
revenues this year suggests that the surplus is also likely to be larger in succeeding 
years than was previously anticipated-by $20 billion to $30 billion in 1999 
(resulting in a surplus of $30 billion or more instead of the $9 billion projected in 
March.)) 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/4xx/doc470/kasich.pdf. Consequently, negotiators 
for the Clinton Administration and the Republican Congress were able to agree on the 
framework for a balanced budget in five years on May 2, 1997, and avoid hard choices such 
as entitlement reforms or adjustment to the Social Security CPI index. George Hager, 
Clinton, GOP Congress Strike Historic Budget Agreement, 55 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 993 
(1997). 
123. George Hager, New Twist for Clinton Budget: A Cordial GOP Reception?, 55 CONG. 
Q. WKLY. REP. 275 (1997); Alissa J. Rubin, GOP Gives Mixed Reviews to Clinton Tax 
Proposals, 55 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 332 (1997). 
124. See supra text accompanying note 120 and source cited therein. This, in fact, does 
not appear to have been the case. See supra text accompanying note 119. 
125. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTIVE FEDERAL INCOME TAX RATES 1979-2001, supra 
note 66. 
126. See supra text accompanying notes 109-11 and sources cited therein. 
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on couples filing jointly, 127 presaging President George W. Bush's 2001 tax 
cuts as well as part of his 2003 tax cut. 
The CBO estimated in January 1999 that over the next ten years the 
surplus would equal $1.55 trillion. 128 Democrats, having curtailed 
spending on new programs for a number of years, had a number of pent up 
spending priorities as well as the goal of shoring up the Social Security 
system. 129 In contrast, the Republican majority in Congress wanted a large 
tax cut, 130 ostensibly to return the surplus to the taxpayers before Congress 
could spend it, 131 but for some, to starve the Federal government of 
revenues. 132 President Bill Clinton, however, had demanded in 1998 that 
Congress set aside any plans for use of the surplus until it had dealt with 
Social Security in order to block any substantial tax cuts. 133 
127. Greg McDonald, $792 Billion Tax-cut Measure Clears Congress; Proposal Pushed 
by Republicans Unlikely to Survive Clinton's Veto, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 9, 1999, at AI. 
House voted 221-206 in favor and Senate approved by a margin of one vote, 50-49. !d. 
128. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2000-
2009 xvii (1999), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/10xx/docl059/e&b0199.pdf 
(predicting a cumulative surplus in the total budget projected for 1999 through 2008 of 
almost $2.3 trillion-$745 billion more than estimated in August, 1998); Richard W. 
Stevenson, How to Spend a Long-Sought Surplus, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 1999, at C10 
[hereinafter How to Spend a Long-Sought Surplus]. 
129. How to Spend a Long-Sought Surplus, supra note 129. 
130. Richard W. Stevenson, Republicans to Push for a Tax Cut of Up to $500 Billion, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1999, at A28 (describing how until then, projected surpluses were to 
come from excess Social Security taxes over current outlays). 
131. Richard. W. Stevenson, House Debate on Tax Cuts Gets Under Way, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jul. 14, 1999, atA19. 
132. James Toedtrnan, No Deficit of Rhetoric over Surplus, NEWSDAY, Aug. 23, 1999, at 
C13 
(Republicans have wrapped themselves in seeming indignation at the evils of 
government and crafted the second largest federal tax cut in history. They have 
combined the promise of returning to taxpayers what is properly theirs with a 
theme developed over the past three decades, the starve-the-beast hypothesis that 
the way to shrink government is to shrink tax revenues.). 
See also Leo Rennert, GOP's Bold Support of Tax Cut Could Weigh Heavily on Its Future, 
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 8, 1999, at AJ9; Daniel Schorr, The Phony Tax-Cut War, 
CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Aug. 27, 1999, at II (proposing tired arguments that big tax cut 
hurts economy versus taxpayers should get back some of their money from projected 
surpluses); 145 CONG. REc. Sl0725 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1999) (statement of Sen. Dorgan). 
But see Dan Balz, Bush Bets He Can Sell Tax Cut Where Others Have Failed, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 13, 1999, at A2. 
133. How to Spend a Long-Sought Surplus, supra note 129. 
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CBO's estimates continued to grow, but with only one third from 
outside social security taxes. 134 The Republicans agreed with these "rosy 
scenarios," and their case, or at least desire, for tax cuts grew stronger 
despite polls showing that defensible public outlays were far more popular 
than tax cuts. 135 The Clinton Administration floated the idea of investing 
some of the base surplus in stocks through a government-run pool-a bad 
idea in the eyes of Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan. 136 
In the truncated 1999 floor debate, both sides rounded up the usual 
rhetorical suspects, but the Republican side spoke less about benefiting the 
economy (which was still booming) than usual, and more about returning 
to the taxpayers their money from future surpluses before the government 
could spent it (also a justification for President Ronald Reagan's 1981 tax 
134. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EXTENDED DISCUSSION OF CBO'S JULY 1999 ECONOMIC 
OUTLOOK (1999), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/13xx/docl387/econext99.pdf; 
Richard W. Stevenson, Republicans to Push for a Tax Cut of up to $500 Billion, N.Y. 
TiMES, Jan. 7, 1999, at A28 (reporting that the CBO estimated that about $500 billion of the 
$1.8 trillion in projected surpluses would come other than from outside social security taxes, 
considering across the board rate cuts); George Hager, Senate Panel Projects Huge Budget 
Surpluses, WASH. PosT, Jan. 16, 1999, at AI (describing that the $700 billion "excess" over 
next decade was based upon CBO figures to be released on January 29); Joe Hallett, Bush 
Defends Stance on Gun Laws GOP Front-runner also Explains Support of Huge Tax Cut, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug 21, 1999, at AI; accord, Richard W. Stevenson, Candidates 
Offer Variety of Ways to Spend Surplus, NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 27, 1999, at AI. 
135. Robert Kuttner, Opinion, Embarrassing Riches for Democrats, BOSTON GLOBE, June 
27, 1999, at F7; Alison Mitchell, Democrats Again Face Voter Doubts over Party's Values, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1999, at A18 (noting polls favored Democrats over Republicans fifty-
three percent to twenty-four percent for better improving the health care system; forty-six 
percent to thirty-one percent for better improving education; and forty-nine percent to 
twenty-eight percent on strengthening Social Security). 
136. See infra note 170. The efficiency of U.S. capital markets was the main reason the 
economy had performed well despite a low national savings rate; government investment in 
equities would compromise that efficiency, particularly if pursuant to guidelines to promote 
social ends or to avoid investments in countries run by repressive governments-social 
investing. Kuttner, supra note 136. Interestingly, when President George W. Bush later 
pushed for "personal accounts" in Social Security, Greenspan did not object, although the 
government investing these funds poses the same problem. For discussions of social 
investing compare John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law of 
Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 72, 96 (1980) (economically imprudent), with Maria O'Brien 
Hylton, "Socially Responsible" Investing: Doing Good Versus Doing Well in an Inefficient 
Market, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 51 (1992) (may make economic sense); Einer Elhauge, 
Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 733 (2005) (arguing 
corporate mangers have a bounded discretion to sacrifice corporate profits in the public 
interest which is efficient largely due to social and more sanctions to behaviorial regulation 
to which shareholders are underresponsive due to insulation and collective action problems). 
See generally, Brian Grow eta!., The Debate over Doing Good, Bus. WK., Aug. 15, 2005, at 
76. 
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cuts). 137 The Democratic side scored the excessive benefits to the rich138 
and, recalling the moral of the story of the "supply-side" 1981 Reagan tax 
cuts 139-don't count your chickens before they hatch lest deficits come 
home to roost140-pointed to the future deficit dangers if the surplus failed 
to occur and/or the out year tax costs exploded. 141 
III. A SECOND SUPPLY SIDE TAX REVOLUTION AND MUCH MORE: 
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH'S TAX CUTS 
A. 2001 ORDINARY INCOME RATE CUTS AND ESTATE TAX REPEAL 
Citing CBO projections of a $1 trillion surplus over the next ten 
years, 142 Governor George W. Bush began his first Presidential campaign 
by advocating a tax cut (1) to make sure the projected surplus did not get 
spent while growing the baseline of government spending; and (2) more 
importantly, as an insurance policy against economic slowdown. 143 In the 
137. E.g., 145 CONG. REc. H6101 (daily ed. Jul. 21, 1999) (statement of Rep. Camp); id. 
at H5988 (daily ed. Jul. 20, 1999) (statement of Rep. Schaffer). See also 141 CONG. REc. 
S2441 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1995) (statement of Sen. Packwood) (arguing that between 
January 1980-July 1981 every CBO, OBM, JCT, and private economist projected between a 
$150 billion-$200 billion surplus by 1985 from assumed continued high inflation and 
bracket creep; Reagan Administration proposed 1981 tax cuts in that amount so Congress 
wouldn't add new spending programs; then Congress added on many more tax cuts). 
138. E.g., 145 CONG. REc H8005 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1999) (statement of Rep. DeLauro). 
139. !d. at Sl0296 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1999) (statement of Sen. Wellstone) ("[George H. 
W. Bush] at the time famously derided Mr. Reagan's supply side fantasies as 'voodoo 
economics."'); Larry Summers, a respected economist and Secretary of the Treasury during 
President Clinton's second term, simply refers to the claimed economic efficiencies of the 
flat tax as "deja voodoo economics." Lee A. Sheppard, Flat Tax and Politics at NYSBA, 70 
TAX NOTES 488 (1996). 
140. See 146 CONG. REc. S8621 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 2000) (statement of Sen. Dorgan, 
quoting column by Paul Krugman) ("The most likely prospect is that those big surpluses 
won't materialize. And when the chickens that didn't hatch come home to roost, we will rue 
the days when, misled by sloppy accounting and rosy scenarios, we gave away the national 
nest egg."); id. at H7252 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1999) (statement of Rep. Jones). 
141. E.g., 145 CONG. REc. at Sl0313 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1999) (statement of Sen. 
Lieberman); id. at H6194 (daily ed. Jul. 21, 1999) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee). 
142. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE 2 (1999) 
("Cumulative on-budget surpluses are projected to total nearly $1 trillion between 1999 and 
2009."), available at http://www.cbo. gov/ftpdocs/13xx/doc 1386/e&b07-99.pdf. 
143. Governor Bush Meets With New Hampshire High-Tech Leaders to Share His Low-
Tax Message, Presidential Campaign Press Materials, December 9, 1999 
(Governor George W. Bush today promoted his plan for reducing taxes on 
working families and entrepreneurs as a powerful tool to encourage 
entrepreneurship and expand economic opportunity for all Americans .... But he 
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early stages of his 2000 Presidential campaign, Governor Bush, in an 
attempt to show his conservative "compassion,"144 combined relief targeted 
toward lower-income groups, e.g., such as expanded child tax credits, with 
rate cuts (down to thirty-three percent as the top rate) and the repeal of the 
estate tax, purportedly to spur investment and entrepreneurship. His 
proposal would also give something to both the social conservatives and 
enterprisers factions ofthe GOP. 145 
Bush maintained that half of the costs of his plan would benefit 
moderate and low-income families, thereby manifesting his 
"compassion."146 Many commentators concluded, however, that Bush's 
will warn that tax cuts are needed as an insurance policy should the economy take 
a downturn.); 
Joe Hallett, Bush Defends Stance on Gun Laws GOP Front-runner also Explains Support of 
Huge Tax Cut, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 21, 1999, at AI; Richard W. Stevenson, 
Candidates Offer Variety of Ways to Spend Surplus, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1999, at AI 
(Bush says his tax plan [the centerpiece of his domestic agenda], which would 
most likely use up nearly all of the non-Social Security surplus over 10 years, or 
perhaps even more, would provide benefits to workers across the income 
spectrum. Moreover, he said, by putting money back in the hands of taxpayers it 
would keep Washington from spending it on ever-larger government programs.). 
144. Owen Ullmann, Bush Campaign Searches for Balance in Tax-cut Blueprint, USA 
TODAY, Aug. 24, 1999, at A5; Eric Pianin & Terry M. Neal, Bush to Offer $483 Billion Tax-
Cut Plan; Working Poor, Middle Class Would Get Much of Relief, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 
1999, at AI (reporting that the tax package proposed was far more generous than the one 
passed by Congress; tax cuts to be paid for with projected budget surpluses, excluding those 
generated by the Social Security payroll tax); Richard W. Stevenson, Bush to Propose 
Broad Tax Cut in Iowa Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1999, at AI (describing the cuts: over 
phase-in period, top income tax rates reduced to thirty-three percent from thirty-six percent 
and 39.6%; twenty-eight percent and thirty-one percent rates consolidated at twenty-five 
percent; much of fifteen-percent bracket; child credit doubled to $1,000 and more affiuent 
families allowed to claim the credit; many married couples benefited by reviving a 
deduction based on the lower-earning spouse's income; added incentives for charitable 
contributions, and tax on large estates phased out over eight years). 
145. See Dan Balz, Disparate Coalitions Now Make Up Two Parties, Study Finds, WASH. 
PosT, May 16, 2005, at Al5. The same pattern continued in the 2003 tax cuts. Richard 
Simon, With Economic Plan Not Yet Out of Bag, Barbs Fly, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2003, at 1-
10. For a discussion of the enterpriser and social conservative factions, see infra Part III. 
146. Editorial, An Empty Drawer, WASH. PosT, Dec. 2, 1999, A38 (claiming that one half 
of revenue costs designed to help poor enter middle class (ten percent bracket and doubled 
child tax credit) exaggerated-more than one third of benefits would go to top one percent; 
three-fourths to the highest twenty percent; and about four percent to the lowest-income 
forty percent; surplus based on the unlikely assumption that a future Congress would cut 
most domestic spending by more than twenty percent in real terms; this unlikelihood 
coupled with proposed increases in defense spending "make it even less likely such a 
surplus will occur."); Michael M. Weinstein, Editorial Observer; Dividing Up the Money 
From the Bush Tax Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1999, at A22 (explaining Bush's view of his 
own plan, costing $480 billion over five years, saying it focuses "on low- and moderate-
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plan "would use nearly all of the non-Social Security surplus for the next 
five years ... [and] would primarily benefit wealthier taxpayers, ... but he 
presented it as an effort to make it easier for the working poor to reach the 
middle class."147 Commentators asserted that tax cuts of the magnitude 
Bush proposed ($743 billion over the budget window) would "force the 
government back into a policy ofborrow-and-spend."148 
income families," and provides the "greatest help for those most in need" (His description 
exaggerates benefits to the poor.)); Michael Tackett, Bush Calls for Tax Rate Overhaul; 
Working Poor, Estate Heirs Would Benefit Under Plan, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 30, 1999, at Nl. 
Governor Bush was referring to the first year costs; Democrats referred to the benefits when 
fully phased in. Also note that by reducing the lowest tax rate and doubling the child tax 
credit, Bush "freed millions of families with modest incomes from paying income taxes 
altogether." While middle-income families benefited from lower ordinary rates of 2001 cut, 
"they reap little or nothing from one of the most controversial tax cuts Bush pushed through 
- on dividends and capital gains." Moreover, these tax cuts will, as a practical matter, be 
eliminated by the rapid spread of the alternative minimum tax (AMT). Elizabeth Auster, 
GOP Inattention to Middle Class Could Help Dems, PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 13, 200S, at H3. 
See also David Cay Johnston, Report Says Bush's Tax Cuts Will Cause Some to Pay More, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 200S, at C2 (reporting that the Joint Committee on Taxation letter said 
Bush tax cuts reduced regular income taxes for millions to a level where they would be 
subject to the alternative minimum tax, reducing their tax savings from 2001 and 2003 tax 
cuts by $739.2 billion over next ten years; the Administration claimed inflation not tax cuts 
cause this effect (the Joint Committee on Taxation said two thirds was attributable to cuts), 
but an expert it relied on said that design of Bush tax cuts, not inflation, was the major 
reason the alternative tax produced more revenue after 2001); Letter to Editor dated Sept. 
21, 200S from House Ways & Means Committee Democratic Staff Chief Tax Counsel John 
Buckley, AMT Explosion: Bush Cuts Still to Blame, 108 TAX NOTES 1S81 (200S) (including 
attached letter from JCT Chief George Yin). This issue is discussed in a work-in-
progress-Selling of Bush II Income Tax Cuts. 
147. Richard W. Stevenson, Economic Debate Emerging in Race, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. S, 
1999, at 1-SO ("There is a consensus in both parties that the two-thirds of the projected 
federal budget surplus generated by the Social Security system should be off limits for tax 
cuts or general government spending."). Vice President AI Gore called George W. Bush's 
tax cut plan reckless. Gerard Baker & Deborah McGregor, Bush Eager To Keep the Good 
Times Rolling Economic Program, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2000, at 10; Jon Sawyer, Bush's 
Goal This Week Is To Show "Different" GOP;Convention Will Tout Diversity, Play Down 
Rancor, Attacks Candidate's Staff; Mirrors Tone, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jul. 30, 2000, 
at AI. 
148. Editorial, An Empty Drawer, supra note 146; Ronald Brownstein, Bush Aims 
Squarely at GOP's Right Wing with Tax Cut Plan, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1999 at AS; Texas 
Governor Takes a Risk with Sweeping Proposal Designed to Align Himself More with 
Conservative Thinking. It Also Promises to Sharpen Ideological Differences with 
Democrats, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1999, at AS. 
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Governor Bush continued to rely on his tax cut proposal on the stump 
throughout the 2000 campaign. 149 Meanwhile, as the "surplus" allowed 
Congress to effectively gut the pay-go restrictions, 150 legislators spent extra 
billions "for highways and bridges, water projects, emergency farm aid, 
school construction and scores of other projects."151 Governor Bush's math 
did not add up: to both implement the tax cuts and protect the Social 
Security "fund" needed for when the "Baby Boomers" began to retire was 
implausible, 152 since two thirds of the projected surplus was attributable to 
149. E.g., Raja Mishra, Campaign 2000: Tax-Cut Plans; Bush, Gore Philosophies Differ 
Widely, B. GLOBE, Nov. 20, 2000, at A35 (noting that Bush's cuts were more sweeping, tend 
to benefit the rich more [than the poor]); Dave McKinney, Candidates Use Tax Cuts to Woo 
Voters, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Oct. 29, 2000, at 30. 
!50. See Alan Greenspan, Testimony Before the Committee on the Budget, U.S. House 
of Representatives on Economic Outlook and Current Fiscal Issues (Feb. 25, 2004), 
available at http://federalreserve. gov/board/docs/testimony/2004/20040225/default.htm 
(For about a decade, the rules laid out in the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, and 
the later modifications and extensions of the act, provided a procedural framework 
that helped the Congress make the difficult decisions that were required to forge a 
better fiscal balance. However, the brief emergence of surpluses eroded the will to 
adhere to those rules, and many of the provisions that helped to restrain budgetary 
decisionmaking in the 1990s-in particular, the limits on discretionary spending 
and the PA YGO requirements--were violated more and more frequently and 
eventually allowed to expire.). 
The "pay-as-you-go" or "paygo" procedures ofOBRA 1990, as extended by OBRA 1993, 
required revenue decreases to be offset by: (I) increases in revenues (unlikely due to the 
Republican aversion to tax increases), or (2) decreases in spending, so there would be no net 
increase in the deficit. Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset 
Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 501, 514 (1998). Paygo 
expired in 2002 and the Senate attempted in 2004 to reinstitute it as to taxes as well as 
discretionary spending while the House and the Administration were opposed as to 
application to taxes because they wanted to make the 2001 and 2003 cuts permanent. 
Richard A. Oppel Jr., Panel Vote Draws Battle Lines for Pay-as-You-Go Tax Cuts, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 18, 2004, at A30. 
151. Eric Pianin, Binges Becoming Regular Budget Fare; As Spending Annually Exceeds 
Congressional Plans by Billions, Hawks Warn That Surplus and Process Are at Risk, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 25,2000, at A29; Feb. 25, 2004 Greenspan Testimony, supra note 150 
(In recent years, budget debates have turned to choices offered by those 
advocating tax cuts and those advocating increased spending. To date, actions that 
would lower forthcoming deficits have received only narrow support, and many 
analysts are becoming increasingly concerned that, without a restoration of the 
budget enforcement mechanisms and the fundamental political will they signal, 
the inbuilt political bias in favor of red ink will once again become entrenched.). 
See Richard W. Stevenson, Budget Threatens Candidates' Plans to Spend Surplus, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2000, at AI. 
152. Glenn Kessler, Cabinet Opens up on Bush; Treasury Secretary Says Social Security 
Math Doesn't Add up, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2000, at AI. 
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projected wage tax payments in excess of current outlays. 153 Vice 
President Gore's criticism along these lines was undercut by the fact that he 
proposed cuts equal to seventy-five percent of Bush's proposals, 154 albeit 
his were targeted tax cuts155 on education, health care and the military, and 
intended to shore up Medicare as well as to reduce the national debt. 156 
President George W. Bush began his Presidency with a proposal to use 
the surplus both for his tax cut and to pay down part of the deficit, and, to 
the surprise of both parties, the latter became popular in opinion polls. 157 
Opinion polls also suggested a preference for spending on top domestic 
priorities. 158 President George W. Bush soon adopted a two-pronged 
approach: the surplus was big enough to accommodate both, and the now 
$1.6 tax trillion cut was necessary to spur a faltering economy .159 The 
I 53. Richard W. Stevenson, Candidates Offer Variety of Ways to Spend Surplus, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 27, I999, at AI (reporting that $2 trillion of the current surplus forecast of three 
trillion dollars over the next decade would come from excess Social Security revenues). 
I 54. Mishra, supra note I 50. Gore's tax breaks for college tuition, retirement, energy-
efficient technology, and a host of other things implementing the active government strategy 
of using the tax code to reward good behavior; whereas Bush advocated putting money back 
in the hands of taxpayers and by reduction of revenues limiting government; however, 
reflecting the distribution of pre-tax income and the slight progressivity of the individual 
income tax as much as sixty percent of Bush's tax cuts would go to top ten percent of 
earners, those making $92,500 or more, according to an analysis by the Citizens for Tax 
Justice. /d. President Bill Clinton had also pushed a number of incentives at relatively low 
costs to provide a little something, but not much, for as many constituent groups as possible 
within pay-go strictures. Lee & Seago, supra note 32, at 632. 
I 55. Mishra, supra note I 50. 
I 56. Richard W. Stevenson, Budget Threatens Candidates' Plans to Spend Surplus, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 27,2000, at AI; McKinney, Supra note 149, at 30. 
I 57. Richard W. Stevenson, President to Seek Cuts of$2 Trillion of Debt in Decade, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 27, 200I, at AI. 
I58. Dan Balz, President Begins His Toughest Sell, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 200I, at AI; 
Andrew Taylor, Tax Fight Energizes Democrats, 59 CONG. Q. WKLY. 465 (200I) (noting 
that public and private polls suggest the public believes tax cuts less are important than 
education, Medicare and Social Security). Bush tried to balance contrasting themes: (a) 
increasing layoffs, rising energy prices, too many failing schools, persistent poverty, etc., 
and (b) balanced budget, big surpluses, technology that is revolutionizing the world, etc.-
but "neither picture is complete in and of itself." Craig Gilbert, Bush Pitches "Urgent" Tax 
Relief to Congress; Budget Seeks to Slash Taxes, Shrink Debt, MILwAUKEE J. SENTINEL, 
Feb. 28, 200I, at AI. 
159. Daniel J. Parks, Bush Faces Concern That Tax Cuts Will Be Too Much, Too Late, 59 
CONG. Q. WKLY. 419 (200I); Balz, supra note I41. See also David Leonhardt, 3 New 
Reports Show Evidence Of Weakness In the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 200I, at C-I; 
William Neikirk, Projected Surplus Is Among Question Marks in Tax Plan, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 
28, 200 I, at N-9 (CBO cited major uncertainties in its estimates of a surplus based on 
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public listened as Democrats challenged Bush's numbers and warned that 
the tax cut could lead back to an era of deficits. 160 
Early factors seemed to militate against success of the tax cut: Some 
Republican leaders urged a capital gains tax cut, not staying on message, 161 
and polls indicated a high approval rating of President George W. Bush but 
increasing concern over the economy. 162 Democrats' internal polling 
indicated that a tax cut, even one tilted to millionaires, was more popular 
than debt reduction, but that using the surplus on social spending-for 
assumed average economic growth of 3 percent a year from 2002); Richard W. Stevenson, 
Bush Team Sensed Economic Slump Early, N.Y. TiMES, Apr. 22, 2001, at 1-20 (Cheney, a 
director of Union Pacific, heard that loading of freight cars was down; which was consistent 
with other soundings that the economy was deteriorating; so Cheney in December 2000 
declared in a televised interview, "We may well be on the front edge of a recession here." 
The game plan then became to avoid appearing out of touch with the economic worries of 
voters and to assert that policy proposals developed and debated during a period of 
confidence and optimism remained the right prescriptions for an era of uncertainty.). 
George W. Bush actually sounded the dual themes of taxpayers' money and need for 
stimulus in late 1999. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
160. Alison Mitchell, The President's Budget: The Democratic Response; Democrats 
Cite Deficit Fears in Opposing Bush's Tax Plan, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 28, 2002, at Al4. 
161. Mike Allen, GOP Leaders Urge Cut in Capital Gains Rate, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 
2001, at A5; David E. Rosenbaum, G.O.P. Aides Considering Capital-Gains Tax Rate Cut, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21,2001, at Al2. 
162. Richard L. Berke & Janet Elder, 60% in Poll Favor Bush, but Economy Is Major 
Concern, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 14, 2001, at AI. Some opined that the increase in the projected 
surplus would make it easier for President George W. Bush to turn his tax cut plan into 
legislation. /d.; Heidi Glenn, et a!, Bush Tax Cut to Get Boost from increased CBO 
Estimates, 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY 21-1 (2001) (noting that on the eve of the CBO official 
surplus release, Democrats and Republicans scrambled January 30 to fortify their positions 
on tax cuts and the budget, while President George W. Bush invited lawmakers to the White 
House for more strategy sessions); Daniel J. Parks & Lori Nitschke, CBO Update Bolsters 
Tax Cut Plans, 59 CONG. Q. WKLY. 276 (2001). Others thought the facts that the 2000 
Presidential election was so close and did not appear to have turned on policy proposals 
would make this task more difficult. Mark Z. Barabak, Campaign 2000; One Vote Result 
Already In: Neither Will Get a Mandate; Projections: The Close Election Means the Next 
President Won't Persuade Congress That He's Acting on the Will of the People, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 3, 2000, at A22 (discussing conclusions based on agreement of experts and analysts in 
both parties). Here, too, commentators split with some concluding that Governor Bush had 
changed the public agenda from putting tax cuts at the bottom of possible uses of the surplus 
to the top ahead of deficit reduction. Robin Toner & Janet Elder, The 2000 Elections: The 
Polling; An Electorate Largely Split Reflects a Race So Very Tight, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 
2000, at B-1 (relying on exit questionnaires as voters left polling places on November 7, 
2000 and noting public sentiment that Governor Bush's argument that government's role in 
public life needed to be reduced clearly resonated). This is the hallmark of a successful 
policy entrepreneur. Lee & Seago, supra note 32, at 639 (arguing that legislation results 
under a political science "garbage can" theory of governance when a policy entrepreneur 
connects a proposed policy with a perceived problem in a window of political opportunity). 
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education, health, science, and housing-was more popular than either 
cutting taxes or retiring debt. 163 Shortly after the 2000 Presidential 
Election, the CBO indicated that its January 2001 estimation of the 
surplus164 would be even bigger-perhaps as much as $1 trillion bigger-at 
$5.7 trillion over 10 years. 165 
But those surpluses proved illusory as the U.S. economy slipped into 
recession in March 2001. Both CBO and OMB grossly overestimated tax 
revenues. Instead of $5.6 trillion, a better surplus projection-more 
accurately predicting the performance of the economy and the level of tax 
receipts-would have been $2.4 trillion, as CBO acknowledged later. On 
top of the bad surplus projections came surplus-draining tax cuts. Finally, 
an explosion in spending in response to the Sept. 11 assaults and in 
connection with the invasion of Iraq combined to turn the budget picture 
on its head. 166 
Fate took a hand. Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan virtually 
endorsed tax cuts in testimony before a January 25, 2001 Senate Budget 
Committee hearing167 due to CBO's estimation of zero debt by the end of 
the decade. 168 In that event, Greenspan believed reduction of the surplus 
163. Robert Kuttner, Opinion, Bush Paid Dearly for Arrogance, BOSTON GLOBE, May 27, 
2001, at D-7. 
164. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2002-
2011 (2001), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/27xx/doc2727/entire-report.pdf. 
165. Peter G. Gosselin, Decision 2000: America Waits; the Bigger the Surplus, the Easier 
the Politics; Budget: A Projection of up to $1 Trillion More Will Aid Bush or Gore's 
Programs and Attract Legislative Support, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2000, at AI; David 
Westphal, Greenspan Endorses Tax Cuts; Some Democrats Warn That Amid Economic 
Slowdown, Deficits Could Follow, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 26, 2001, at AI 
(reporting that despite polls showing a majority against tax cuts, Bush stuck to his plan; 
Greenspan's virtual endorsement marked a stunning turnaround). 
166. The Nonpartisan Concord Group concluded that as of September 2003 only one third 
of the deterioration of the Federal balance sheet was attributable to the Bush tax cuts. 
Andrew Taylor, Next Presidency: A Future of Shortfalls, 62 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2230 (2004); 
Gebe Martinez, The GOP's Internal Divide, 62 CONG. Q. WKLY. 166 (2004). 
167. Alan Greenspan, Testimony Before the Committee for the Budget, U.S. Senate on 
the Outlook for Federal Budget and Implications for Fiscal Policy (Jan. 25, 2001) 
[hereinafter January 25 Greenspan Testimony], transcript available at 
http://www. federalreserve .gov/boarddocs/testimony /200 1/200 I 0 125/default.htrn. 
168. January 25 Greenspan Testimony, supra note 168 
(The most recent projections, granted their tentativeness, nonetheless make clear 
that the highly desirable goal of paying off the federal debt is in reach before the 
end of the decade. This is in marked contrast to the perspective of a year ago when 
the elimination of the debt did not appear likely until the next decade.) 
Greenspan also indicated that even a retroactive a tax cut would have little effect on the 
recent downturn in the economy. !d.; Patti Mohr, Greenspan Backs Tax Cuts, Social 
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was needed to avoid Treasury having enough left over after retirement of 
the public debt to invest in private assets 169-an earlier proposal of the 
Clinton Administration. 170 He warned, however, that economic growth had 
slowed very close to zero, which suggested tax cuts to some, but cuts 
would not generate an immediate stimulus. 171 Moreover, sixty-four percent 
of individual taxpayers, accounting for thirty-eight percent of reported 
taxable income, would have received no reduction in marginal rates. 172 
Greenspan added that if Congress would otherwise use the surplus for 
open-ended spending programs, as 2000 indicated probably would be the 
case, then tax cuts were preferable. 173 Notwithstanding the slowing 
economy, Greenspan argued that CBO's budget surplus projections were 
probably accurate, partially because the jump in productivity during the 
Security Privatization, 90 TAX NOTES 564 (2001); Eric Pianin & John Lancaster, Tax Cuts 
Gain Momentum; Gramm-Miller Plan Like Bush's; Daschle 's Package Smaller, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 23, 2001, at A2 (reporting that the tax cut increased in resonance as the economy 
weakened and federal budget remained in surplus). 
169. January 25 Greenspan Testimony, supra note 168 
(At zero debt, the continuing unified budget surpluses currently projected imply a 
major accumulation of private assets by the federal government .... [T]he federal 
government should eschew private asset accumulation because it would be 
exceptionally difficult to insulate the government's investment decisions from 
political pressures. Thus, over time, having the federal government hold 
significant amounts of private assets would risk sub-optimal performance by our 
capital markets, diminished economic efficiency, and lower overall standards of 
living than would be achieved otherwise.); 
Daniel J. Parks, How Much Debt Is Too Much, 62 CONG. Q. WKLY. 141 (2004); David R. 
Francis, Greenspan Gives Tax Cut Big Push, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 26, 2001, at I. 
170. President Clinton had proposed just that, which Greenspan had strongly criticized. 
See supra note 13 7 and accompanying text. 
171. January 25 Greenspan Testimony, supra note 168 ("Lately there has been much 
discussion of cutting taxes to confront the evident pronounced weakening in recent 
economic performance. Such tax initiatives, however, historically have proved difficult to 
implement in the time frame in which recessions have developed and ended."); Robert J. 
Caldwell, Editorial, President Bush Starts Out Fast, Wins Debate over Tax Cut, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIB., Feb. II, 2001, at G-1 ("With annual budget surpluses piling up and the 
economy slowing if not stalled, the debate about whether to cut taxes is over."). 
172. William G. Gale & Samara R. Potter, An Economic Evaluation of the Economic 
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, 55 NAT'L TAX J. 133 (2002) (citing 
Donald Kiefer et a!., The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001: 
Overview and Assessment of Effects on Taxpayers, 55 NAT'L TAX J. 89, Table 2 (2002)). 
173. January 25 Greenspan Testimony, supra note 168 
([I]f long-term fiscal stability is the criterion, it is far better, in my judgment, that 
the surpluses be lowered by tax reductions than by spending increases. The flurry 
of increases in outlays that occurred near the conclusion of last fall's budget 
deliberations is troubling because it makes the previous year's lack of discipline 
less likely to have been an aberration.). 
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past five years would continue. 174 The ')ump in productivity" was 
significantly overstated. 175 Moreover, this "jump" was concentrated in 
thirty percent of the private economy. 176 
Hindsight would show, as astute observers warned, that the 1998-2000 
increased federal income tax collections from individuals were mostly due 
to realizations of capital gains in the stock market boom by investors and 
day-traders and ordinary income revenues reporting by corporate officers 
upon the exercise of stock options177-all of which would dry up with the 
174.Id. 
(The key factor driving the cumulative upward revisions in the budget picture in 
recent years has been the extraordinary pickup in the growth of labor productivity 
experienced in this country since the mid-1990s .... Since 1995 ... productivity 
growth has accelerated markedly, about doubling the earlier pace, even after 
taking account of the impetus from cyclical forces. Though hardly definitive, the 
apparent sustained strength in measured productivity in the face of a pronounced 
slowing in the growth of aggregate demand during the second half of last year was 
an important test of the extent of the improvement in structural productivity. These 
most recent indications have added to the accumulating evidence that the apparent 
increases in the growth of output per hour are more than transitory.). 
See also 147 CONG. REc. S9327 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 2001) (statement of Sen. Hollings) 
(Where are we? From 41 percent of the workforce in manufacturing down to 12 
making what? Nothing. I was sort of amazed at Alan Greenspan saying in 
February that we have so much productivity we have a surplus as far as the eye 
can see, and so we ought to have a tax cut when the productivity has gone 
overseas.). 
175. Louis Uchtitelle. Notions of New Economy Hinge on Pace of Productivity Growth, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2001, at Al (indicating that the boom had collapsed despite 
Greenspan's faith that ever-greater efficiencies of the information age would continue 
raising profits, incomes and employment; that productivity calculations for peak boom years 
(1999-2000) were revised down from 3.4 percent to 2.6 percent; and that late 1990's rapid 
productivity gains were caused in part by unsustainable business investment leading to a 
spurt in growth that temporarily forced more efficient use oflabor). 
176. Louis Uchtitelle, Deepening Wrinkles in the New Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 
2001, at C2 ("[N]early all the surge from 1995 through 2000 occurred in six sectors: retail, 
wholesale, telecommunications, securities, the assembly of computers and the manufacture 
of semiconductors."). 
177. Taxpayers reporting $200,000 or more sold huge quantities of ever-more-valuable 
stock during the boom years and cashed in hundreds of billions of dollars in stock options 
taxed as ordinary income. Cash bonuses, commissions and fees augmented their share of 
household income from 14.6% in 1994 to 18.1% in 1996. Meanwhile, their share of income 
taxes rose from 14.6% to 37.2%. These increases were equal to the 1999 surplus. 
Overvalued stock prices were vulnerable to a collapse that would bring down the budget 
surpluses as well. Louis Uchtitelle, A Surplus Built on Bricks of Income Inequality, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 28, 1999, at 3-4. See also, e.g., Richard. W. Stevenson & Michael M. 
Weinstein, Is $1 Trillion Windfall As Ephemeral As a Breeze?, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 3, 1999, at 
A8 (indicating that estate taxes were up substantially, reflecting the rising stock market and 
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collapse of the stock market bubble. They were so right. Ominously, at the 
end of 2000 the Dow Jones Industrial Average closed 6.8 percent lower 
than it had begun the year, after five straight years of double digit 
increases. 178 
Chair Alan Greenspan prudently recommended a trigger on the 200 I 
Act tax cuts to suspend them if that part of the surplus otherwise dedicated 
to Social Security and Medicare would be invaded due to the cuts. 179 The 
the big holdings of public stocks and bonds by taxable estates); Robert Barbera, America's 
Bubble Budget: The Federal Surplus Will Not Look So Big Once Tax Revenues From Stock 
Options Start to Fall, FIN. TIMES (London, USA Ed.), Oct. 27, 2000, at 19; Anatole 
Kaletsky, Victory for Bush Could Prove Disastrous All Round, TIMES (London), Nov. 7, 
2000 (indicating that the question of whether the budget surplus was shrinking, and the 
threat of a bear market on Wall Street, were much debated during the campaign). SOl data 
for 1999 shows for all individual returns reporting capital gains from stock sales almost 
twice as many short term as long term transactions, although the amount of long term gain 
was over twice the amount of short term gain. SOl Tax Stats - Sales of Capital Assets 
Reported on Individual Tax Returns, at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article 
/O,id=96649,00.htrnl. The ratios of short term to long term transactions was even greater 
for returns reporting AGI of $200,000 and greater; Short term gains, however, were eighty 
percent of long-term gains for AGI from $200,000 to $500.000; Long-term gains were twice 
short term gains for $500,000 to $1,000,000 and around four times for $1,000,000 or more. 
Id. See also Philip Coggan, Financial Models Predicting Market Behaviour Are Often 
Based on Assumptions That Do Not Always Correspond with the Real World, FIN. TIMES, 
Feb. 14, 2005, at 32 (noting behavioral economics has shown that investors are not so 
rational being more averse to losses than to reductions in profits. "They value short-term 
gains more highly than long-term."). 
178. The Dow Jones Industrial Average opened 2000 at 11,356.51 and closed at 
10,785.85 for a 6.19% decline; 1999 had increased 25.22%; 1998, 16.10%; 1997, 22.64%; 
1996, 26.05%; and 1995, 33.45%. Dow Jones Industrial Average, available at 
http://averages.dowjones.com/downloads/xlspages/DJIA-Hist-perf.xls. 
179. January 25 Greenspan Testimony, supra note 168 
(In recognition of the uncertainties in the economic and budget outlook, It IS 
important that any long-term tax plan, or spending initiative for that matter, be 
phased in. Conceivably, it could include provisions that, in some way, would limit 
surplus-reducing actions if specified targets for the budget surplus and federal debt 
were not satisfied. Only if the probability was very low that prospective tax cuts 
or new outlay initiatives would send the on-budget accounts into deficit, would 
unconditional initiatives appear prudent. The reason for caution, of course, rests 
on the tentativeness of our projections. What if, for example, the forces driving 
the surge in tax revenues in recent years begin to dissipate or reverse in ways that 
we do not now foresee? Indeed, we still do not have a full understanding of the 
exceptional strength in individual income tax receipts during the latter 1990s. To 
the extent that some of the surprise has been indirectly associated with the surge in 
asset values in the 1990s, the softness in equity prices over the past year has 
highlighted some ofthe risks going forward.). 
See 147 CONG. REc. H752 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2001) (statement of Rep. Roukema) (indicating 
that Chairman Greenspan "outspokenly supported" a trigger in testimony both before House 
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Senate rejected any trigger, maintaining that resulting uncertainty would 
undermine the long-term stimulative effect of the cuts. 180 Senate Finance 
Chair Grass ley assured opponents of the rate cut that "if things go south on 
the projections, you can be sure that Congress will raise taxes," as it had in 
1982, 1984, 1990 and 1993. 181 He failed to note that in those tax acts one 
or both of the chambers of Congress had been controlled by Democrats and 
the ballooning deficit had been of great concern to Congress and the 
President at the time. 182 When the projections did go South, Congress, at 
the urging of President George W. Bush, cut taxes further instead of raising 
them. 183 
As the economy began to look more like a recession and consumer 
confidence fell, deficits began to reemerge as an acceptable policy on the 
theory that surpluses hold money back from the economy. 184 By May, it 
appeared that the CBO would report in the summer that the projected 
surpluses were over; accordingly, President George W. Bush and 
congressional proponents of the tax cuts pressed hard to pass such a bill 
and Senate Committees); see also 147 CONG. REc. S5683 (daily ed. May 24, 2001) 
(statement of Sen. Stabenow) 
([W]e had an amendment we tried twice to pass-a budget trigger which says if 
the phase-in of the tax cut dips into Social Security and Medicare to pay for it, if 
we go back into debt, we will suspend that action, further tax cuts or spending, 
until the revenue comes in.); 
Paul Krugman, Opinion, The Awful Troth, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 13, 2004, at Al3 
(In May 2001 Mr. Greenspan gloomily told Mr. O'Neill that because the first 
Bush tax cut didn't include triggers-it went forward regardless of how the budget 
turned out-it was 'irresponsible fiscal policy.' This was a time when critics of 
the tax cut were ridiculed for saying exactly the same thing.). 
180. Lori Nitschke, Proposals to Alter Bush's Tax Plan Multiply Despite White House 
Appeals for Unity, 59 CONG. Q. WKLY. 377, 378 (2001) (demonstrating that the trigger has 
less support in Congress than would appear on its face). 
181. 147 CONG. REc. S5091 (daily ed. May 17, 200l)(statement of Chair Grassley). 
182. After the 1981 "riverboat gamble" tax cut, the Reagan administration agreed to (a) 
deficit-reducing tax increases in 1982 and 1984, and (b) the bipartisan 1983 Social Security 
changes, improving the fiscal posture of both Social Security and the government as a 
whole. DanielL. Shaviro, Reckless Disregard: The Bush Administration's Policy of Cutting 
Taxes in the Face of an Enormous Fiscal Gap, 45 B.C.L. REv. 1285, 1329 (2004). The 
surplus that the government ran in 1998-2000 arose mainly from the unanticipated boom in 
the economy and the stock market, the increase in productivity, and the slowdown in the rise 
of health spending due to managed care. David E. Rosenbaum, The Deficit Disappeared, 
but That Was Then, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2003, at 4-3. 
183. See infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text. 
184. Accordingly, the Senate pushed successfully for an immediate stimulus through 
retroactive individual tax refunds. Lori Nitschke, House Presses Bush's Tax Agenda While 
Senate Talks ofStimulus, 59 CONG. Q. WKLY. 707 (2001). 
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before that time since "any softening of surplus projections lends credence 
to the main argument of opponents: the predictions of the nation's long 
term financial solvency are not certain enough to make such a deep tax cut 
prudent."185 
Under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2001/ 86 the maximum individual rate would be gradually reduced over a 
six-year period, e.g., from 39.6% to 39.1% in 2001, and was scheduled to 
be 35% in 2006 and thereafter. 187 The high income PEP and Pease phase-
out of personal exemptions and haircut of non-business itemized 
deductions188 were scheduled to be phased out in the years beginning after 
2005. To fit within budgetary constraints, 189 Congress repealed the Estate 
Tax only as to persons dying after December 31, 2009. Furthermore, 
absent additional congressional action, the Estate Tax will rise from the 
185. Daniel J. Parks, Tax Cut Backers Hurry to Beat a Touch of Surplus Pessimism, 59 
CONG. Q. WKLY. 1253 (2001). 
186. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub.L. No. 107-16, 
115 Stat. 38 (200l)[hereinafter "2001 Act"]; see generally Susan Kalinka, Highlights of the 
2003 Jobs and Growth Tax Reconciliation Act: Economic Stimulus or Long-term Disaster?, 
64 LA. L. REv. 219, 265-66 nn. 248-35 (2004). 
187. See 2001 Act, § lOl(a), I.R.C. § (i) (2005). See also STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 
1836, THE ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TAX RELIEF RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2001 (JCX-50-01) 
(Comm. Print 2001). 
188. See 2001 Act,§ 102(a), I.R.C. § 15l(d)(3)(E) and (F) (2005); § 103(a), I.R.C. § 68(t) 
(2005); see also Fessler, supra note 93 
(Don J. Pease, D-Ohio, ... "has long thought that raising the top rate or imposing 
a surtax on the rich would be 'the cleanest way to make the tax system more 
progressive." But recognizing the impending political logjam, he came up with a 
plan [in OBRA 1990] that allowed both sides to claim some victory. It would 
limit a taxpayer's itemized deductions by 3 percent of the amount his or her 
adjusted gross income exceeded $100,000. While a taxpayer's top rate would not 
be raised overtly, the change would have the effect of increasing the top marginal 
rate of high-income taxpayers by almost one percentage point. ... Another key 
piece of the final compromise-phasing out the personal exemption-was 
embraced primarily as a way to break an impasse over Democrats' insistence that 
a 10 percent surtax be imposed on millionaires, a change the administration found 
too close to a rate hike for comfort. Under the plan, the value of the personal 
exemption, now $2,050 per taxpayer and dependent, would be gradually phased 
out for individuals with adjusted gross incomes from $100,000 to $225,000 and 
for married filers with incomes from $150,000 to $275,000. The effect would be 
to increase a taxpayer's marginal rate by as much as half a percentage point for 
each exemption; that could mean an effective top marginal rate of 34 percent for a 
couple with four children in that income range.). 
189. This and other gimmicks are discussed in a work-in-progress-Selling of Bush II 
Income Tax Cuts. 
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dead in 2011. 190 Thus, Congress may well have shifted costs to future 
legislators by creating tax cuts which would be politically, though not 
legally, impossible to repeal. 191 The 2001 Act also carved out of the old 
lowest (fifteen percent) bracket a new ten percent bracket applicable to the 
first $12,000 of taxable income for married couples ($6000 for singles and 
$10,000 for heads of households) through 2007. 192 The maximum taxable 
income level at which the fifteen percent bracket ends was raised for joint 
filers as part of the marriage penalty relief provisions. 193 The 2001 Act 
raised the alternative minimum tax exemption by $2000 for single 
taxpayers and $4000 for married taxpayers through 2004. 194 
B. 2003: PARITY OF CAPITAL GAINS AND DIVIDENDS RATE AT 1938 
LEVEL 
1. Historical Background of Dividends 
During most of the 20th Century dividends were important: from 1926 
to 1993, blue-chip stocks produced an average return of about ten percent a 
year, 5.4% a year from capital appreciation and 4.9% from dividends. 195 
By the 1980s, dividend income began to fade in importance as the long-
term capital gains rate was cut while dividends remained taxed as ordinary 
190. Transitional provisions leading to complete abolition of the Estate Tax in 2010 
addressed a number of significant issues. The top Estate Tax rate would be gradually 
reduced from the pre-2001 Act fifty-five percent to forty-five percent for decedents dying in 
2007. See 2001 Act§ 5ll(a)-(c), 115 Stat. 70 (codified at I.R.C. § 200l(c) (2005)). The 
Estate Tax exemption amount would be gradually increased from the pre-2001 Act 
$675,000 to $3.5 million for decedents dying in 2009. See id. § 52l(a), 115 Stat. at 71 
(codified at I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2005)). 
191. David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REv. 2544,2628 n.314 
(2005); Shaviro, supra note 183, at 1300 
(The main reason for these 'sunsets'-which proponents of the two Acts insisted 
would not be permitted to take effect-was to lower the official ten-year estimates 
of the Acts' revenue cost by more than fifty percent. Thus, looking at either what 
the proponents openly intended or at the likely resolution of the politically 
unrealistic policy path suggested by the sunsets, the sunsets result is a significantly 
higher estimate of the fiscal gap.). 
192. 2001 Act § lOl(a)(l), I.R.C. § l(i) (2005). The limit was scheduled to rise to 
$14,000 in 2008 and to be indexed for inflation starting in 2009. !d. 
193. See id. §lOl(c), I.R.C. § l(f)(8) (2005). 
194. See id. §70l(a)(l), I.R.C. § 55(d)(l) (2005). 
195. Tom Petruno, The President's Economic Plan; Dividends' Role Gains Currency, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2003, at 1-1. 
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income. 196 The capital gains tax rate was cut again in 1997, to a maximum 
of twenty percent, coinciding with and helping to fuel the surge of money 
into the stock market. With the top tax rate on dividend income nearly 
twice the capital gains tax rate and annual double digit growth in the stock 
market, there was little reason for many investors to want dividends and 
thus little incentive for many firms to pay or raise the amount of 
dividends. 197 Management used the retained profits for expansion or to buy 
back shares of stock, which allowed executives to set aside millions of 
shares they awarded to themselves as part of their compensation and to 
help increase the stock price by reducing the supply. 198 By 2000, the 
average dividend yield of the Standard & Poor's 500 corporations fell to a 
record low of 1.1 %. 199 During the late 1990's stock market bubble, 
dividend-paying stocks fared poorly compared to non-dividend paying 
stocks. For instance, in 1999, the value of 402 stocks in the Standard & 
Poor's Industrial 500 paying dividends rose an average of 2.1 %, while the 
value of 98 non-dividend paying companies in the index rose an average of 
89.8%.200 
2. Bursting of the Stock Market Bubble in 2000 
With the bursting of the stock market bubble in March 2000, and the 
market's continued decline for three straight years thereafter as well as the 
ceaseless parade of corporate accounting scandals, investors began to 
reward (or at least punish less severely) dividend-paying corporations, 
196. /d. 
197. Jeffery Brown et al., Executive Financial Incentives and Payout Policy: Firm 
Responses to the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut 1 (Nat'l Bureau ofEcon. Research, Working Paper 
No. 11002, 2004) ("[D]ividend payout ratios fell substantially and share repurchases 
increased rapidly over past 2 decades."), available at http:// www.nber.org/papers/w11 02. 
198. Floyd Norris, Reversing Trend, Number of Dividend Increases Grows, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 3, 2003, at C-3; David Leonard & Claudia H. Deutsch, Few Officials at Companies 
Expect Surge in Dividends, N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 8, 2003, at C-1. 
199. Petruno, supra note 195. Historically, about one half of S&P corporation profits 
were paid out as dividends; this has fallen to thirty-five percent. William Patalon III, 
Dividends Sail Back From Land of Disdain; Microsoft's Surprise, Bush's Proposal Look 
like Good Things for Investors, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 18, 2003, at C9 
(Until recently, at any point in history, only about 50 of the 500 largest U.S. public 
companies did not pay dividends .... Now, however, 139 members of the 
Standard & Poor's 500 index do not pay dividends ... [a]nd even those payouts 
are at their nadir.). 
200. Norris, supra note 199, at C3. 
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many of which led the market in 2001-2003.201 For example, in 2002, the 
Standard & Poor's 500 companies paying dividends declined by an average 
of 18.4%, while the stocks of such non-dividend paying companies fell by 
an average of 30.3%.202 
While many economic indicators by the beginning of 2003 indicated an 
economic recovery, jobs continued to be lost and unemployment continued 
to be high-a "jobless recovery."203 Moreover, in 2002 the stock market 
had seen the worst percentage decline in value since 197 4 and the deepest 
three straight years of stock-market declines-the first such losing streak 
since 193 9-1941.204 
20 I. Leonhard & Deutsch, supra note I99; Petruno, supra note I95; Andrew Countryman 
& Janet Kidd Stewart, Dividend Comeback; The Administration's Push to Eliminate Taxes 
on Dividends Could Help Fuel a Rebound in the Number of Companies Making Payments to 
Shareholders, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 7, 2003, at N-1. 
202. Norris, supra note I99. 
203. I49 CONG. REc. SI0890 (daily ed. Aug. I, 2003) (statement of Sen. Reed) (noting 
that more than 3.2 million private sector jobs were lost, with I.2 million jobs lost even after 
the "end" of the recession twenty months earlier, and that the slight decrease in 
unemployment (6.4% to 6.2% of the civilian labor force) in July did not represent a growth 
in jobs, only a drop in the number of people looking for jobs); EcoNOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, 
STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2004/2005: RECOVERY YET TO ARRIVE FOR WORKING 
FAMILIES (2004), available at http://www.epinet.org/books/swa2004/ news/swa2004_ 
release_fmal.pdf; Warren Rojas, Bush Claims Tax Cuts Are Working, Critics Point Out 
People Are Not, IOO TAX NOTES 875 (2003); Alex Berenson, Is There Such a Thing as a 
Jobless Recovery?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2003, at 4-3 (lack of job growth downside of the 
productivity boom); Ron Scherer, For Unemployed, Statistics Tell Only Part of Story, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 30, 2003, at I (indicating that the long-term unemployed 
constituted the fastest growing groups and that "people [were] so discouraged by the job 
search that they've just quit looking."); John M. Berry, Economy Lost 100,000 Jobs In 
December; Unemployment Rate Remains at 8-Year High, WASH. POST, Jan. II, 2003, at AI; 
David Leonhardt, Hiring in Nation Hits Worst Slump in Nearly 20 Years, N.Y. TIMES, 
February 6, 2003, at AI; Warren Vieth, Jobless Rate Slips to 5. 7% in January; Fewer 
Holiday Workers Are Laid Off But It's Too Early to Celebrate Job Growth, Economists 
Say, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2003, at 3-I; David Leonhardt, 108,000 Jobs Lost in March, U.S. 
Says, N.Y. TIMES. Apr. 5, 2003, at C-1. Job creation finally began to surge in February 
2004, prompting presidential candidate John Kerry, to shift his emphasis from job losses to 
"the apparently accurate claim that the new jobs pay less, on balance, than the ones that 
have been lost-$9,000 a year less, on average." Louis Uchitelle, It's the Economy, Right? 
Guess Again, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2005, at 3-1. 
204. Danielle DiMartino, Good Riddance; Year Offered Investors Little to Hang onto; 
Although Rallies Helped, Stock Indexes Turned in Their Third Annual Loss, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Jan. I, 2003, at D-1. See also http://averages. dowjones.com/ 
mdsidx/downloads/2000-2009.pdf. The Dow Jones Industrial Average first touched 10,000 
on March 16, 1999; it first closed above IO,OOO on March 29, 1999, at I0,006.78. The Dow 
Jones Industrial Average reached its highest point on January I4, 2000, closing at 
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3. Bush II Proposal of Exclusion oflndividual Dividends 
In early January 2003, the George W. Bush Administration released a 
trial balloon "stimulus" package with the three most significant proposed 
tax cuts being (1) exclusions of a large portion of individual dividend 
income from taxation205-the largest element ($364 billion) in the $674 
billion tax cut over 10 years; (2) increases in the amount of currently 
deductible small businesses equipment purchases; and (3) an acceleration 
of the individual rate cuts originally scheduled by the 2001 Act for 2004 to 
2003?06 
The Administration's earliest trial balloons would have excluded only 
one-half of dividends to reduce the revenue costs and to counter the 
11,722.98. At the beginning of2003, it had last closed above 10,000 on May 27,2002, at 
10104.26. Since January 14, 2000, the Dow Jones Industrial Average had its lowest close 
on October 9, 2002, at 7286.27. The Dow again crossed the 10,000 level on Dec. 9, 2003. 
Dow Jones Index News Release December 10, 2003, available at http://www.djindexes. 
com/mdsidx!htrnllpressrelease/press_hist2003.htrnl. 
205. The original Bush proposal excluded 100% of dividends paid out of current year 
earnings to individual taxpayers. Robert F. Manning & David F. Windish, A Concise 
Explanation of the Administration's Tax Proposals, 98 TAX NOTES 902 (2003); Jonathan 
Weisman, In House, Fight Brews Over Bush Tax Plan; Ways and Means Panel Targets 
President's Centerpiece-Dividend Cut-for Overhaul, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2003, at A5 
(noting that companies would record fully taxed profits in an "excludable dividend 
account," then inform shareholders which dividends are tax-free (or taxable), and that 
complexity has raised quiet concerns among corporate accountants). Bush's proposal would 
have also required a showing of taxes paid by the corporation distributing the dividend 
which they might be loath to disclose since this often would reveal a low effective income 
tax rate. Tom Petruno & Josh Friedman, Wall St. Expected to Hail Investment Tax Cuts; 
Though Less Than Expected, the Reductions Could Make Stocks More Appealing, 
Bolstering the Market's Nascent Recovery, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2003, at 1-17 (reporting 
that the Administration's plan was criticized as skewing Internal Revenue Code and 
corporate behavior too far in favor of dividend payments and that some analysts feared that 
technology companies "might fail to retain enough earnings to fund long-term growth." In 
response, the Treasury Department proposed allowing corporations to effectively give 
shareholders a capital-gain tax cut over time by increasing their stock basis by retained 
earnings, an approach that was criticized as "way too complicated"). For estimates of 
reductions in effective rates of high income individual taxpayers under the President's 
dividend exclusion proposal see Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., President's Dividends Plan 
Undertaxes High-Income Taxpayers, 98 TAX NOTES 389, 393-95 (2003). Note that the 
GAO estimated that the average individual effective income tax rate in 2004 of the top 
twenty percent was 14.2%. GAO, supra note 6, at 32 table 3. Given the fact that most of 
the income of the wealthiest one percent of taxpayers consists of capital gains and dividend 
income, their average effective income tax rate is probably lower than 14%. See supra 
notes 7, 15, and 17 and infra note 360. 
206. Edmund L. Andrews, Too Many Pennies from Heaven? N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003, 
at3-15. 
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appearance that the tax cut package was tilted to the wealthy,207 but 
"officials said George W. Bush decided to end the tax to provide a greater 
boost to the economy."208 Actually, the George W. Bush Administration 
was careful at first not to call the dividend tax cut package a stimulus 
proposae09 as many economists posited that the tax cut would not have the 
effect of increasing investment.210 The Administration did maintain that 
increasing the value of the stock market would make the cost of capital 
cheaper to public corporations.211 Here too, most economists disagreed,212 
and the future would prove them right-"[ n ]et equity issuance has stayed 
negative so far this year [first half of 2005], and share retirements have 
been boosted by considerable stock buy backs and cash-financed merger 
and acquisition activity."213 One would think that any cheaper cost of 
capital would have led to more public offerings. 
207. Edmund L. Andrews, White House Aides Push for 50% Cut in Dividend Taxes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 25, 2002, at Al. The Administration also floated in December the idea of not 
covering top bracket individual taxpayers from a proposed acceleration of ordinary rate cuts 
for the same reason, but dropped that idea due to opposition of Senate Finance Chair 
Charles Grassley (R-Ia.) because he did not want small business owners to be taxed at a 
higher top marginal rate than large corporations. Jill Barshay & Alan K. Ota, White House 
Must Keep Delicate Balance When Drafting Latest Tax Cut Package, 61 CONG. Q. WKLY. 
31 (2003). 
208. Bob Kemper & Frank James, Battle Begins on Rival Stimulus Plans; Democrats, 
GOP Argue over How to Boost Economy, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 7, 2003, at N-1. 
209. Dana Milbank, Bush Outlines Economic Plan; $674 Billion Package Would End Tax 
on Dividends, Accelerate Rate Cuts, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2003, at Al; Linda Feldmann, A 
Presidential Roads how to Pitch the Tax Cut, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 25, 2003, at 1. 
210. E.g., William G. Gale & Peter R. Orzag, Deficits, Interest Rates, and the User Cost 
of Capital: A Reconsideration of the Effects of Tax Policy on Investment 1 (Discussion 
Paper No. 27, Brookings Institution, Aug. 19, 2005) [hereinafter Deficits, Interest Rates, 
and Cost of Capital] (indicating that traditional economic formulations hold that lower 
capital income tax rates reduce the user cost of capital and stimulate investment. But, when 
a reduction in taxes generates an increase in the budget deficit, the expanded deficit raises 
interest rates and the opportunity cost of investment as well as the user cost of capital), 
available at http:/ /www.urban.org/UploadedPDF /311211_ TPC_DiscussionPaper_27 .pdf. 
211. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush and the Economy: Genesis of a Plan; Nurturing the 
Tax Cut Idea Since the Era of Reagan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2003, at Al6. 
212. See supra note 211. 
213. BOARD OF Gov. OF THE FED. RES. SYS., MONETARY POL'Y REP. TO THE CONG. 8 (July 
20, 2005); BOARD OF Gov. OF THE FED. RES. SYS., MONETARY POL'Y REP. TO THE CONG. 7 
(July 20, 2004) ("[N]et equity issuance has remained negative this year. Seasoned offerings 
have been scarce, the pace of initial public offerings has only inched up, and share 
retirements have continued to be strong"); BOARD OF Gov. OF THE FED. REs. SYS., 
MONETARY PoL'Y REP. TO THE CONG. 9 (Feb. 11, 2004) (indicating that equity issuance 
perked up in the second half of 2003, but still "for the year as a whole, firms extinguished 
more equity than they issued."); BOARD OF GOV. OF THE FED. RES. SYS., MONETARY POL'Y 
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The George W. Bush Administration asserted that the dividend tax cut 
was intended to restore confidence in the market214 and please the "investor 
class,"215 as well as affect long-term tax reform-"the first installment in a 
plan to overhaul the tax system from one that taxes income to one that 
taxes consumption."216 These justifications were more or less accurate, 
and, as discussed below, the true reasons for this tax cut.217 The more 
frequent, but less than accurate, rationale for the 100% exclusion was the 
REP. TO THE CONG. 9-11 (July 15, 2003) (stating that low interest rates and a stock market 
rise 
are helping to hold down firms' cost of capital; [however, n]et equity retirements 
in the first quarter of 2003 were probably a shade larger than in the fourth quarter 
of 2002, as the decline in gross new issuance more than offset lower gross 
retirements. Equity retirements from cash-financed mergers were a bit below their 
pace in the past two years, and share repurchases appear to be running somewhat 
slower as well). 
My colleague, Jayne Barnard, informed me that some of the equity retirements may have 
reflected smaller firms going private to avoid the burdens of SEC registration, particularly in 
light of Sarbanes-Oxley. A quick survey of the recent literature confirms her insight as to 
the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on smaller public firms. E.g., Larry Cata Backer, Privatizing 
and Nationalizing Corporate Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 327 
(2005); Andrew Skouvakis, Comment, Exiting the Public Markets: A Difficult Choice for 
Small Public Companies Struggling with Sarbanes-Oxley, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 1279 
(2005); Nathan Wilda, Comment, David Pays for Goliath's Mistakes: The Costly Effect 
Sarbanes-Oxley Has on Small Companies, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 671 (2004). 
214. Maura Reynolds, The President's Economic Plan; Bush Offers Tax Cuts to Spur 
Growth; the President Unveils a $674-billion Plan That He Says Will Stimulate Spending 
and the Stock Market. Critics Say Only the Rich Will Get Relief, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2003, at 
Al (reporting Bush's claim that the tax cuts would "boost confidence in our markets."); 
Edmund L. Andrews, Bush and the Economy: the Overview; White House Aides Launch a 
Defense of Bush Tax Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2003, at Al (detailing the CBO's report that 
Bush's tax cut and spending plan would bring only a negligible stimulus to the economy). 
215. Richard W. Stevenson, Bush and the Economy: News Analysis; The Politics of 
Portfolios, N.Y. TIMES , Jan. 7, 2003 Al; Editorial, The Charles Schwab Tax Cut, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2003, at Al8; Alan K. Ota, Uncertain Future in Conference Awaits Bush Tax 
Cut Package, 61 CONG. Q. WKLY. 935 (2003) (indicating that the Bush Administration told 
Republicans that elimination of dividends fit into the Administration's strategy of appealing 
to the investor class and energizing GOP business allies). 
216. Alan K. Ota, Investor Class Flexes New Political Clout in Debate over Bush's 
Dividend Tax Cut, 61 CONG. Q. WKLY. 248 (2003); Andrews, supra note 196; R.C. 
Longworth, Ultimately, an Attempt at Major Tax Reform, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 8, 2003, at N-1; 
Sam Zuckerman, Critics Question Bush Stimulus Plan; Many Argue Proposals Favoring 
Rich Won't Help in Short Term, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 8, 2004, at B-1; Mark Weisbrot, Opinion, 
Will New Tax Cuts Help Revive America's Sluggish Economy? No; Real Purpose Is to 
Rewrite Tax Code, Not Jump-Start Stalled Economy, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 29, 
2003, at B-7 (opining that the legislation was not designed to jump-start the economy, nor to 
help distressed families; its purpose was to rewrite the tax code so as to shift even more 
post-tax income to the richest individual taxpayers). 
217. See infra Part III. 
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notion of the "unfairness" of taxing income twice: once as corporate 
income and once as individual income. 218 When the dividend cut proved 
difficult to sell to Congress, the Administration changed its story and 
asserted that the cut would generate jobs.219 This too was problematical.220 
218. Alan K. Ota, Investor Class Flexes New Political Clout in Debate Over Bush's 
Dividend Tax Cut, 61 CONG. Q. WKLY. 248 (2003) (indicating that a leading pollster 
predicted that the investor class will have divided loyalties depending on income and 
affiliation with other groups, and that the bull market of the 1990s helped treble growth of 
households with investors from nineteen percent in 1983); Bob Kemper, Bush "Old Plan" 
for Economy; Tax Cuts, Jobless Aid Sought; 10-Year Package Totals $674 billion, CHI. 
TRIB., Jan. 8, 2003, at N-1; Edmund L. Andrews, Bush Budget Plan Would Eliminate Tax on 
Dividends, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2003, at AI (detailing budget proponents' claim that it is a 
distortion in the tax system to tax such income twice); Michael Kinsley, Dubya 's Dividend 
Delight, WASH. PosT, Jan. 17, 2003, at A23; Jill Barshay & Alan K. Ota, White House Must 
Keep Delicate Balance When Drafting Latest Tax Cut Package, 61 CoNG. Q. WKLY. 31 
(2003) (indicating that a Republican congressional aide advocated countering populist 
criticism with "corporate governance reform measure," and that companies were hoarding 
cash which insiders used "for their own fun and bad deals"). 
219. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, GOP Hunts Billions to Offset Tax Cuts; Lawmakers Lookfor 
Ways to Pay for Bush Proposal, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 29, 2003, at A1 ("Bush argues that 
another round of deep tax cuts would create jobs and spur enough growth to erase those 
deficits in the future, essentially paying for themselves."); Allan Sloan, For Bush, Cutting 
Taxes Is the Plan for All Seasons, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2003, at E3; Janet Hook, GOP 
Domestic Dispute Is On; With an Intraparty Split on Tax Cuts and the 2004 Elections on the 
Horizon, the Pressure Is on Bush to Get His House and Senate in Order, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 
27, 2003, at A30. Commentator Thomas Oliphant dismissed the tax-free dividends stock 
market player's issue as "at best inconsequential and at worst a serious threat to responsible 
fiscal and social policy." He also indicated tha Bush did not even refer to it in relation to the 
poor economy. "Instead, his rhetoric uses cover like 'jobs package'or 'growth package,' 
ignoring the absence of evidence that his program would affect either. Above all, he shouts 
to the rafters that size matters, claiming that Congress must give him a 'package'of at least 
$550 billion." Thomas Oliphant, Opinion, The Real Deal on Bush's Tax Cut Plan, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Apr. 20, 2003, at D-11. The unemployment rate rose to six percent in April of 2003 
in light of recent reports of persistent job losses. Janet Hook, House OKs $550-Billion Tax 
Cut Bill; The Measure Includes Key Elements of Bush 's Initiative. Stage is Set for a Fight 
with the Senate, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 2003, at A1 ("Bush and his GOP allies have put new 
emphasis on selling tax cuts as an engine of job creation. In the absence of such a message, 
a GOP pollster said voters' concern about the growing federal budget deficit threatens to 
undercut support for plan."); Peter G. Gosselin, News Analysis; "Jobs and Growth" Plan 
May Not Do Much for Either; Congressional Study Raises Doubts About Effectiveness of 
Bush's Tax-cutting Proposals, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 2003, at A-23. 
220. Jonathan Weisman, Bush Offers New Argument for His Tax-Cut Proposal; President 
Says $550 Billion Reduction Would Create More Jobs, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2003. at A4 
(indicating that the Council of Economic Advisers projected that the original Bush plan 
would create 510,000 new jobs in 2004, but, given that the economy was losing 92,000 jobs 
a month, net only 192,000 jobs; virtually all the jobs so "created" in 2004 would have 
happened anyway in 2005-07). 
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Many commentators and economists believed that eliminating double 
taxation of corporate earnings in and of itself was sound due to the 
distortions such taxation was thought to create:221 (1) reliance on corporate 
debt (interest is deductible) rather than equity financing (dividends are not 
deductible);222 (2) corporate retention of earnings in cash (and perhaps 
221. A few commentators criticized the fundamental assumption of double taxation of 
dividends. The effective rate of federal income taxation of public corporations is often 
stated to be fifteen percent of income. George K. Yin, How Much Tax Do Large Public 
Corporations Pay?: Estimating the Effective Tax Rates of the S&P 500, 89 VA. L. REv. 
1793, 1794 n.6 and 1797 (2003) (estimating that the average effective income tax rate on 
world-wide income on S&P 500 corporations fell from 28.5% in 1995 to 24.20% in 2000, 
with great variation between industry sectors). Furthermore, only one half of dividends are 
subject to taxation due to the overwhelming ownership of public corporations by owners not 
subject to taxation on dividends, e.g., tax-exempt owners (retirement plan and charities), 
foreigners, and other corporations. Paying Dividends: How the President's Tax Plan Will 
Benefit Individual Investors and Strengthen the Capital Markets, Hearing Before the House 
Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, March 18, 
2003 (Testimony of Peter R. Orszag), available at http://fmancialservices.house.gov/ 
hearings.asp?formmode=detail&hearing=I90; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David S. Miller, 
Opinion, A Tax Plan That Will Pay Few Dividends, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2003, at B-2; Lee, 
Critique, supra note 6, at 84; Tom Petruno & Josh Friedman, Wall St. Expected to Hail 
Investment Tax Cuts; Though Less Than Expected, the Reductions Could Make Stocks More 
Appealing, Bolstering the Market's Nascent Recovery, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2003, at Al7 
("Although investors who own stocks in tax-deferred retirement accounts would not benefit 
directly from a tax cut, over time they would gain if the tax plan lifts stock prices."). 
Professor Kwall has made a case against elimination of double taxation to the extent it does 
exist. Jeffrey L. Kwall, The Uncertain Case Against the Double Taxation of Corporate 
Income, 68 N.C.L. REv. 613 (1990) (questioning the prudence of eliminating the double 
taxation of distributed corporate income because it may jeopardize recent tax reforms aimed 
at improving the efficiency and equity of our tax system); Lee, Entity Classification and 
Integration, supra note 7, at 100-03 (describing rough justice in partially offsetting vertical 
and horizontal inequities as to high income individual owners) and 97 n.I52 (viewing at 
least for teaching purposes (pre-9-11) corporate tax as an appropriate user fee because large 
public corporations exploit foreign markets and therefore rely on the country's (expensive) 
military might in order to ensure stability in those markets). 
222. Tom Saler, Zero Tax for Dividends Puts Emphasis on Cash; Historical Perspectives; 
Zero Tax for Dividends Puts Emphasis on Cash, Not Promises; Federal Attention Shows 
Increasing Importance of Wall Street to America, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 18, 2003, at 
D-2 (describing how new debt was used to expand productive capacity beyond all reason, 
restraining business investment); Federal Reserve Board's Semiannual Monetary Policy 
Report to the Congress: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, March 7, 2002 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd. Of 
Governors) 
([E]xpenditures on computers rose at a double-digit annual rate in real terms last 
quarter. But investment expenditures in the communications sector, where the 
amount of over capacity was substantial, as yet show few signs of turning up, and 
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making unwise investments or encouraging empire building by corporate 
management); (3) skewing of the market toward stock in growth 
corporations retaining earnings rather than steady earners paying dividends; 
and ( 4) by discouraging pay outs requiring cash profits, encouraging 
"financial funny business that only looks good on paper."223 The 
consensus, however, was that the better way of addressing these problems 
was a corporate level deduction for dividends in parity with deduction of 
interest. 224 
Most economists agreed that an individual shareholder level dividend 
tax cut would improve the stock market, but were skeptical that it would do 
much to increase business investment or consumer spending in the short 
term.225 Dividend exclusion proposals, of course, faced Democratic 
business investment in some other sectors, such as aircraft, hit by the drop in air 
travel, will presumably remain weak this year.), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ boarddocs/hh/2002/march/testimony.htm. 
223. Virginia Postrel, Tax Policy Is Not Just an Economic Tool. It's Also a Partisan 
Weapon, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2003, at C-2. 
224. !d. Commentators noted that a capital gains rate cut from twenty percent to fifteen 
percent was highly unlikely to provide a stimulus. JOEL FRIEDMAN, ET AL, CENTER ON 
BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, WOULD A CAPITAL GAINS TAX CUT STIMULATE THE 
ECONOMY? 1 (2001 ), available at http://www.cbpp.org/9-20-0 1 tax.pdf 
([A]dvocates of a capital gains tax cut have not traditionally claimed it has a 
stimulus effect. In the past, they have argued that it would provide long-term, 
rather than short-term, benefits for the economy. Even these long-run benefit 
arguments are weak. The Congressional Budget Office and other respected 
analysts have found that a capital gains tax cut would have very little impact on 
economic growth.). 
Others believed that the Bush Administration did not choose the better way to end "double 
taxation" (corporate deduction for dividend payments) because the tax cost for such a 
deduction is far greater than the cost of an individual preference since less than one half of 
public stock is held by individuals (taxing tax-exempt shareholders on the receipt of 
dividends deductible by the distributing corporation or barring a deduction if the recipient 
shareholder was tax-exempt or functionally tax exempt generally was not considered). 
Also, in the wake of accounting scandals, cutting corporate taxes became politically more 
dangerous than cutting taxes on the wealthy. Jill Barshay & Alan K. Ota, White House Must 
Keep Delicate Balance When Drafting Latest Tax Cut Package, 61 CONG. Q. WKLY. 31 
(2003); Richard W. Stevenson, Bush and the Economy: News Analysis; The Politics of 
Portfolios, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2003, at A 1 ("[C]ritics even question the existence of a so-
called investor class as anything other than an excuse for Republicans to cut taxes again for 
the wealthy."). 
225. Edmund L. Andrews, Bush Budget Plan Would Eliminate Tax on Dividends, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2003. at A 1; Janet Hook & Lynn Marshall, For Many, Tax Cut Windfall Will 
Be Socked Away; Bush's Hope That People Will Spend the Extra Cash to Give a Bounce to 
the Sagging Economy May Fall Victim to Tight Fiscal Times, Analysts Say, L.A. TIMES, 
May 26, 2003, at A21 (indicating that in the past more taxpayers used tax windfalls to pay 
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opposition due to their distributional effects,226 but also Republican 
opposition on the grounds that a dividend exclusion would undermine tax 
credits intended to "encourage business investment in such pet causes as 
alternative energy and low-income housing," as well as corporate 
investments. 227 
With twenty-five percent unused industrial capacity,228 a proposal for 
additional capital expenditures was probably rnisdirected,229 and arguably 
off debt or increase savings rather than for new consumer spending; only twenty-five 
percent of those surveyed said they spent the rebate they received under Bush's 2001 tax 
cut); Peter G. Gosselin, Modest Jolt in Economy Seen From Tax Cut; People Will Have 
More Cash to Spend, Analysts Say, but the Package's "Sunset" Provisions Prevent Long-
term, Sustained Growth, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 2003, at Al7 (noting that independent 
economists, even if sympathetic to more tax cuts, doubt that cuts of the size in final bill will 
be enough to get the economy out of its torpor). "They'll have some positive effect in the 
short run, but not much .... Most doubt surrounding the economic effect of the tax cut 
package centers on its sunset provisions." !d. 
226. 149 CONG. REc. S5747 (daily ed. May 6, 2003) (statement of Sen. Conrad) 
(The House Ways and Means committee plans to take up a tax plan that makes 
President Bush's look like a model of budget honesty, fiscal probity, and 
distributional fairness. The plan concocted by Chairman Bill Thomas junks the 
president's proposal to end taxes on dividends in favor of a proposal to cut the top 
rate on both dividends and capital gains to 15 percent. The Thomas plan is more 
straightforward than the administration's complicated proposal but has not much 
else to recommend it. First, it is tilted even more heavily to the very wealthy. An 
analysis by the Urban Institute-Brookings Tax Policy Center shows that 
households with annual incomes of more than $1 million would see their taxes 
drop an average of $42,800 under the Thomas capital gains-dividend cut, 
compared with $26,800 under the Bush dividend plan. Taking the two plans as a 
whole, those households would receive an average tax cut in 2003 of $105,600 
under the Thomas plan and $89,500 under the Bush plan.). 
227. Alan K. Ota, Bush Encounters Ill-Wind .from Republicans on Dividend Tax Cut, 61 
CONG. Q. WKLY. 335 (2003). Corporate opposition to corporate-shareholder integration 
sank President Jimmy Carter's integration proposals. Lee, Entity Classification and 
Integration, supra note 7, at 70. 
228. Federal Reserve Statistical Release G.l7, Industrial Production and Capacity 
Utilization, 2002 Historical and Annual Revision. (Dec. 5, 2002) 
([T]he rate of industrial capacity utilization in the third quarter of 2002, at 76.2 
percent, is essentially unchanged from previously reported data (table 7). The rate 
was more than 5 percentage points below its 1972-2001 average and about 3 
percentage points below the low in the 1990-91 recession, but 5 percentage points 
above the trough in the 1982 recession.), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/G 17/Revisions/20021205/default_ 
rev.htrn. In 2005, there was still only 78.4% industrial capacity utilization, up from 77.9% 
at the end of 2004. Monetary Policy Report to Congress, Fed. Reserve Bull. (Fed. Reserve 
Bd., Washington, D.C.), July 2005, at 3, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boarddocs/hh/2005/july/fullreport. pdf. 
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unlikely to increase employment in any case.230 More important to the 
George W. Bush Administration was the strategy of reversing the three-
year decline in the stock market since 2000.231 Also reportedly important 
229. Peter Orszag, The Administration's Economic "Stimulus" Proposals, Testimony 
Before the Democratic Policy Committee, 3 (Jan. 22, 2003), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/views/testimony/orszag/20030121.pdf; Robert B. Reich, Bush 
Proves He's an Upper-Class Act; Under His Tax Plan, the Only Winners Are the Economic 
Elite, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2003, at B-12 
(The president's plan responds to the nation's two overarching economic 
problems-overcapacity and widening inequality-by worsening both. It's a 
remarkable achievement, made all the more remarkable by the utter cynicism with 
which it's being marketed. It's not a plan for 'growth and jobs.' It's a plan for 
rewarding the rich when what the economy needs is more spending by people of 
modest means. And it further concentrates wealth and power at a time when 
wealth and power are already in fewer and fewer hands.); 
George Hager, Recovery Not Likely to Be Robust, USA TODAY, Dec. 10, 2001, at B-1 
(indicating that 74.6% of industrial capacity utilization was the lowest figure in more than 
eighteen years); Steven Pearlstein, Impasse on Stimulus Could Deepen Downturn, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 8, 2001, at E-1 (stating that business tax cuts were unlikely to persuade 
businesses to make additional investments in plants and equipment if sales are falling and 
businesses already have more productive capacity than they can profitably use). 
230. Tom Petruno, On Wall St., Economy Returns to Center Stage, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 
2003, at 3-1. (showing that seventy-three percent of CEO's were expected to maintain or 
increase capital expenditures within six months, but only nine percent planned more hiring 
in the next six months); Alan B. Krueger, As Recovery Builds, the Less Educated Go to the 
End of the Employment Line, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2002, at C-2. In times of recession firms 
tend to restructure, which in tum tends to increase demand for skilled workers, who are 
more flexible. Meanwhile, when companies introduce new technology, they tend to hire 
skilled workers to operate the equipment and release unskilled workers whose skills become 
obsolete. !d. 
231. Roland Watson, Bush Gambles His Future on Stock Market Revival, TIMES 
(London), Jan. 8, 2003, at 13 (proposed abolition of dividend taxes showed Bush pinning his 
re-election hopes on a stock market recovery rather than any other economic indicator); 
Mike Allen & Dana Milbank, President to Seek Dividend Tax Cut; Stimulus Plan's 10-Year 
Cost Put at $300 Billion, WASH. PosT, Jan 3, 2003, at AI (recounting the argument that 
eliminating the taxation on dividends might help restore investor confidence and encourage 
investments in profitable companies); Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush and the Economy: Genesis 
of a Plan; Nurturing the Tax Cut Idea Since the Era of Reagan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2003, at 
Al6 (reporting a conservative lobbying group's claim of"virtual unanimous agreement that 
reducing the tax on dividends would provide the most help for the stock market in the 
shortest period of time"); 149 CONG. REc. S15922 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 2003) (statement of 
Sen. Santorum) ("As a result of that tax reduction, which in part was reducing capital gains 
tax, but also reducing the double taxation of dividends, it has caused a $2 trillion increase .. 
. in valuations of equities in this country. That is an enormous turnaround."); 149 CONG. 
REc. S6958 (daily ed. May 22, 2003) (statement of Sen. Finance Committee Chair Grassley) 
(A major cause of the sluggish economy is the bursting of the stock market bubble 
created in the 1990s. This bill will address the ailing stock market. It will help 
create jobs. It will grow the economy. It will put money back into the hands of 
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to President George W. Bush was giving the impression that he cared about 
the economy and jobs.232 He continued to push, however, for the dividend 
tax cut notwithstanding its unpopularity in the polls.233 
In March of 2003, President George W. Bush formally proposed a tax 
cut of $726 billion over 10 years, with more than one half attributable to 
the proposed elimination of the tax on dividends.234 In the early stages of 
the proposal, the Administration also proposed making the 2001 Act cut 
permanent.235 The Administration's firm Republican support in the House 
and Senate for the entire cut began to erode with its request in late March 
families, consumers, investors, and businesses that will help fuel our economic 
engines that create those jobs that we hope will be created from this legislation.); 
149 CONG. REc. S6961 (statement of Sen. Nickles) (arguing that the bill would help the 
stock market). 
232. Edwin Chen, Bush Turns His Attention to Ailing Economy; The Administration 
Plans a Big Push for His Agenda to Try to Prevent the Political Fate That Befell His Father 
After the Persian Gulf War, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2003, at A26; Judy Keen, Politics Behind 
Bush's Tax Reversal, USA TODAY, May 23, 2003, at Al3 ("Bush can boast to voters that he 
has twice fought for and won substantial tax cuts."). 
233. Fifty percent of poll respondents supported and thirty-eight percent opposed the 
proposed tax cuts, but when "tax cuts are stacked against alternative national priorities, they 
score low on the list, after items such as healthcare and education." A plurality believed 
"Congress should not pass President Bush's tax cut plan because the federal budget is now 
in deficit and the costs of the war are unknown." Linda Feldmann, A Presidential 
Roadshow to Pitch the Tax Cut, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Apr. 25, 2003, at 1. See also 
David L. Greene & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Bush Retreats on Tax-cut Proposal; With 
Congress Resisting, He Says He'd Accept a $550 Billion Package, BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 
16, 2003, at A3("[Seventy percent of respondents] approve of the way the younger Bush is 
handling his job as president, fewer than half say they approve of his management of the 
economy. And a majority of those surveyed say they don't think now is the time for new 
tax cuts."); Bob Kemper, Bush Launching Tax-cut Blitz; Sagging Economy Becomes New 
War, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 15, 2003, at C-11 (reporting Gallup poll results showing that most 
believe their taxes are "fair" while sixty percent believe richest taxpayers pay "too little"); 
Jim VandeHei, Bush's Domestic Agenda Suffers Hill Setbacks; Actions on Tax Cut, Oil 
Drilling in Alaska, Faith-Based Initiative Reflect Problems, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2003, at 
AS (showing that sixty-five percent of poll respondents "favor cutting Bush's tax cut in half 
to pay for the war, shore up Social Security and shrink the deficit"). Another report 
indicated that public opinion represents a thicket of contradictions on taxes. Both parties 
privately mistrust some of what the polls reveal, but acknowledge that the public draws little 
connection between the kinds of tax cuts Bush supported and direct improvement in the 
economy. Polls show fifty-seven percent believe strengthening the economy should be at 
top of the president's agenda; five percent favor passing tax cuts; sixty-four percent suggest 
there are better ways to improve the economy than by cutting taxes. Dan Balz, Bush's 
Fortunes Tied to Economy's, WASH. PosT, May 24,2003, at A7. 
234. Jim VandeHei, GOP Liberals Are Key to Tax Cut; Fate of Bush Proposal Depends 
on Votes of a Few Senators, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2003, at A3. 
235. Alan K. Ota, Duration of Tax Cuts, Budget has GOP on Horns of a Dilemma, 61 
CONG. Q. WKLY. 499,500 (Mar. 1, 2003). 
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for an additional $75 billion to fund military operations.236 The possibility 
of an invasion of Iraq increased fears of a rapidly growing deficit. 237 
4. Parity of Capital Gains and Dividends Ploy 
The House limited its tax cut to $529 billion over ten years; the Senate 
leadership, to $350 billion.238 Neither Chamber supported the 
Administration's proposed significant increase in individual tax savings 
proposals (another backdoor consumption tax ploy).239 Bush criticized the 
$350 billion tax cut as "little bitty."240 Under a $350 billion ceiling, a full 
individual dividend exclusion, with revenue losses for the budget window 
estimated at around $364,241 would have ruled out all other tax cuts.242 
236. Jim VandeHei, supra note 234; Jill Barshay, GOP Tax Cutters Stumble Out of the 
Gate, Bloated Military Bill Pulled from House Floor, 61 CONG. Q. WKLY. 560 (2003). 
237. Alan K. Ota, Tax Cut Agendas Compete in Senate as War Clouds Breed Deficit 
Fears, 61 CONG. Q. WKLY. 610, 614 (2003). 
238. Alan K. Ota, GOP Leaders Seek the Magic Number: A Survivable Tax Cut 
Compromise, 61 CONG. Q. WKLY. (2003) (indicating that the $350 billion number was 
necessary to obtain the approval of two centrist Republican senators); Jim VandeHei, supra 
note 234 
([A]lthough Bush enjoys solid support for his tax cut from ninety-five percent of 
House and Senate Republicans, regardless of the pace of the war and the size of 
projected deficits, the ever-shrinking Rockefeller wing of the party is still large 
enough-and concerned enough-to join Democrats and slice it in half .... The 
Senate, under pressure from these members, yesterday passed a budget resolution 
calling for $350 billion in tax cuts over I 0 years.); 
Jill Zuckman, GOP Leaders Can't Get on Same Page; Disputes Erupt in Congress over 
Domestic Agenda, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 22, 2003, at C-10 ("Senate Finance Committee 
Chairman Charles Grassley (R-Ia.), eager to win the support of moderates for a broad 
budget plan, promised Sens. Olympia Snowe (R-Maine) and George Voinovich (R-Ohio) he 
would limit the package to $350 billion. Frist approved the deal .... "). 
239. Jim VandeHei, supra note 234. 
240. Edwin Chen & Janet Hook, Bush Launches Tax Cut Offensive; The Least He 'II 
Accept is $550 Billion, President Says in a Challenge to His GOP Congressional Critics, 
Who He Says "Have Some Explaining to Do," L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2003, at 1-1 ("If they 
agree that tax relief creates jobs, then why are they for a little-bitty tax relief package?"); Jill 
Barshay, For Bush, Tax Cut Package is Next Must-Win Battle, 61 CONG. Q. WKLY. 974 
(2003). 
241. Jim VandeHei, supra note 234. 
242. Alan K. Ota, Tax Cut Agendas Compete in Senate as War Clouds Breed Deficit 
Fears, supra note 237, at 614. 
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The George W. Bush Administration then floated the idea of phasing in 
the dividend exclusion over ten years,243 which most proponents of a 
dividend exclusion for individuals opposed as tending to delay payments of 
dividends until shareholders would get the better deal.244 Commentators 
speculated that the Administration's proposal was an opening bid in a 
negotiating strategy, which it denied,245 though subsequent events revealed 
that likely was the case. The Senate's proposal, while providing a full 
exclusion (for one year), was especially gimmicky with yo-yo effective 
dates in addition to phase-ins.246 
243. Jill Zuckman, GOP Leaders Can't Get on Same Page; Disputes Erupt in Congress 
over Domestic Agenda, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 22, 2003, at C-10 (revealing that another option 
considered by the White House was to implement half of the cuts immediately and the rest 
over a decade); Jonathan Weisman, White House Eases Stand on Dividend Tax; Cut Could 
Be Phased In Gradually to Win Passage, WASH. POST, Apr. 22,2003, at E-1. 
244. Jonathan Weisman, In House, Fight Brews over Bush Tax Plan; Ways and Means 
Panel Targets President's Centerpiece-Dividend Cut-for Overhaul, WASH. POST,Apr. 27, 
2003, at AS. 
245. Jonathan Weisman & Mike Allen, Bush Will Propose Larger Stimulus; $674 Billion 
Initiative Accelerates Tax Cuts, WASH. PosT, Jan. 7, 2003, at AI; Dana Milbank, Bush 
Outlines Economic Plan; $674 Billion Package Would End Tax on Dividends, Accelerate 
Rate Cuts, WASH. PosT, Jan. 8, 2003, at AI; Janet Hook, Many Lawmakers Feel Bush 
Growth Package Needs Overhaul; Democrats Are Cold to the Plan and Even GOP Senators 
Signal That Its Success Isn't Assured, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2003, at 1-1; Dana Milbank & Jim 
VandeHei, Key GOP Senators Object to Bush Plan; President Has Difficult Sell on Tax 
Package, WASH. POST, Jan. 11,2003, at AI. 
246. Individual taxpayers could exclude $500 in dividends. In the first four to five years, 
ten percent above that amount would also qualify, rising to twenty percent in later years. 
The cost due to scattered effective dates was only $81 billion, less than Administration and 
House proposals. Dan Morgan, GOP Senators Reach Tax Cut Pact; Finance Committee 
Would Limit Relief on Stock Dividends, WASH. POST, May 8, 2003, at A2. See also 149 
CONG. REc. S7085 (daily ed. June 2, 2003) (statement of Sen. Baucus) 
(The conferees have designed a tax cut that is one big yo-yo. Now you see it, now 
you don't. Child credit is increased for 2003 and 2004. Then it is taken away. 
Part of the marriage penalty is eliminated for 2003 and 2004, and then the penalty 
comes back. The 10-percent tax bracket is expanded for 2003. Then it reverts 
back. Even the dividend tax cut disappears after 2008. If accounting gimmicks 
and financial statement manipulations were intolerable for corporate America, 
then why not for the Congress?); 
149 CONG. REc. H4707 (statement of Rep. Frost) ("[M]ajority leader, the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. DeLay), was in the newspapers bragging about how easy it is to fudge the 
numbers to make their tax plan look less expensive than it really is."); Editorial, Yo-Yo 
Economics, WASH. POST, May 23 2003, at A24 
(Nine of the 10 tax cuts in the package are set to expire before 2013, most after 
just two--that's right, two--years. The point is to make the 10-year projections 
look affordable, and never mind the irrationality. 'A whole basket of yo-yos,' as 
the Senate Finance Committee's ranking Democrat, Max Baucus (Mont.), said 
Winter 2006] CLASS WARFARE 109 
House Ways & Means Chair Bill Thomas (R-Cal.) came up with the 
winning idea: tax individual capital gains and dividends at the same rate, 
fifteen percent for all but the lowest bracket taxpayers who would be taxed 
at 5 percent,247 as "a better stimulus to the economy than trying to eliminate 
dividend taxes."248 Unlike the partisan 2001 Act largely following 
President George W. Bush's proposals, Chair Thomas was forced to opt for 
a strategy of compromise, much like President Bill Clinton in 1997, in 
order to meet the Senate's $350 billion ceiling on tax cuts.249 President 
George W. Bush first favored the Senate approach because it "embraced 
the principle of repeal," but then switched to the House approach since it 
could meet the $350 billion Senate budget ceiling on tax cuts once the 
sunsets were advanced, thus shortening the periods the cuts would be in 
yesterday. Congress has resorted to this sort of trickery before, but never on such 
an audacious scale.) 
Such trickery is discussed in a work-in-progress: Selling of Bush II Income Tax Cuts. 
247. Stephen J. Norton, Bush Determined Not to Repeat Father's Politically Fatal Errors, 
61 CoNG. Q. WKLY. 976 (2003) (indicating that Thomas proposed eight percent (lower 
income taxpayer's) and eighteen percent for both capital gains and dividends); Jonathan 
Weisman, In House, Fight Brews over Bush Tax Plan; Ways and Means Panel Targets 
President's Centerpiece-Dividend Cut-for Overhaul, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 2003, at A5 
(indicating that Thomas originally proposed an eighteen percent dividend tax rate, cutting 
the top individual rate on dividends almost in half); Jonathan Weisman, Simpler Tax Cut Is 
Floated; House Leaders Offer Uniform Rate on Dividends, Capital Gains, WASH. POST, 
May I, 2003, at A4 (indicating that Thomas's draft proposal would increase (1) the $600 
child credit to $1,000 but for as little as one year; (2) increase the amount of investments 
that small businesses could write off to $75,000 from the current $25,000, but again only a 
year or two; and (3) immediately eliminate the marriage penalty, but only temporarily. 
Bush's corresponding proposals would have been permanent. Thomas's plan did include 
Bush's immediate cut in income tax rates to levels previously scheduled to take effect in 
2006.). This simplified the Code as to capital gains by eliminating the eighteen percent after 
five-year holding period. 149 CONG. REc S7072 (daily ed. May 23, 2003) (statement of 
Chair Grassley). At an earlier stage, Chair Grassley had floated a proposal to provide a fifty 
percent rate cut for both dividends and capital gains. Alan K. Ota & Jill Barshay, Bush's 
Dividend Plan at Center Stage as Tax Cut Negotiations Begin, 61 CONG. Q. WKLY. 668, 669 
(2003). See also Alan K. Ota, GOP Leaders Seek the Magic Number: A Survivable Tax Cut 
Compromise, 61 CONG. Q. WKLY. 812 (2003). 
248. Jonathan Weisman, In House, Fight Brews Over Bush Tax Plan; Ways and Means 
Panel Targets President's Centerpiece-Dividend Cut-for Overhaul, WASH. POST, Apr. 
27, 2003, at A5 (indicating that foregone revenue would "cost the Treasury considerably 
less through 2013: about $234 billion, compared with Bush's $396 billion."); Jonathan 
Weisman, White House Eases Stand on Dividend Tax; Cut Could Be Phased In Gradually 
to Win Passage, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 2003, at E-1. 
249 Alan K. Ota, Deadlocked Tax Cut Proposals Expose Rift in GOP Ideology, 61 CONG. 
Q. WKLY. 1029 (2003). 
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effect.250 This greatly angered Senate Finance Chair Grassley, who felt 
undercut by President George W. Bush. 251 
The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003252 cut 
dividend and capital gains to fifteen percent (five percent and zero percent 
in 2008 for taxpayers in the fifteen percent and below bracket), a rate not 
250. Janet Hook, House, Senate Reach a Deal on Tax Cuts; GOP Negotiators Back a 
$350-billion Plan to Slash Dividend and Capital Gain Levies While Aiding States. Bush 
Could Get the Bill This Week, L.A. TIMES, May 22, 2003, at AI; Jonathan Weisman, White 
House Bends on Tax Cut; House GOP Compromise Gets Administration's Support, WASH. 
POST, May 2, 2003, at A4; Carolyn Lochhead, Bakersfield Republican Has Winning Tax 
Plan; Bush, Senate Outfoxed with Compromise, S.F. CHRON., May 22, 2003, at A3 (House 
plan far more popular among rank-and-file Republicans); Jonathan Weisman, Bush Backs 
House Version of Tax Cut; Plan Seeks to Cut Rate on Dividends to 15%, WASH. POST, May 
21, 2003, at El; Janet Hook, Congress OKs $350-Billion Tax Cut Bill; If Its Many 
Temporary Provisions Are Made Permanent, the Bill Could Provide a Bigger Cut Than 
Bush Sought-Up to $1 trillion, L.A. TIMES, May 24, 2003, at AI5; David E. Rosenbaum, A 
Tax Cut Without End, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2003, at AI; Dana Milbank & Jim VandeHei, 
Bush Retreat Eased Bill's Advance, WASH. POST, May 23, 2003. at A5. At the last minute 
the Conference omitted child tax credits for the working poor. 149 CONG. REc S7453 (daily 
ed. Jun. 5, 2003) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller); 149 CONG. REc H4845 (daily ed. Jun. 3, 
2003) (statement of Rep. Brown). A subsequent act added them back. See Janet Hook, A 
Push to Revive Child Tax Aid for Poor; Amid Criticism, 2 GOP Bills Now Seek to Give 
Refunds to Low-income Families, Benefits That Had Been Dropped From the Tax Cut Law, 
L.A. TIMES, June 3, 2003, at Al4 (indicating that the bills provide child tax credit refunds to 
6.5 million families earning between roughly $10,500 and $26,625 a year, for whom refunds 
were quietly dropped from the tax cut measure as part of fmal congressional jockeying to 
keep its total cost at $350 billion); Paul Krugman, Opinion, Duped And Betrayed, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jun. 6, 2003, at A33 ("As in 2001, the administration softened the profile of a tax cut 
mainly aimed at the wealthy by including a credit for families with children."). 
251. Grassley came away from a meeting with Thomas, House and Senate leaders and 
President Bush 
convinced the final bill would feature a limited version of Bush's plan to make 
dividends tax-free. And he reacted angrily when Thomas and the White House 
agreed the following day to drop the dividend plan in favor of a variation on the 
House's approach. Thomas, a former political science professor, explained to 
Bush that while the Senate bill stayed true to the president's vision, 'the structure 
didn't make sense.' The tax break would end too soon, and it would fail to require 
companies to pay income taxes before distributing dividends tax-free. That last 
oversight would do more than end double taxation of corporate profits-Bush's 
goal-it would allow them to be tax-free altogether. Worse still, Thomas informed 
the president, Senate rules would forbid inserting a new provision in conference to 
fix the problem. 
Alan K. Ota, Tax Cut Package Clears Amid Bicameral Rancor, 61 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1245 
(2003). See also Jill Barshay, A Rough but Steady Hand at Helm of Ways and Means, 61 
CONG. Q. WKLY. 1668, 1669 (2003) (indicating that Thomas misstated Senate rules). 
252. Pub. L. No. I 08-27, 117 Stat. 252. 
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seen for capital gains since 1941 under the 1939 Code. 253 These capital 
gains/dividend rate cuts provided an extremely disproportionate benefit to 
top income taxpayers254 which, unlike the 2001 cut, was not deferred. At 
the same time, the 2003 Act adopted a number of tax cuts which also 
disproportionately benefited the top income taxpayers: accelerating the 
effective date of the 2001 Act rate reductions by putting into effect for all 
tax years after 2002 and before 2011 the twenty-five percent, twenty-eight 
percent, thirty-three percent, and thirty-five percent brackets originally 
scheduled to take effect in 2006; and temporarily increasing cuts targeted at 
middle and lower income taxpayers: (a) the standard deduction and the 
upper limit of the fifteen percent regular income tax rate bracket for 
married taxpayers filing joint returns to twice the upper limit of the fifteen 
percent regular income tax rate bracket for single taxpayers taxable years 
beginning in 2003 and 2004; and (b) the upper limit of the ten percent rate 
bracket from $6000 to $7000 for single taxpayers and from $12,000 to 
$14,000 for married taxpayers filing joint returns (indexed for inflation in 
2004), previously scheduled to take effect in 2008, effective in 2003 and 
2004. The reduction to thirty-five percent at the top was almost twice as 
great a reduction as the reduction of the three lower brackets-"[t]or the 
middle three income brackets . . . rates would drop by two percentage 
points, but the top rate will fall by 3.6 percentage points."255 The top one 
253. Lee, The Capital Gains "Sieve", supra note 10, at 13, 21. 
254. See supra note 15. 
255. 149 CONG. REc. S7079 (daily ed. Jun. 2, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 149 
CONG. REc. at S7072 (statement of Sen. Dayton) 
(It uses every trick in the budget book to line the pockets of the upper class. It 
cuts the top tax rates immediately, retroactively, and permanently. It lowers the 
top rate by almost twice as much as the next three. That gives the most rate 
reduction to people who are making over $370,000 a year, only half of that rate 
reduction to people making over $150,000 a year, and no rate reduction at all to 
people in the bottom two brackets-the I 0 and 15 percent rates. There is just a 
tweaking of the bottom I 0-percent bracket, which provides $100 a year to couples 
and $50 a year to individuals. That is also the only change to a tax bracket which 
is temporary. The top rate cuts are all permanent.). 
112 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:1 
percent was projected to garner sixty-four percent of the benefits of the 
2003 Act tax cuts in 2005 ?56 
These 2003 rate accelerations forced "the Democrats toward a stark 
choice they had hoped to avoid: either accepting the Bush cuts or explicitly 
proposing to increase taxes.257 The first option would leave them with little 
money to fund the initiatives they [were] proposing; the second would 
256M M h c a on, supra note 7 1063 Th d. "b . , at e 1stn utton o fd" "d d . tl II lVI en s IS as o ows: 
Income Share of Share of Share of all Average dividend for 
all returns returns dividend those with dividends 
with amounts 
dividends 
Under $50,000 71.8% 16.8% 18.5% $796 
$50,000 to $100,000 19.8% 41.5% 18.5% $1,428 
$100,000 to $1,000,000 8.2% 71.9% 41.8% $4,511 
Over $1,000,000 0.2% 96.3% 21.2% $75,463 
All Returns 100.0% 26.4% 100.0% $2,411 
JOEL FRIEDMAN & ROBERT GREENSTEIN, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, 
EXEMPTING CORPORATE DIVIDENDS FROM INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES 21 (2003), available at 
http://www.cbpp.org/l-6-03tax.pdf; Leonard E. Burman & David Gunter, 17 Percent of 
Families Have Stock Dividends, 99 TAX NOTES 1261 (2003) (2000 data) 
(3.8 percent of families with income above $200,000 received 47 percent of all 
dividends, and families with incomes over $100,000 accounted for 72 percent. 
Similarly, households with large amounts of dividends accounted for most 
dividends. The 0.7 percent of households with dividends larger than $25,000 
accounted for about half of all dividends. . . . 42 percent of total reported 
'dividends' in 2000 were actually interest paid through mutual funds.); 
see also Robert B. Reich, Opinion, Bush Proves He's an Upper-Class Act; Under His Tax 
Plan, the Only Winners Are the Economic Elite, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2003, at 213; Mike 
Meyers, Bush's Tax Cuts Split Economists; Consequences Difficult to Gauge, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis), Jan 7, 2003, at D-1. Due to their higher ordinary income brackets, more 
than half of the tax benefit of eliminating dividend taxes would flow to the top five percent 
of taxpayers. Edmund L. Andrews, Bush Budget Plan Would Eliminate Tax on Dividends, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2003, at AI. The final provision of a fifteen percent rate on dividends 
(and capital gains) similarly benefited the high income taxpayers disproportionately. 
Jonathan Weisman, Bush Blunts "Fairness Question" on Taxes; President's "Class 
Warfare" Rhetoric Brings Support for Cuts Skewed to the Wealthy, WASH. POST, May 13, 
2003, at A6 ("About 80 percent of dividend income goes to higher-income households."). 
257. Mark Z. Barabak, Once Again, Democrats Take On Tax Issue; Presidential 
Candidates See the Debate As One of Choices. However, 20 Years Ago, They Flamed out in 
a Similar Attack on a Popular President, L.A TIMES, June 25, 2003, at Al2 ("The key-and 
it is tricky, party strategists acknowledge-is turning the tax debate into a discussion of 
fairness and making voters feel the pain that Democrats anticipate from a downsized federal 
government."). 
Winter 2006] CLASS WARFARE 113 
increase their vulnerability to GOP charges of reverting to tax-and-spend 
economics. "258 
Commentators disagreed as to the potential economic effects of the 
Bush 2003 treatment of dividends paid to individuals as capital gains.Z59 
Many predicted that the cut would boost the appeal of dividend-paying 
stocks compared with interest-paying investments, thereby lifting the stock 
market overall. 26° Furthermore, the cut was expected to force corporate 
managers to think more about returning profit directly to investors via 
dividends rather than parking corporate earnings for their own pet projects 
or empire building, thereby allowing the marketplace to decide the best use 
ofmoney.Z61 
258. Ronald Brownstein & Janet Hook, The Nation; 2004 Race May Pivot on Details of 
Tax Bills, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 2003, at AI; Ronald Brownstein, Tax Cut Is a Victory and a 
Risk for Bush, L.A. TiMES, May 24, 2003, at A 1 
(The passage of this year's bill, beyond underscoring an image of effectiveness, 
may offer Bush several other political benefits. Tax cuts excite his core GOP 
base, and could help him replicate in 2004 the heavy turnout among these loyalists 
that keyed the party's gains in 2002. By accelerating into 2003 cuts in income tax 
rates that were scheduled for 2004 and 2006, the new bill creates a political 
headache for Democrats. Several of the party's presidential contenders had hoped 
to finance their agenda not by repealing the tax breaks that took effect in 200 1, but 
by merely blocking the future reductions-a nuance that would allow them to 
argue they were not raising taxes. Now, to fund their initiatives, those Democrats 
may have to propose raising taxes-at least on affluent families-by repealing the 
rate cuts that will be advanced into this year. Such Democratic proposals could 
activate the Republican base even more than Bush proposals to cut taxes.). 
259. Tom Petruno, Dividend Tax Cut Effect Mixed; The Experts Differ on Whether the 
Reality of the Rate Reduction Has Lived up to the Hype, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2003, at Cl; 
James Bernstein & Jeff Meyer, The Dividend Bust; Investors Snub Heftier Company 
Payouts and Instead Are Gambling on Short-term Gains, NEWSDAY, Oct. 5, 2003, at F-6; 
Tom Petruno, Markets; Dividends on a Hot Streak; The Tax Cut Has Spurred More 
Companies to Boost Their Payouts. But Are Investors Paying Attention?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 
2003, at Cl. 
260. See, e.g., Tom Petruno, Dividend Tax Cut Effect Mixed; The Experts Differ on 
Whether the Reality of the Rate Reduction Has Lived up to the Hype, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 
2003, at Cl. 
261. Id. 
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The 2003 Act capital gains/dividend cut did increase the level of the 
stock market substantially,262 and to some degree dividend payouts/63 
although the data was skewed by a one-time $32 billion dividend paid by 
Microsoft.264 As much as forty percent of the firms paid one-time special 
dividends, 265 which "mitigates the positive effects that regular dividends 
are believed to yield in terms of improved corporate governance and 
economic efficiency over the long run."266 Furthermore, about half of the 
corporations introducing or increasing dividends apparently substituted 
such payments for share repurchase programs, thereby failing to increase 
total payout to shareholders.267 
262. See supra note 205 and accompanying text for an account of stock market woes 
preceding the 2003 Act. "The firms which have historically paid large dividends and which 
had a large fraction of individual shareholders experienced larger stock market gains in 
response to the proposal and enactment ofthe tax cuts." Brown et al., supra note 198. 
263. JOEL fRIEDMAN, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, DIVIDEND AND 
CAPITAL GAINS TAX CUTS UNLIKELY TO YIELD TOUTED ECONOMIC GAINS (2005), available 
at http://www.cbpp.org/3-l0-05tax.pdf; Allan Sloan, For Bush, Cutting Taxes Is the Plan 
for All Seasons, WASH. PosT, April29, 2003, at E-1 (describing a fourteen percent increase 
from March 11 to April 28, 2003); Chris Gaither, Microsoft Announces Dividend Software 
Giant Is Flush with Cash as Profits Jump 12%, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 17, 2003, at D-1 
(reporting that cries from investors became even louder after announcement of President 
George W. Bush's proposal to exclude dividends from individual income). 
264. FRIEDMAN, supra note 264, at 11-12; Ariana Eunjung Cha, Microsoft to Pay 
Dividends for the First Time; Profit Uptick, Legal 'Clarity' Provide Backdrop for a Move 
That Analysts Call Politically Astute, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2003, at E-1 (reporting that 
industry analysts thought Microsoft's announcement of a dividend was financially and 
politically astute. 
Microsoft's cash stockpile wasn't growing as quickly as it might have liked. And 
by distributing dividends the company gives an indirect nod to Bush's proposal at 
a time when some other technology companies have criticized it. 'It shows 
support for an administration that has shown a tremendous amount of support for 
them" by settling the federal antitrust case.'); 
Bill Barnhart, First-ever Microsoft Dividend Well-timed, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 17, 2003, at Nl. 
265. FRIEDMAN, supra note 264, at 13. 
266. FRIEDMAN, supra note 264, at 2 (citing Raj Cherty & Emmanuel Saez, Dividend 
Taxes and Corporate Behavior: Evidence from the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut (National 
Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper 10841, 2004); and Jennifer Blouin et al., Did 
Dividends Increase Immediately After the 2003 Reduction in Tax Rates (Nat'l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10301, 2004)). 
267. FRIEDMAN, supra note 264, at 3 (citing Jeffery Brown et al., Executive Financial 
Incentives and Payout Policy: Firm Responses to the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut (Nat'! Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11002, 2004), available at http://www.nber. 
org/papers/w II 02. 
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Corporations most likely to respond to the 2003 Act cuts were those in 
which top executives had greater stock ownership/68 but corporations were 
less likely to increase dividends both before and after the 2003 Act 
reduction in tax in dividends paid to individual shareholders where 
executives had large holdings of stock options (the value of which is 
negatively related to the amount of dividends paid).269 A speculative 
bubble in high tech arguably arose again.270 Moreover, as an unintended 
consequence, the rise in stock, bond and house prices, and the jump in 
household wealth relative to income, contributed to the low savings rate 
and rise in household debt.271 An intended consequence of the rate cuts 
was a substantial increase in Wall Street contributions to Republicans.272 
268. FRIEDMAN, supra note 264, at 4 and 12 (citing Brown et al., supra note 197); Floyd 
Norris, In Various Ways, the New Tax Law Affects How Companies Handle Their 
Dividends, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2003, at C-11 
(Just how much the new tax law affected those decisions is impossible to say, 
especially since the number of companies raising dividends had been growing for 
much of the last year, as the economy gradually strengthened .... [C]ompanies 
where insiders own large blocks of stock might be more inclined to raise 
dividends. They might decide it was better to pay a dividend .... ). 
269. Brown et al., supra note 198. 
270. Ben White & Amy Joyce, Decide to Run With the Bulls; With Economy Shaky, Some 
Analysts Whisper "Irrational Exuberance," WASH. POST, June 7, 2003, at A1; Tom Petruno, 
Aim of Tax Cuts: Boost Risk-Taking; Reduced Capital Gains and Dividend Levies Would 
Encourage Stock Investing. But What If the Bear Market Isn't Over?, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 
2003, at 3-1. 
271. Chairman Alan Greenspan, Reflections on Central Banking, Address at a symposium 
sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming (Aug. 26, 
2005), available at http:/ /federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050826/default 
.htrn 
(The steep rise in the ratio of household net worth to disposable income in the 
mid-1990s, after a half-century of stability, is a case in point [of policy becoming 
increasingly driven by asset price changes]. Although the ratio fell with the 
collapse of equity prices in 2000, it has rebounded noticeably over the past couple 
of years, reflecting the rise in the prices of equities and houses. Whether the 
currently elevated level of the wealth-to-income ratio will be sustained in the 
longer run remains to be seen. . . . The lowered risk premiums-the apparent 
consequence of a long period of economic stability--coupled with greater 
productivity growth have propelled asset prices higher. ... Such an increase in 
market value is too often viewed by market participants as structural and 
permanent. ... But what they perceive as newly abundant liquidity can readily 
disappear. Any onset of increased investor caution elevates risk premiums and, as 
a consequence, lowers asset values and promotes the liquidation of the debt that 
supported higher asset prices. This is the reason that history has not dealt kindly 
with the aftermath of protracted periods oflow risk premiums.); 
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C. 2004 AND 2005: EXTENSIONS, EXTENSIONS AND PLEAS FOR 
PERMANENCY 
1. 2004 
President George W. Bush opened 2004 calling for Congress to make 
permanent the expiring provisions of his 2001 Tax Act.273 Due to massive 
revenue costs of extending all of the tax cuts at once,274 Republicans 
pushed a series of more narrow measures extending popular tax cuts in the 
run-up to the November elections.275 Early candidates for extension were 
Philip Aldrick, Greenspan Warns of the Dangers from Capital Gains, DAILY TELEGRAPH 
(London), Aug. 29, 2005, at 28. 
272. Glen Justice, Patrick McGeehan & Landon Thomas Jr., Once at Arm's Length from 
Bush, Wall Street Is Now Biggest Donor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003, at AI 
(After winning Congressional approval for cuts in taxes on dividends, capital 
gains and for certain business investments, and after navigating a raft of corporate 
accounting scandals that shook the investment community, President Bush seems 
to have won over many financial executives, who are now strongly supporting his 
re-election campaign. A study to be released today shows that the financial 
community has surpassed all other groups, including lawyers and lobbyists, as the 
top industry among Mr. Bush's elite fund-raisers.). 
CEOs were also very pleased. See Bradley Meacham, CEO Pay Often Gets Big Boost from 
Dividends, SEATILE TIMES, Jun. 8, 2003, at N-18; Dana Milbank & Jonathan Weisman, In 
GOP Holdout's State, Bush Pitches Tax Cut, WASH. PosT, Apr. 25, 2003, at A2 (indicating 
that Timken's top four executives would have received as much as $955,000 tax-free last 
thirteen-cents-per-share quarterly dividend checks; Chairman William R. Timken would 
have received $50,440 tax-free in a single quarter, with $879,560 in quarterly tax-free 
dividend income going to his foundations and other trusts tax-free in a single quarter; 
Timken has contributed more than $260,000 to Republican candidates and party 
organizations since the 2000 election cycle). 
273. Alan K. Ota, Bush Stands Behind Tax Cuts, 62 CONG. Q. WKLY. 200 (2004) 
(describing a split in Republican ranks in Congress over whether to pay for making tax cuts 
permanent and estimating the cost of making the cuts permanent through 2013 at $1.6 
trillion. The article quotes George W. Bush as stating, 
[w]hat the Congress has given, the Congress should not take away .... For the 
sake of job growth, the tax cuts you passed should be permanent." The president 
argued that lawmakers have a choice between moving forward with his domestic 
agenda, or trying to reverse course and go "back to the old 'policies and old 
divisions.); 
see infra note 357 and accompanying text; Andrew Taylor, Next Presidency: A Future of 
Shortfalls, 62 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2230 (2004) (indicating that the CBO used Spratt 
assumptions to project annual deficits in the $300 to 400 billion range). 
274. See infra note 358. 
275. Alan K. Ota, A New Tax Cut Equation, 62 CONG. Q. WKLY. 342 (2004) 
(The tax cuts Bush pushed through Congress in 2001 and 2003 begin expiring at 
the end of this year and are scheduled to be gone at the end of 2010. The 
expiration dates were necessary to allow the tax cuts to move through the Senate 
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maintaining the child tax credit at $1,000, extending the ten percent bracket 
and the marriage penalty relief, and extending for one more year the then-
current AMT exemption.276 The bill passed by the House, however, tended 
to follow the permanency tack as to some, but not all, of the 2001 tax cut 
provisions.277 Republican majorities in both Chambers began to push 
extension bills just before the Democratic National Convention to force 
Democrats "to cast potentially awkward votes."278 Then Senate Finance 
Committee Chair Grassley stalled the extensions by making them hostage 
to a corporate tax cut (designed to offset for a companion repeal of a 
under budget reconciliation procedures providing protection from filibusters. 
Republicans have long planned to make the tax cuts permanent law, calculating 
that it would be politically difficult for Democrats to resist extending them. But a 
combination of factors has changed the equation. In addition to growing deficit 
worries, lawmakers in both parties are concerned that new tax cuts could make it 
impossible to provide enough money for their other priorities, including defense 
and homeland security. Another factor is the desire among lawmakers to revise 
the alternative minimum tax (AMT) to prevent it from denying upper-middle-
income taxpayers the benefits of tax breaks already on the books.). 
276. Andrew Taylor, Tough Tests Lie Ahead for Plans to Trim Spending, Deficit, 62 
CONG. Q. WKL Y. 505, 526 (2004); Andrew Taylor, Details of Expiring Tax Cuts, 62 CONG. 
Q. WKLY. 1675 (2004). 
277. Alan K. Ota, Democrats Hone Their Demands as Tax Cut Bills Hit the Senate, 62 
CoNG. Q. WKLY. 1013 (2004) (reporting that House Vote 138 made the repeal of the 
marriage penalty permanent while including a Democratic quid pro quo of making 
permanent refundable EITC credits (even if individuals paid no income taxes)); Alan K. 
Ota, House Renews AMT Extension, Puts Long-term Fix on Hold, 62 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1074 
(2004) (describing a House ploy to show bipartisan support for making permanent popular 
provisions, actually expecting only extensions); see also, Alan K. Ota, It's All About Sunsets 
and Offsets as Parties Sell Their Tax Plans, 62 CONG. Q. WKL Y. 1673 (2004). 
278. Alan K. Ota, It's All About Sunsets and Offsets As Parties Sell Their Tax Plans, 62 
CoNG. Q. WKLY. 1673 (2004) (reporting how Democrats sought an offset for extending 
middle class cuts through a surtax on incomes above $200,000); Alan K. Ota, GOP Readies 
Intense Pre-Election Push for Five-Year Extension of Tax Breaks, 62 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2047 
(2004) 
(Bush might have had an easy victory in July on extending the tax cuts. But the 
president and his senior aides urged GOP leaders to jettison a bipartisan deal for a 
$75 billion, two-year extension of the expiring tax breaks. They include the $1,000 
per-child tax credit, a tax benefit for married couples and the current higher 
income limit for the I 0 percent tax bracket. The package also would have 
extended for one year the current exemption from the alternative minimum tax ... 
. Bush mentioned his ultimate goal-permanently extending the tax breaks-in his 
nomination acceptance speech Sept. 2 .... Having been poised to support the 
earlier two-year extension proposal, Democrats are divided on whether to back the 
five-year measure.). 
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subsidy for exports which had triggered European trade sanctions).279 In 
the end, Congress renewed four family tax breaks set to expire at the end of 
2004, extending the $1,000 per child tax credit for five years and tax 
benefits for married couples through 2008; the expanded ten percent tax 
bracket through 201 0; and a one-year extension of current income 
exemptions from the alternative minimum tax for one year.280 
2. 2005 
Republicans and the President again started with a push to make 
permanent many of the 2001 and 2003 Acts' tax cuts.281 The House again 
passed a permanent repeal of the estate tax, but 
with a growing federal deficit in the background, the Senate outlook 
remain[ ed] unpredictable. Leaders appear[ ed] short of the 60 votes 
necessary to stop an expected Democratic filibuster, and [had] been 
discussing a compromise with some Democrats who want[ ed] to 
permanently restructure the estate tax, but [did not] want to take it off the 
books forever. 282 
The House and the Senate adopted a budget plan for 2006 permitting $105 
billion in tax cuts over the next five years,283 approximating the President's 
proposed 2006 budget, which called for extending through 2010 all of the 
2001 and 2003 Acts' tax cuts scheduled to expire in the next four years, 
279. Alan K. Ota & Jill Barshay, Grassley Stalls Tax Cut Extension, Vexing Fellow 
Republicans, 62 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2097 (2004) (indicating that Grassley was worried about 
the effect of trade sanctions on agricultural exports). 
280. Alan K. Ota, GOP Faces Tough Tax Choices After Easy Renewal of Some Cuts, 62 
CoNG. Q. WKLY. 2250 (2004); Alan K. Ota & Jill Barshay, Floor Action in Both Chambers 
Planned for Tax Cut Extensions; Wide Democratic Support Likely, 62 CONG. Q. WKLY. 
2162 (2004) (noting that at this stage the legislation also included extending the upper limit 
of the fifteen percent income tax bracket at double the tax bracket's cutoff point for single 
filers for three more years). 
281. Alan K. Ota, Issues to Watch in 2005: Taxes, 63 CONG. Q. WKLY. 32 (2005); Joseph 
J. Schatz, This Year's Fight: Tax Extenders, 63 CoNG. Q. WKLY. 788 (2005); Jill Barshay, 
Tax Cuts: When the Fix is Not in, 63 CONG. Q. WKLY. 376 (2005) (indicating that the 
President's Budget for 2006 proposed permanently extending the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, at 
a ten-year cost of $1.1 trillion, but with no AMT fix (the AMT will reach 20.5 million in 
2006, up from 3.8 million in 2005; the cost of revamping the AMT would cost from $600 
billion to $1.2 trillion over a ten-year period)). 
282. Joseph J. Schatz, House Hits 4-0 on Estate Tax Repeal, 63 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1013 
(2005). 
283. Andrew Taylor, Fiscal 2006 Plan Narrowly Adopted, 63 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1148 
(2005). 
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including the capital gains and dividends rate cut, but no extension of the 
AMT exemption increase.284 
The Senate Finance Committee considered using about $30 billion in 
offsets to put together a $100 billion reconciliation package, including 
temporary extension of the reduced tax rates on dividends and capital 
gains, several other popular "extenders" and a one-year patch for the 
alternative minimum tax as in 2004, whereas the House Ways and Means 
Chair Thomas preferred a smaller reconciliation package addressing 
permanent solutions for some of the other provisions.285 While some 
commentators had earlier speculated that the cost of reconstructing the Gulf 
Coast after Hurricane Katrina (and the growing costs of the War in Iraq) 
might lead the GOP in Congress to abandon the costly project of making 
the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts permanent,286 the past history of the George W. 
Bush Administration and the GOP majorities in Congress suggests that 
284. Schatz, supra note 283. 
285. Dustin Stamper, Fall Agenda Is Anything but Settled, Starting with the Estate Tax, 
108 TAX NOTES 1089, 1090 (2005); Joseph J. Schatz, GOP Works to Extend Tax Breaks, 63 
CONG.Q.WKLY.2332(2005) 
([The] Finance Committee ... [is] assembling a $90 billion package of tax breaks 
that would extend all the major tax cuts of 2001 and 2003 through 2010, reduce 
for one year the effect of the alternative minimum tax on the middle class, and 
renew for one year expiring business tax breaks such as the research and 
development tax credit. ... To keep the package under the $70 billion limit set in 
the 2006 budget resolution (H. Conf. Res. 95), they are searching for $20 billion in 
revenue-raising offsets.). 
286. The relief and recovery outlays will be financed almost entirely with government 
debt. The prospects for an estate tax repeal, $70 billion of tax cuts proposed for the fiscal 
2006 budget reconciliation package, permanent extension of the remaining 2001 and 2003 
individual income tax cuts, permanent relief from the alternative minimum tax, and plans 
for fundamental tax reform are all diminished and will turn on handful of swing [deficit 
hawk] Republican Senators. Also, the economic effects of Katrina could include $150 
billion-$200 billion projected increase in government spending for Katrina relief. Martin A. 
Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Katrina's Stealth Impact on the Budget, 108 TAX NOTES 1490 
(2005). See also Shailagh Murray & Charles Babington, GOP Agenda Shifts as Political 
Trials Grow; Katrina Puts Estate Tax Repeal on Ice, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2005, at A6; 
Editorial, Lagging Poor, WASH. PosT, Sept. 6, 2005, at A25; Carolyn Lochhead, Hard 
Times In Big Easy; Efforts Intensify To Evacuate Living, Recover Dead; The Politics, S.F. 
CHRON., Sept. 9, 2005, at AI (indicating that the high price of hurricane relief threatens to 
wash away Bush's second-term agenda; Republicans quickly shelved plans to repeal the 
estate tax and delayed a big budget bill containing $70 billion in tax cuts and $35 billion in 
spending cuts mainly in Medicaid and farm programs); Dustin Stamper, Support Slipping 
for Extension of Capital Gains and Dividend Cuts, 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 190-1 (2005); 
Dustin Stamper, GOP Agenda in Turmoil, 109 TAX NOTES 7 (2005). 
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they will push forward at least with the extenders.287 Indeed, a Wall Street 
Journal Editorial maintained that 
Economic Leadership also means instructing Americans on the link 
between the economic vitality needed to fund both Katrina relief and the 
war on terror. Predictably, the Bush tax cuts are under attack for denying 
revenue and because they don't require "sacrifice" in wartime. But the 
truth is that federal revenues are rising by an estimated $262 billion-or 
roughly 14o/o-this year thanks to the growth that followed the 2003 tax 
cuts. Republicans have been far too defensive on tax cuts, and Katrina is 
an opening to explain their necessity and to push for making them 
permanent. 288 
The actual truth is that CBO Director Douglas Holtz-Eakin explained 
that increased federal revenue in 2005 was driven by a forty-two percent 
increase in receipts from corporate income taxes and a 14.6 percent 
increase in receipts from individual income taxes and estimated that the rise 
in corporate receipts was "largely a temporary phenomenon" brought about 
by the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, which allows a one-time 
287. The GOP reconciliation tax package would extend several popular tax breaks, the 
AMT exemption, and more contentious tax cuts on dividends and capital gains in 2006. In 
addition, an ABC/Washington Post poll conducted September 8-11 reported that fifty-nine 
percent of respondents believed Congress should put off its proposed $70 billion tax cut 
package while thirty-six percent believed it should go forward as proposed. This figure 
corresponds roughly with the percentage of the electorate that is Republican. Dustin 
Stamper, Tax Package, Delayed, But Still a Go, 108 TAX NOTES 1353 (2005). See also infra 
note 307 and accompanying text. A short time later, as the projected $200 billion cost of 
reconstruction began to sink in, rumbling began among Congressional Republicans of 
postponing the agenda of future tax cuts. Shailagh Murray & Jim VandeHei, Katrina's Cost 
May Test GOP Harmony, WASH. POST, Sept. 21,2005, at AI 
(Conservatives are calling for spending cuts to existing programs, a few GOP 
moderates are entertaining the possibility of a tax increase, and many in the 
middle want to freeze Bush tax cuts that have yet to take effect. ... A new Gallup 
poll shows a majority of Americans believe the mission in Iraq should be cut to 
cover the recovery costs, while only a small fraction support slashing other 
domestic programs, raising taxes or increasing the deficit to finance it.); 
Dustin Stamper, Fate of Spending Reconciliation Bill Key to Tax Cut Protections, I 08 TAX 
NOTES 1493 (2005); John Cranford, The Deficit's Hard Truths, CONG. Q. WKLY. 2554 
(2005) 
(In the latest Gallup poll, 45 percent of those surveyed expect Americans to make 
'major sacrifices' so that the federal government can afford the cleanup after 
Katrina. Only 15 percent said they supported borrowing the money. More than 
half said spending on the war in Iraq should be curtailed to pay for Katrina, while 
the number favoring tax increases was almost three times as large as that favoring 
reduced domestic spending. Those sorts of views pose powerful risks for 
lawmakers who choose to ignore them. And the message seems to be sinking in.). 
288. Editorial, Bush and Katrina, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6, 2005, at A28. 
Winter 2006] CLASS WARFARE 121 
repatriation of international profits to the United States. He added that 
"maybe a quarter" of the increased revenue would continue into the 
future. 289 
IV. INTEREST GROUP POLITICS OF CAPITAL GAINS/DIVIDENDS RATE CUTS 
President George W. Bush "raised the prospect of such [capital gains 
and dividend] tax cuts this summer [of 2002], but congressional 
Republicans put them on hold during the [mid-term elections] campaign, 
fearing they would enable Democrats to paint the GOP as the party of the 
rich."290 Any such fear ultimately was outweighed by the hope of reviving 
the stock market.291 The Dow Jones Industrial Average closed for 2002 at 
8,341.63, a 16.76 decline for the year, following declines of 7.10 percent 
and 6.19 percent in 2001 and 2000, respectively?92 A decline in the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average for three consecutive years had not occurred since 
1939-1941.293 
Journalists believed that revival of the stock market would serve many 
purposes: (1) rewarding the contributing class (the wealthy, CEOs, and 
stock brokers294); (2) heading off a revolt at the polls in 2004 by angry 
289. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director, Cong. Budget Office, "The Budget and Economic 
Outlook: An Update," Address at News Conference (Aug. 15, 2005), in FED. NEWS SERV.; 
Robert Pear, Surge in Corporate Taxes Is Expected to Reduce the Deficit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
16, 2005, at AlO; Wesley Elmore, CBO Projects Smaller Deficit for Fiscal 2005, 108 TAX 
NOTES 855 (2005); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: AN 
UPDATE (2005), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6609/08-15-
0utlookUpdate.pdf; David Cook, Federal Deficits: A Brighter Picture for Now, CHRISTIAN 
Sci. MONITOR, Aug. 17, 2005, at 2 (indicating that the CBO's projected overrun was smaller 
than expected in 2005, but that the long-term outlook remained gloomy; also projecting that 
if Bush II's tax cuts are made permanent, projected deficits will never dip below $330 billion 
over the next ten years). 
290. Bob Kemper, Pass Security Bill Now, Bush Urges; Economic Stimulus Also on the 
Agenda, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 8, 2002, at N1. 
291. See Mike Allen & Dana Miller, President to Seek Dividend Tax Cut; Stimulus Plan 's 
10-year Cost Put at $300 Billion, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2003, at A 1. 
292. Josh Friedman, After 3 Years of Losses, Stock Funds' Biggest Challenge May Lie 
Ahead; Managers See Cause for Optimism in Year-End Stock Market Rally, L.A. TiMES, 
Jan. 6, 2003. at C 1 (indicating that the loss in value of mutual funds for 2002 was 22.6 
percent, the worst performance since 1974 and about twice as bad as 2001, when the 
average fund slid 10.9 percent; the last time stock funds endured three consecutive losing 
years was 1939-1941). 
293. Amy Feldman, eta!., How Bad Is It?, MONEY, Sept. 2002, at 76. 
294. Thomas B. Edsall & Sarah Cohen, Bush Campaign Raises a Record $49.5 Million; 
For Their Efforts, Fundraisers Also Gain, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2003, at AI; Jill Barshay, 
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small investors;295 and (3) energizing the Republican Party's base.296 Some 
Democrats and other commentators asserted that the real audience of the 
2001 tax rate cuts was the GOP's enterpriser base, or perhaps more its big 
campaign contributors base.297 The chief GOP fund raiser, Rep. Tom 
Davis (R-Va.), bragged to media that the proposed tax cut at the top "has 
been a big money-raiser for us."298 This was most important due to the 
For Bush, Tax Cut Package Is Next Must-Win Battle, 6I CONG. Q. WKLY. 974 (2003) 
(positing that Wall Street did not expect the dividend tax cut would provide much of an 
economic boost, though firms themselves would have much to gain). 
295. See Robert Dodge, Will Angered Stock Market Investors Punish the GOP?, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, July 29, 2002. at DI; Stephen J. Glain, Dow Back Above 10,000; Rising 
Markets May Give Bush Lift Rising Stock Prices Would Be an Asset to Reelection Bid, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. I2, 2003, at BI6 (indicating that the I990s investor class became a 
key electoral constituency and suggesting that the capital gains/dividend rate cuts and the 
upturn in the stock market energized them to give money and turn out the Republican vote); 
see I49 CONG. REc. S6959 (daily ed. May 22, 2003) (statement of Chair Grassley, Jr.) 
(indicating that over the past twenty years people investing in the stock market or in 
pensions and 40I(k) plans dependent upon the market grew from twelve percent to fifty-five 
percent). 
296. Claudia Deane & Dan Balz, GOP Puts Stock in 'Investor Class'; Parties Debate 
Impact of Rise in Voters with Money in Market, WASH. PosT, Oct. 27,2003, at AI (reporting 
a Post survey that found that "direct investors are more optimistic about the economy, more 
likely to identify themselves as Republicans, have a more favorable view of the GOP and 
are more inclined to support Bush's reelection than are non-investors of comparable 
income."); Richard W. Stevenson, President Willing to Give Greenspan New Term at Fed, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2003. at AI ("Many Republican strategists have identified the stock 
market's health as an important concern for people who tend to vote, a concern reflected in 
Mr. Bush's insistence on sticking by his plan to eliminate taxation of most dividends despite 
lukewarm support in Congress."). Jill Barshay & Alan K. Ota, White House Must Keep 
Delicate Balance When Drafting Latest Tax Cut Package, 6I CONG. Q. WKL Y. 3I (2003). 
297. See I45 CONG. REc. SI0332 (daily ed. Aug. 5, I999) (statement of Sen. Kerry) 
(stating that the bill was a political statement to service campaign contributors); I45 CONG. 
REc. H7699 (daily ed. Sept. 8, I999) (statement of Rep. DeFazio) ("[The] Republican bill .. 
. is delivering to the people who fund their campaigns, it is delivering to the people who run 
the corporations that fund their campaigns."); Richard W. Stevenson, House Panel Votes 
$864 Billion Tax Cut, WASH. POST, Jul. I5, I999, at A21. The release of the tax-cut plan 
was timed to get to the right of Steve Forbes. 
To make sure the purists got the point, Bush met with the editors of the Wall 
Street Journal editorial page-they constitute the Sacred Congregation for the 
Doctrine of the Faith in supply-side circles--and sold them on the idea that this tax 
cut was the very best they could expect in these political times. 
Citizens for Tax Justice concluded that two-thirds of benefits would go to the top ten 
percent E.J. Dionne Jr., Opinion, Bush's Tax Timing, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, I999, at A31. 
298. I45 CONG. REc. H8085 (daily ed. Sept. 9, I999) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee). 
For an excellent discussion of the political impact of wealth see James R. Repetti, 
Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 835, 840-49 (2001). Larry Bartels notes 
that Senators in the late I980s and early I990s were considerably more responsive to the 
opinions of wealthy constituents than of middle-class constituents, and that Republican 
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"bundling" technique used in the George W. Bush 2000 presidential and 
2004 re-election campaigns to avoid the public financing system 
restraints.299 From 1998 through mid-2004, Bush raised a record $296.3 
million in campaign funds, giving him an overwhelming advantage in 
running against Vice President Al Gore and Sen. John F. Kerry (D-Mass.). 
A third to one-half of the total was raised by 631 people functioning as an 
extraordinarily organized and disciplined machine.300 This pattern of 
political contributions helps explain why President George W. Bush pushed 
for his tax cuts in 2001 and 2003, notwithstanding the lesser importance at 
this time of tax cuts in polls301 (Kerry also raised huge amounts, but did not 
seek similar special tax benefits302). 
Senators were twice as responsive as Democratic Senators to the ideological views of the 
wealthy. Bartles also points to a strong correlation between income and political 
contributions. Larry M. Bartels, Economic Inequality and Political Representation 4, 13-14, 
28-30 (revised Aug. 2005), available at http://www.princeton.edu/-bartels/economic.pdf. 
299. George W. Bush created a network of people who could get at least 100 friends, 
associates or employees to give the maximum individual donation allowed by law to a 
presidential candidate: $1,000 in 2002, $2,000 in 2004. Thomas B. Edsall, el a!., Pioneers 
Fill War Chest, Then Capitalize, WASH. PosT, May 16, 2004, at Al. "Pioneers" raised at 
least $100,000 each; "Rangers," $200,000. !d. See also Thomas B. Edsall & Sarah Cohen, 
Bush Campaign Raises a Record $49.5 Million; For Their Efforts, Fundraisers Also Gain, 
WASH. PosT, Oct. 15, 2003, at A1 (indicating that at least thirty-seven Rangers and Pioneers 
were from the finance industry, which is vocal in its support of the Bush II administration's 
economic program: "first and most important, the tax reduction in dividend income and 
capital gains;" that at least fourteen Rangers and Pioneers were from power and energy 
industries supported repeatedly by the Bush II administration with legislative and regulatory 
initiatives over the objection of environmentalists; that at least twenty-five executives in the 
real estate and construction industries were Rangers and Pioneers; and that elimination of 
the estate tax was particularly important to business interests); see also Julian Borger, Why 
Americas Plutocrats Gobble Up Dollars 1,500 Hot Dogs: In the Final Part of a Series, 
Julian Borger Examines the Inequality of the Bush Era, GUARDIAN, Nov. 5, 2003, at 14 
(indicating that Bush II policy has reinforced the income gap rather than mitigating it, as 
evidenced by the distribution of the fully phased-in tax benefits of the 2001 and 2003 Acts. 
Every member of the Bush II cabinet is a millionaire and his cabinet's aggregate net worth 
is more than 10 times that of Clinton's cabinet, arguably personifying "a new plutocracy."). 
300. Edsall, el a!., Pioneers Fill War Chest, Then Capitalize, WASH. PosT, May 16, 2004, 
at A1; Marilyn Geewax, Economic Stimulus Plan: Bush Bets Tax Cuts Will Spur Recovery; 
Democrats Question How Much It Will Help, ATLANTA J. CONSTITUTION, Jan. 8, 2003, at 
A1 (indicating that half of cost of proposal was attributable to the exclusion of dividends, 
"leading Democrats to charge the main goal is to aid the president's wealthy political 
supporters."); Thomas B. Edsall, Republicans Name 62 Who Gave Big Money, WASH. POST, 
July 1, 2004, at A6. 
301. Peter G. Gosselin, Arguments for Tax Cuts Weaker Than in the Past, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 17, 2003, at 3-1. E. J. Dionne characterized the plan as redistribution to the wealthy 
and to favored interest groups. "And when it comes to the politics of payoff," he wrote, "the 
president and his allies are nothing short of brilliant. ... By recycling a small fraction of the 
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Just as, if not more important, was the small direct investor as voter 
(not particularly as contributors). The Republican base-"Enterprisers" and 
"Social Conservatives" making up 34 percent of registered voters303-
overwhelmingly vote Republican in Presidential elections. The Democratic 
constituencies make up forty-four percent of registered voters.304 The key, 
therefore, to Republican victory in Presidential Campaigns is to charge up 
their base and attract at least two-thirds of the unaffiliated voters (thirty-
two percent of registered voters) when the Democratic base is equally 
charged up: 
Republicans had gained, in part, by winning increased support from the 
middle of the political spectrum-a part of the electorate less inclined 
toward the GOP in 1999, the last time the center conducted such a broad 
study. Andrew Kohut, the nonpartisan [Pew] research center's director, 
said the new finding was a testament to Bush's personal popularity among 
many voters--even as his job approval ratings had sunk below 50%-and 
to the strength of his leadership on national security issues. That, 
cash back to Bush and his party in the form of campaign contributions, those friends are 
financing the construction of a mighty political machine." Dionne also noted that public 
spending per person is higher under Bush II than it was under Clinton, with a share of big 
increases going to defense contractors whose employees contribute heavily to the 
Republicans. Many of the Medicare drug bill provisions help core Republican 
constituencies, including private health plans that get billions to compete with Medicare. 
Twenty-five billion dollars goes to rural hospitals but not to urban hospitals (urban areas did 
not vote for Bush) and huge monopoly benefits go to pharmaceutical companies. Dionne 
further states that the "bill forbids Medicare from using its bargaining power to bring down 
the cost of drugs." E.J. Dionne, Jr., Opinion, Politics of Payoff, WASH. PosT, Dec. 2, 2003, 
at A27. 
302. John Kerry created the most effective fundraising machine in Democratic Party 
history by tapping disparate interests--especially trial lawyers, financial services 
executives, social liberals, teachers, Hollywood figures and others-united by their 
antipathy to President Bush. Lawyers comprised twenty-five percent of Kerry's big-dollar 
fundraisers, ten percent of which were plaintiffs lawyers in lawsuits seeking damages. 
"Much of the seed money for the Kerry presidential campaign was collected through donors 
to his Senate campaigns, including lobbyists with interests before two of the Senate 
committees on which Kerry serves." During the previous twelve months Kerry raised $65 
million on the Internet compared with $8.7 million for Bush. 
Kerry appears to have succeeded in creating a new class of donors and fundraisers 
for the Democratic Party. Kerry's donor base is overwhelmingly bicoastal, 
substantially out raising Bush in California and N.Y., $39.7 million to $28.5 
million; whereas Bush has crushed the Democrats in Florida and Texas, raising 
$36 million to their $8 million. 
Thomas B. Edsall, et al., Redefining Democratic Fundraising; Kerry Has Amassed Record 
Sums from Disparate Groups Opposed to Bush, WASH. POST, July 24,2004, at Al. 
303. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, THE 2005 POLITICAL TYPOGRAPHY 4 (2005) [hereinafter 
2005 POLITICAL TYPOGRAPHY], available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/242.pdf. 
304. 2005 POLITICAL TYPOGRAPHY, supra note 304, at 5. 
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however, raises questions about whether Republican gains will outlast 
Bush's presidency-or fade if the public's focus shifts from foreign to 
domestic policy.305 
125 
While currently forty-one percent of Enterprisers and of Liberals (key 
Republican and Democratic constituencies, respectively) each have 
household incomes of at least $75,000; fifty-three percent of the former 
buy or trade stocks, compared to only thirty-eight percent of the latter.306 
As for Social Conservatives (thirteen percent of electorate), thirty-five 
percent own or trade stocks; and forty-two percent of Upbeats (thirteen 
percent of the electorate) own or trade stocks, 307 a swing constituency 
voting for Bush 4:1 in 2004.308 Enterprisers are generally affluent, mostly 
male, patriotic, pro-business, and very conservative.309 Conservative 
Southern Democrats, who earlier had supported a capital gains preference 
principally for timber, small business and farmers, 310 have since 1994 
largely been succeeded by Southern Republicans, now the bastion of the 
Republican Party.311 
305. Janet Hook, Survey of Voters Maps Subtle Splits; A Study Finds That in Spite of 
GOP Gains, Republicans, Democrats and Independents Are Divided over Issues Depending 
on Their Type, L.A. TIMES, May ll, 2005, at Al6. 
306. 2005 POLITICAL TYPOGRAPHY, supra note 304, at ll, 17. Note that this category is 
the top quintile of households. The author suspects that the top two percent or so is more 
heavily Republican and the lower percents more heavily Democratic since a significant 
portion of the top two percent consists of enterprisers (CEOs and business people). 
307. !d. 
308. Dan Balz, Disparate Coalitions Now Makeup Two Parties, Study Shows, WASH. 
POST, May 16, 2005, at Al5. 
309. Dan Balz, Poll Cites GOP Gains Since 9/11; But Party's Internal Divisions Are 
Called an Obstacle, WASH. POST, May 11, 2005, at A2. See also 2005 POLITICAL 
TYPOGRAPHY, supra note 304, at 4. 
310. Lee, Critique, supra note 6, at 27-28. 
311. Amy Hamilton, Economist Says Wall Street Turbulence Caused By Election Anxiety, 
96 TAX NOTES TODAY 148-7 (1996) (quoting Economist David D. Hale in a July 28 speech 
to the National Conference of State Legislatures stating that "Republicans now have 77 of 
the 125 House seats in the South-and pending Democratic retirements could leave 
Republicans with two-thirds of the seats in the South ...• Democrats now depend far more 
on the urban centers of the Northeast, Midwest, and California for their congressional 
membership."); Ronald Brownstein, GOP Has Lock on South, and Democrats Can't Find 
Key, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2004, at AI ("In their midterm landslide of 1994, Republicans for 
the first time captured the majority of House and Senate seats from the South."); David 
Lightman, Civil Rights, Political Fallout; "Momentous Act" Changed America, HARTFORD 
COURANT, July 2, 2004, at A2 (noting that forty years ago today President Lyndon Johnson 
signed the Civil Rights Act and reportedly told an aide, "We have just lost the South for a 
generation." He was right.). Thus the Southern Republican Succession has been more 
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Professor Bartels' explanation is "unenlightened self interest." Middle 
and lower-income taxpayers supported tax cuts they suspected went largely 
to the rich, believing that they, too, would benefit if only by a small 
amount, and that they were overtaxed, but largely because they failed to 
connect the tax cuts to rising inequality, their future tax burden, or the 
availability of government services? 12 Indeed, the better informed the 
taxpayers were, the more they were critical of the George W. Bush tax cuts, 
and the more pessimistic about equality in America?13 As a practical 
matter, the 2001 and 2003 Acts' tax cuts lowering the tax burden much 
more on the rich than on the poor was made more palatable because so 
many taxpayers across income levels paid less,314 not realizing that many of 
the cuts below the top had much shorter lives? 15 I have long suspected that 
"Unenlightened Self Interest" did underlay the traditional support of 
owners of small businesses or timber lots and farmers as to livestock and 
more rarely as to sales of farm land itself 16 (but these special interests by 
and large are included in the Republican "Enterpriser" constituency). 
A related explanation for the critical support of "Upbeat" independents 
(who tend to vote Republican in National Elections) for capital gains cuts is 
"optimistic individualism."317 I have called this group the capital gains 
"wannabes."318 In 1995 House Hearings and on the House floor, a 
successful than the Southern Democratic Secession of more than a century earlier. "Yes I 
believe the south is gonna rise again, oh, but not the way we thought it would back then." 
TANYA TUCKER, I Believe the South Is Gonna Rise Again, on TANYA TUCKER- GREATEST 
HITS (Columbia 1990). Unfortunately it is not the way the author hoped back when he first 
heard the song. 
312. Larry M. Bartels, Homer Gets a Tax Cut: Inequality and Public Policy in the 
American Mind 4, 10, 14, 19-20, 22, 26-8, 34-5 (2003), available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/-policybriefs/bartels_taxcut.pdf; see also Brookings Briefing, 
Transcript, Do Misperceptions Guide the Tax Policy Debate?, available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/comrn/events/20031216.pdf (presenter Joel Slernrod found that 
many thought the current system was unfair because the wealthy paid at a lower effective 
rate than the middle class and would pay more under a flat tax); Zelenak, supra note 16, at 
94; Alan B. Krueger, Economic Scene; Connecting the Dots from Tax Cuts for the Wealthy 
to Loss of Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,2003, at C-2. 
313. Bartels, supra note 313, at 29. 
314. Andrew Balls & Christopher Swann, Republican Radicals Eager for "Second 
Front" on Tax: But It Is Too Early to Say How Bold the President Intends Reforms to Be, 
FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. II, 2004, at II. 
315. This technique is discussed in a work-in-progress entitled Selling of Bush II Income 
Tax Cuts. 
316. Lee, Critique, supra note 6, at 27-30. 
317. 2005 POLITICAL TYPOGRAPHY, supra note 304, at 14; David Brooks, Opinion, Meet 
the Poor Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2005, at 4-14 (citing Pew Research Center). 
318. Lee, Critique, supra note 6, at 31. 
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proponent of a proposed capital gains cut recounted a story of a seventeen-
year old who favored capital gains tax cuts because some day he hoped to 
have capital gains? 19 Former Ways & Means Chair Sam Gibbons (D-Fla.) 
rejoined that a seventeen-year old would be better off playing the lottery 
because only eight percent ever won anything on the capital gains tax 
t 320 cu. 
Clinton's 1997 capital gains cut also illustrates the importance of 
capital gains preferences to the Republican base. All prior major capital 
gains cuts or changes ( 1921, 1934, 1938, 1942, 1978, and 1981) had 
occurred against a backdrop of downturn in the economy, or in the stock 
market, or in both. "There can be no argument, as there was in the early 
1980s, that these cuts are needed for economic growth."321 In 1997, 
[t]he stock market has risen into the stratosphere, beyond the opening in 
the ozone layer. Does this sound like an economy that needs a jumpstart 
through a tax cut? ... To provide a tax cut now is like encouraging 
someone who has just paid off a huge credit card debt, complete with 
whopping interest payments to go on a wild and uncontrollable shopping 
spree.322 
319./d. 
320. !d. While it is true that the lower and middle income components of that eight 
percent tend to change every year, they still accounted in the aggregate for less than ten 
percent of the total realized gain over a five-year sample. !d. at 48; see also CONG. BUDGET 
OFFICE, PERSPECTIVES ON THE OWNERSHIP OF CAPITAL ASSETS AND THE REALIZATION OF 
CAPITAL GAINS 12, Table 3 (1997) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES ON THE OWNERSHIP OF 
CAPITAL ASSETS] (providing data from a ten-year panel, using 1993 dollars and indicating 
returns reporting $10,000 to $50,000 (in $10,000 increments) reported gains on the average 
three years out of seven, with the average gains ranging per increment from just over $1,000 
to just under $2,000, constituting in the aggregate 2.77% of all gains reported ($5,805 out of 
$209,521) and returns with $200,000 and over reported gains in all seven years and over 
85% of the gains reported ($179,041 out of $209,521)), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/3xx/doc303/capgains.pdf. 
321. 143 CONG. REc. S8444-45 (daily ed. July 31, 1997) (statement of Sen. Byrd). 
322. 143 CONG. REc. S8444-45 (reporting that with a sixth consecutive year of economic 
growth, the stock market continues to reach record highs, that unemployment recently 
dipped below five percent, and that inflation has remained in check); 143 CoNG. REc. 
H4698 (daily ed. June 26, 1997) (statement of Rep. Coyne) (claiming that the economy 
today is in the best shape in twenty-five years and is still growing, and that inflation is low. 
The statement further indicates that the federal deficit was reduced from more than six 
percent of national output to roughly one percent). 
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Thus, a capital gains rate cut was not needed, and even dangerous in 
that it probably encouraged the "irrational exuberance"323 in the bubble 
market, potentially leading to a greater bust. The goal of the Republicans 
of rewarding their enterpriser base324 with capital gains rate cuts was more 
openly exposed than ever before.325 A capital gains cut to twenty percent 
raised the risk of future deficits in the event of an economic downturn-
another river boat gamble.326 And, of course, the capital gains cut delivered 
323. "[H]ow do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, 
which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan 
over the past decade? And how do we factor that assessment into monetary policy?" Alan 
Greenspan, Remarks at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of The American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C. on The Challenge of 
Central Banking in a Democratic Society (Dec. 5, 1996), transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/ 19961205 .htm. Cutting the 
capital gains tax does not square with Republican laissez-faire ideology that markets, not the 
government, should dictate investments. The Wall Street boom in 1997 of more than fifty 
percent since 1993 undermined the argument that investors need special tax incentives to 
invest. "Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has even warned that 'irrational 
exuberance' has sparked overinvestment in the market. If he's right, then it would make 
more sense to raise the capital gains tax. But Archer ... 'views his job as protecting job 
makers, risk takers and investors."' Jonathan Chait, Lavey-Dovey, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 3, 
1997, at 15 (emphasis supplied); Editorial, Stocks Continue to Break Records as 
Expectations of Profits Soar; Capital Gains Tax Cut, Low Interest Rates Credited with 
Causing Investor Euphoria, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 7, 1997, at 2. 
324. Rick Henderson, The "Leave Us Alone" Coalition, J. OF CoM., Aug. 18, 1997, at A 7 
(indicating that enterprisers comprised nineteen percent of likely voters); see also Thomas 
B. Edsall, Not Running for Preacher; Gramm Is Uneasy Ally of Religious Right, WASH. 
POST, June 22, 1995, at AI (indicating that moralists have nearly doubled in size since 1987 
and have displaced enterprisers as the dominant Republican faction). 
325. 143 CONG. REc. S8445 (daily ed. July 31, 1997) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (stating 
that the justifications for capital gain tax cuts "do not extend beyond the realm of pure 
unadulterated politics .... Tax cuts sell well on the campaign trail, magnetically drawing 
checkbooks out of coat pockets, but in current fiscal situation they are not sound fiscal 
policy."); Jonathan Riskind, Businesses' Political Donations Paid Off, Report Shows, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 5, 1997, at Al5 (citing Common Cause). Observers have noted 
the "striking overlap" between "the check-writing Daddy Warbucks of national politics and 
government influence" and "the most important owners of America profiled in the Fortune 
500, the Forbes 400 and similar lists." Kevin Phillips, Opinion, Heading for a Fall; 
Clinton's Loss on "Fast Track,": Combined with the Stock Market Drop and Sharpening 
Divisions in Society, All Point to Trouble Ahead, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1997, at M-1. 
326. 143 CONG. REc. El604 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1997) (extension of statement of Rep. 
Skaggs) (noting the potential for renewed and greatly increased deficits in a few years and 
finding the cut inherently more beneficial to high income taxpayers with resources to make 
investments than to those with more limited means); 143 CONG. REc. S8390 (daily ed. July 
31, 1997) (statement of Sen. Campbell) (bemoaning a "return to the 1980's when politicians 
stumbled over themselves to promise newer and bigger tax cuts without regard to our budget 
deficit"); 143 CONG. REc. S8417-18 (daily ed. Jul. 31, 1997) (statement of Sen. Moynihan) 
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most of its benefits to the big investors at the top of the income scale.327 
The proponents' argument that the growth of mutual funds required an 
update of the image of who benefited from a capital gains rate cue28 was 
misleading. 329 Proponents of the 1997 capital gains cut pointed to the 
(expressing concern over whether cutting taxes might undo the astonishing progress over the 
last four years). OBRA 93 produced extraordinary increases in wealth "because it sent a 
signal to the economy that this Government was going to get hold of its financing, pay its 
bills in sound dollars, not ... inflate the currency and get rid of your debt in that mode." !d. 
See also 143 CONG. REc. S8421 (statement of Sen. Wellstone); 143 CONG. REc. S8444 
(statement of Sen. Byrd) (stating that losses after the ten-year budget window could propel 
the country back to the irresponsible 1980s: "one severe recession in the next few years 
coupled with the impact of these backloaded tax cuts could throw us right back into the 
deficit canyon."); Richard Foster, Budget Deal Well-Intentioned, but Flawed, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL, July 30, 1997, at 10; 143 CONG. REc. H4804 (daily ed. June 26, 1997) (statement 
of Rep. Bentsen) (warning of a "tax time bomb" causing budget deficits to explode again). 
327. 143 CONG. REc. S8421 (daily ed. July 31, 1997) (statement of Sen. Wellstone) 
(calling the provision "unfair" and "short sighted"); 143 CoNG. REc. S8441 (statement of 
Sen. Bumpers) (taking account of the child credit and noting that seventy-six percent of 
benefits still go to top twenty percent; also indicating that the tax cut is roughly $134 billion, 
which would provide college education to every youngster in America wanting one). 
Analysis of Distribution of Budget Agreement's Tax Cuts, 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 148-67 
( 1997) (providing an analysis by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities using a report 
by Citizens for Tax Justice); CTJ Release on Tax Plan, TAX NOTES TODAY 147-85 (1997) 
(reporting that the top twenty-percent gamer seventy-eight percent of the tax benefits of the 
Act when fully phased in; the top one percent (over $200,000) gamer 32.3%; and the top 
five percent (over $100,000) gamer forty-four percent). 
328. 143 CoNG. REc. S8439 (daily ed. July 31, 1997)(statement of Sen. Dominici) 
(In 1990, the typical mutual fund owner is someone in the $35,000 to $75,000 
income bracket. The average portfolio is $14,000. Half of these investors do not 
have a college degree. This is a very different image from the wealthy widow 
toting a pampered poodle down Fifth Avenue in New York and being the one who 
can take advantage of capital gains.); 
143 CoNG. REc. 8434 (statement of Sen. Bailey Hutchison) (noting that forty-one percent 
own stock and that fifty-six percent of capital gains were reported by households with 
income under $50,000; one-half of mutual fund shareholders have income under $75,000); 
143 CoNG. REc. S8446 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (claiming that the cut is not just for the 
rich because it helps anyone who invests in a mutual fund or IRA); 143 CONG. REc. H6303 
(daily ed. July 30, 1997) (statement of Rep. Ganske) (citing a 1993 IRS study indicating that 
seventy percent of all capital gains were filed by taxpayers earning less than $75,000). In 
fact, the fifty-six percent of taxpayers reporting capital gains who earned under $50,000 
realized less than ten percent of the annual gains. Lee, Critique, supra note 6, at 43-45; see 
also PERSPECTIVES ON THE OWNERSHIP OF CAPITAL ASSETS, supra note 3 21. 
329. 143 CoNG. REc. S6411 (daily ed. July 31, 1997) (statement of Sen. Conrad) 
(A recent Congressional Budget Office study found that 89 percent of tax returns 
reporting capital gains in 1993 had gains of $10,000 or less with the average gain 
being $2,000. By contrast, the 3 percent of returns showing gains of $200,000 or 
more accounted for 62 percent of the total value of capital gains.); 
see PERSPECTIVES ON THE OWNERSHIP OF CAPITAL ASSETS, supra note 321. 
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number of middle income taxpayers reporting capital gains, omitting the 
much smaller percentage of the gain they reported. 330 
Proponents of the 1997 capital gains cut claimed, as usual, that it was 
necessary to promote economic growth331 or help savings and 
investment,332 with a few adding, in light of the booming economy, that 
cuts were needed to help maintain the strong economic growth experienced 
over the past number of years. 333 The more forthright and revealing 
330. 143 CONG. REc. S8404 (daily ed. July 31, 1997) (statement of Sen. Smith) (noting 
that fifty-six percent of taxpayers with capital gains have income of less than $50,000). 
This omits that they reported less than ten percent of the capital gains. See Unofficial 
Transcript of Finance Panel Hearing on Extension of Tax Cuts, 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 
150-29 (2005) (Opening Statement of Sen. James M. Jeffords) ("The Joint Committee on 
Taxation estimates Americans will realize $327 billion in capital gains this year; $307 
billion of these gains, almost 94 percent, will go to taxpayers making more than $100,000. 
Taxpayers with income of under $50,000 will see less than $5 billion of these gains."); 
Jeffords Speaks Against Cutting Taxes at Savings and Investment Hearing, 2005 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 126-19 (2005). 
331. 143 CONG. REc. S8429 (daily ed. July 31, 1997) (statement of Sen. De Wine); 143 
CoNG. REc. S8445 (statement of Sen. Roth, Jr.); 143 CONG. REc. S8446 (statement of Sen. 
Hatch). 
332. 143 CONG. REc. at S8433 (daily ed. July 31, 1997) (statement of Sen. Max Baucus); 
143 CONG. REc. at 8434 (statement of Sen. Hutchison) (claiming the proposal was important 
for investing, saving and releasing hundreds of billions of dollars worth of tied-up capital); 
143 CONG. REc. S8443 (statement of Sen. Coverdale). For a refutation, see Lee, Critique, 
supra note 6, at I 08 (indicating that proponents made the totally false claim that every time 
capital gains were cut savings increased.); 143 CONG. REc. S8478 (daily ed. July 31, 1997) 
(statement of Sen. Burns). In fact, the savings rate has continued to decline from 1997 to 
present, notwithstanding the capital gains rate cuts in 1997 and 2003. See Peter R. Orzag, 
Net National Saving, I 06 TAX NOTES 1535 (2004). 
333. 143 CONG. REc. S8446 (daily ed. July 31, 1997) (statement of Sen. Hatch). Senator 
Hatch's claim that capital gains cuts would increase revenues was true for the next three 
years only because of the continued market boom. Proponents of capital gains rate 
reductions had long made this claim. 149 CONG. REc. H4708 (daily ed. May 22, 2003) 
(statement of Rep. Dreier). Historical evidence indicates that the initial revenue increase 
from increased realizations due to a capital gains rate cut (or impending hike) is offset by 
decreased realizations in later years. See Lee, Critique, supra note 6, at 56-57, 69-72; Lee, 
The Capital Gains "Sieve", supra note 10, at 73-74; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CAPITAL GAINS 
TAXES AND FEDERAL REVENUES 3-4 (2003), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs 
/38xx/doc3856/ TaxBrief2.pdf. Historically, realizations correlate positively with changes 
in the stock market, not rate changes. Lee, The Capital Gains "Sieve", supra note 10, at 17-
18 nn.82-84; Eric Toder & Troy Kravitz, Volatility of Capital Gains Realizations, 108 TAX 
NoTES I 051 (2005) ("Capital gains realizations appear to track generally the S&P Index, 
except during the early 1980s when capital gains soared while the S&P remained stable."). 
This probably reflects the Leveraged Buyout craze of that period, during which arbitrager 
activity resulted in the "perception that a corporation is 'in play' becom[ing] a self-fulfilling 
prophesy." /d. See also Hearings on Leveraged Buyouts and Corporate Debt Before the 
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comments were that the 1997 capital gains cut "begins to roll back the 
President's 1993 tax increase,"334 which many Republicans in Congress 
hated, 335 and that "the capital gains differential has been part of what 
Republicans thought we should have in this Tax Code for decades."336 
V. REDISTRIBUTION FROM MIDDLE AND LOWER INCOME TO HIGH INCOME 
TAXPAYERS 
In political discourse, the charge of redistribution of income from 
middle and lower income taxpayers to higher income taxpayers is often 
cast as "Robin Hood in Reverse." This metaphor saw frequent use during 
the early and mid 1990s when capital gains cuts proposed by President 
George H.W. Bush, and then by Republican majorities in Congress, would 
have benefited the top one or two percent of families by income quite 
disproportionately and would have been accompanied by decreased 
Senate Finance Comm., JOist Cong. 1st Sess. (Jan. 24-26, 1989) (statement of Treasury 
Secretary Brady) 
(Arbitragers purchase the stock of corporations thought to be acquisition 
candidates, hoping to sell the stock at a higher price if and when the acquisition is 
concluded. By definition, arbitragers are not long-term investors, and the mature 
of their activity and the demand for high rates of return on their available capital 
require that they tum over their investments in a reasonably short period of time .. 
. . Once arbitragers buy up stock of a corporation, the willingness of the 
corporation shareholders to sell is established, and the management's ability to 
resist an acquisition is effectively reduced. The certain knowledge that the 
arbitragers own working control of the target company's stock in tum makes sure 
that the potential acquirer's bidding for the corporation stock will surely be 
successful.). 
The "rest of the story" is that junk bond issuers, viz., allegedly Millikin, fed tips as to targets 
to arbitrageurs, viz., allegedly Boesky, etc. !d. The usual LBO premium (the excess of 
tender offer above pre-offer price) was more than thirty percent. Hearings on Tax Policy 
Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions Before the House Ways & Means Comm. I, JOist 
Cong. 1st Sess. 78 (May 1989) (statement of SEC Chairman Ruder) (indicating that the 
weighted average of premiums is 32.2% of pre-offer trading price). During this period, 
$313 billion in net equity reduction occurred. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 
No. JCS-1-89, FEDERAL INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRUCTURES 
(1989). 
334. 143 CONG. REc. S8432 (statement of Sen. Grams); 143 CONG. REc. S8416 
(statement of Sen. Roth, Jr.) ("America ... needs this capital gains tax relief. It is long 
overdue."). 
335. 147 CONG. REc. S5414 (daily ed. May 22, 2001) (statement of Sen. Gramm). 
336. 147 CONG. REC. S8317 (daily ed. July 30, 1997) (statement of Sen. Domenici); 147 
CONG. REc. H4678 (daily ed. June 26, 1997) (statement of Rep. Christensen) ("For 26 years 
the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Archer] has been here fighting for capital gains, fighting for 
small business owners."). 
132 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:1 
spending on social programs disproportionately benefiting middle and 
lower income families. 337 The same charge has been leveled against 
President George W. Bush's actual ordinary and capital gains rate 
reductions accompanied by spending cuts.338 Professor Larry Bartels has 
337. 143 CONG. REc. H5897 (daily ed. July 27, 1997) (statement of Rep. Pallone) 
(Under the tax plan that was pushed by the GOP, families with children that make 
less than $30,000 a year would not qualifY for a $500 per child tax credit. The 
Republicans fashioned this tax plan so that would exclude these families from 
eligibility for such a tax credit because they do not make enough money. It is like 
a reverse Robin Hood doctrine. They would penalize the poor to benefit the rich.); 
142 CONG. REc. Hl63 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1996) (statement of Rep. Brown); 141 CONG. REc. 
Hl0698 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (statement of Rep. Brown) ("Thousands of my 
constituents have told me that they are outraged at the Republicans' reverse Robin Hood 
tactics, stealing from the working people and the poor and giving tax breaks to the 
wealthy."); 141 CONG. REc. H7263 (daily ed. July 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Brown) 
("Republicans are not so stealthy that their Robin Hood-in-reverse crusade will go unnoticed 
by seniors."); 141 CoNG. REc. S5176 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Boxer) 
(Where is the money going when you cut these programs [school lunches]? I have 
the answer. It is being voted on, as we speak, in the House. Do you know what 
the answer is? It is tax breaks for the wealthiest people in America. Hurt the kids, 
help the rich. That is the Republican contract. I will show you the chart. More 
than 50 percent of their tax cut goes to people over $100,000. A third of the tax cut 
goes to those earning over $200,000 a year. Who gets hurt? The kids, the middle 
class, the poor, Robin Hood in reverse, my friend.); 
Tait Trussell, Editorial, "No-Pain" Medicare Prescription Can Prevent Predicted 
Bankruptcy, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 11, 1995, at A9 
(Democrats are blasting Republicans for trying to cut health care for the elderly 'to 
pay for tax cuts for the rich.' Rep. Corrine Brown, a Florida Democrat, for 
example, states that Florida Medicare beneficiaries could lose $28 billion in 
coverage during the next seven years under Grand Old Party proposals.); 
Lee, Critique, supra note 6, at 54-56. For discussion of the GOP Medicare plan see Robert 
Pear, Republicans Draw Plan for Slowing Medicare Growth, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1995, at 
1-1. 
338. E.g., 151 CONG. REc. H5411 (daily ed. June 9, 2005) (statement of Rep. Brown) 
("[Republicans] practice what I call reverse Robin Hood: robbing from the poor and 
working people to give tax breaks to the rich."); 151 CONG. REc. S2885 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 
2005) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("[T]his budget doesn't reduce the deficit-it increases 
it over the next 5 years. Despite these harmful cuts in Medicaid, they add yet another round 
of tax breaks. Where is the fairness in that? It is Robin Hood in reverse[;] steal from the 
poor to give to [the] wealthy."); 147 CONG. REc. S5793 (daily ed. May 22, 2001) (statement 
of Sen. Wellstone) (describing the plan as "a Robin Hood in reverse raid on the federal 
treasury. When fixes to the Alternate Minimum Tax and interest costs are added in, the tax 
cut will cost over $2 trillion over the next ten years."); 147 CONG. REc. H2212 (May 16, 
2001) (Rep. Matsui) 
(This is redistribution. About 60 percent of the $5.6 trillion [of the projected 
surplus] is in the form of Social Security payroll taxes. Who gets the burden of 
that? The average American, because it is capped at $76,000 a year [$90,000 for 
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reached an interesting empirical conclusion: "[u]nder Democratic 
administrations income growth has been more vigorous among the poor 
than among the rich; under Republican administrations the reverse has been 
true."339 Historical factors appear to have been that Democratic Presidents 
focused more on more employment and output growth while Republican 
Presidents focused more on controlling inflation?40 
A. DISPARITY IN EFFECTIVE RATE CHANGES 
The most bald assertion is that when the after tax real income of the top 
one percent increases, while that of the middle or lower income taxpayers 
does not, the wealthy taxpayers have taken "money away from middle-
income Americans."341 This would be true as to disproportional rate 
changes only if a tax cut at the top had to be made up for by tax increases at 
lower income levels. The pattern instead has been the cuts at the top have 
increased the deficit. A related and somewhat stronger position is that 
income redistribution from lower to upper income households occurs when 
effective rates drop at the top while increasing at the bottom, as is the case 
2004]. So we are going to take the payroll taxes and we are going to redistribute it 
to those people that file income tax returns of$1.1 million a year.); 
Paul Krugman, Opinion, Dooh Nibor Economics, N.Y. TIMES, June I, 2004, at A19 
(echoing the reverse Robin Hood theme and indicating that Congress agreed on a budget 
that cuts funds for Medicaid (and food stamps), even while extending tax cuts on dividends 
and capital gains); Christopher Swann, President Accused of Robbing Poor to Benefit the 
Rich, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb. 9, 2005, at 8 (indicating that the Bush II budget proposal to 
cut food stamps for low-income Americans would exclude 200,000-300,000 families from 
coverage; a freeze on child care funding to the States will mean that 300,000 fewer low-
income children will be assisted by 2009; while extending first term tax cuts largely 
benefiting high income households); Jonathan Weisman, Congressional Budget Plans Differ 
On Depth ofCuts; House Proposing Greater Reductions, WASH. POST, Mar. 13,2003, at A9 
("Democrats and their allies call the House proposal 'Robin Hood in reverse,' saying it 
would cut programs for the poor and elderly to make room for a tax cut on investment 
dividends that largely benefits the wealthy."). The CBO has concluded that two-thirds of 
the 2004 Deficit was due to the Bush II tax cuts. Michael Olesker, Once Again, Working 
Folks Get Soaked, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 15, 2004, at B1; see CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE 
BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE (2004), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/57xx/doc5773/08-24-BudgetUpdate.pdf. 
339. Larry M. Bartels, Partisan Politics and the U.S. Income Distribution, Feb. 2004, at 2 
(taking account of cash benefits from the Government, but not effective rates), available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/-bartels/income.pdf. 
340. !d. at 17. 
341. 138 CONG. REc. S3385-86 (daily ed. March 12, 1992) (statement of Sen. Gore). 
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under the Bush II tax cuts. 342 The strongest position is that pre-tax 
disparities have reflected greater returns on capital than on labor. 
B. INCREASING EFFECTIVE RATES AT THE BOTTOM AND DECREASING 
EFFECTIVE RATES AT THE TOP 
The CBO has projected the effective rates for total Federal taxes and 
for individual income taxes per income classes 2001 to 2014 (using 2001 
incomes for all years), assuming that all of the Bush II tax cuts become 
permanent (except for partial expensing of investment and net operating 
losses which the Administration does not intend to become permanent.) 
The following table reproduces (a) the total effective Federal tax rate and 
(b) effective income tax rates, respectively, for the bottom two quintiles 
and top ten percent, five percent and one percent for 2001 (before any of 
the Bush II tax cuts), 2008 (when all of the tax cuts are phased in) and 
2014.343 
Total Effective Federal Tax Rate Effective Individual 
Income Tax Rate 
Income 2001 2008 2014 2001 2008 2014 
Cate2:orv 
Lowest 5.4 5.8 8.3 -5.6 -5.2 -2.7 
20% 
Next 11.6 12.3 14.7 0.3 1.0 3.4 
20% 
Top 28.6 27.4 30.3 18.7 17.5 20.4 
10% 
TopS% 30.1 28.4 31.6 20.8 19.0 22.2 
Top 1% 33.0 29.6 33.6 24.1 20.7 24.7 
These figures reveal effective tax rates increasing at the bottom, 
especially for 2014, while decreasing at the top one percent for 2008 and 
increasing just slightly for 2014. Note that these tables do not reflect the 
Estate Tax cuts, the benefits of which are concentrated in the top two 
percent or so and especially the top one percent; and further that capital 
income for 2001 (which is used for all years) was down substantially at the 
342. 138 CONG. REc. H620-21 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1992) (statement of Rep. Moody, Ways 
& Means Committee member) ("The tax bill of 1981 and a number of subsequent measures 
produced what has generally been acknowledged to have been the most massive 
redistribution of wealth in this Nation."). 
343. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 14, at 21, Table B-2. 
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top one percent, so that the actual decrease in effective rate at the top will 
probably turn out to be greater than the CBO estimates. 
C. TAX CUTS FUNDED BY SOCIAL SECURITY SURPLUS 
For a number of years, wage taxes have exceeded income taxes for 
eighty percent of individual filers. 344 Wage taxes are the same percentage 
for everyone with no deductions, no personal exemptions and a cap of 
covered wages (or self-employment income) currently in the low $90,000s, 
so that it operates like a flat tax on the masses.345 Looking at contributions 
alone, lower income workers pay a much higher percentage of their pay 
than higher income taxpayers pay346 (this is less clearly the case when 
Social Security benefits are taken into account347). Indeed, some speculate 
344. 144 CONG. REc. S9389, S9403 (daily ed. July 30, 1998) (statement of Sen. Kerrey) 
("[The] average household income in 1996 was $35,492. That family, taking the standard 
deductions and exemptions, paid $2,719 in Federal income tax. But they paid a whopping 
$5,430 in payroll taxes-----<louble what they paid in income taxes." Sen. Kerrey's comments 
were based on CBO data.); 145 CONG. REc. Sl0305 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1999) (statement of 
Sen. Moynihan); 142 CONG. REc. Sl410 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1996) (statement of Sen. Nunn). 
As is often the case with income statistics in Congress, this morphed for some into the 
erroneous statement that eighty percent of Americans paid no income taxes. !50 CONG. REC. 
E1819 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 2004) (statement of Rep. Larson); 150 CONG. REc. S4026 
(statement of Sen. Edwards). 
345. Deborah A. Geier, The Payroll Tax Liabilities of Low- and Middle-Income 
Taxpayers, I 06 TAX NOTES 711 (2005) ("[T]he payroll tax burden ... [is] a large part of the 
revenue stream and yet is borne largely by low- and middle-income taxpayers and ... it 
epitomizes the shift toward taxing labor income more heavily than capital income (which is 
concentrated in upper-income households."); Laurence S. Seidman, A Progressive Value 
Added Tax: Has Its Time Finally Come?, 103 TAX NOTES 1255, 1258 (2004); Robert H. 
Michaelsen, Why the New Tax Law Is a Bad Tax Law, 92 TAX NOTES 677, 679 (2001) 
(describing the new tax law as the most regressive U.S. tax: a flat tax through the taxable 
wage base that then disappears); Gene Steuerle, Republ-taxes and Demo-grants, 96 TAX 
NOTES TODAY 128-112 (1996) (indicating that the Social Security tax is essentially a flat 
rate tax even less progressive than the most current flat tax proposals); Zelenak, supra note 
16, at 90. 
346. See supra tables in notes 99 and 116 and text accompanying note 126. 
347. Historically, much of the redistribution of income to lower income couples and 
individuals was within couples with higher earning workers contributing to the auxiliary 
benefits of their low-earning spouses, but still some redistribution through the payment of 
benefits at a higher rate for lower lifetime earnings benefits and due to changing 
demographics and earnings patterns (increased earnings of married women) will become 
more progressive overtime. Karen Smith, et a!., Lifetime Distributional Effects of Social 
Security Retirement Benefits, 2-5 (Urban Institute May 2001). See also Eugene Steuerle et 
a!., Does Social Security Treat Spouses Fairly? (Urban Institute Nov. 30, 1999); Eduardo 
Porter, Who Wins in a New Social Security?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at 3-6 ("Social 
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that this is the reason that President George W. Bush has been seeking to 
convert Social Security to private accounts, privatization by a more 
euphonious name.348 Additionally, the Administration may hope to capture 
the younger generation for the party and, of course, the GOP leaves the 
impact of making these tax cuts permanent for the rich out of its charge that 
Social Security is in serious funding troubles so that "personal accounts" 
are necessary for the younger workers to ever receive their benefits.349 
Currently, less than ninety percent of individual wage taxes go to pay 
current social security benefits;350 the excess or surplus goes into the Social 
Security uses taxes from the rich to bolster the retirement income of the poor through a 
benefit scale that now replaces about 60 percent of preretirement earnings for low-income 
workers but only 30 percent for the workers in the highest earning band."). 
348 Editorial, How Not to Save Social Security, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at A26 
([For President George W. Bush and other advocates of personal accounts,] Social 
Security is primarily an ideological struggle. Social Security supports retirees by 
shifting income from the young to the old via taxes, and from the rich to the poor 
via the formula for calculating benefits. To Mr. Bush and his supporters, taxation 
and redistribution are anathema, and Social Security is an anticapitalist ploy to 
squelch initiative and growth. Those same arguments were leveled against Social 
Security when President Franklin Roosevelt established it in 1935, and when its 
constitutionality was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1937.). 
349. David Lightrnan, Age Gap on Social Security; Bush Plan Sets off Battle for Support 
of Youth, HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 28,2005, at AI 
(There's a generation gap in the Social Security debate, and whether it narrows 
could have huge political and economic consequences. The debate was triggered 
by President Bush's suggestion that workers be allowed to invest part of their 
contributions in private accounts, and that could determine not only the system's 
future, but the shape of American politics.). 
350. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE OUTLOOK FOR SOCIAL SECURITY, 1-2 (2004) (indicating 
that in 2003 the government paid out $479 billion in Social Security benefits and collected 
$534 billion in Social Security taxes, so 10.29% of these taxes-or $55 billion-were not 
spent.), available at http://www.cbo.gov/Ftpdocs/55xx/Doc5530/06-14-Socia1Security.pdf; 
Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director, Cong. Budget Office, Option for Social Security: Budgetary 
and Distributional Aspects, Address Before Senate Finance Committee (May 25, 2005) 
[hereinafter Social Security: Budgetary and Distributional Aspects], available at 
http://www//cbo.gov/ftpdocs/63xx/doc6376/05-25-SSTestimony.pdf (indicating that "[i]n 
2004, the Social Security system took in $569 billion in tax revenue and paid out $493 
billion in benefits." $569- $493; excess= $76 billion+ $569 billion=l3.36%). At the end 
of fiscal year 2002, Social Security trust funds held more than $1.4 trillion in Treasury 
Securities. Adriel Bettelheim, A Wide Open "Lockbox," 62 CONG. Q. WKLY. 157 (2004) 
(indicating that each year Treasury borrows billions from the funds with staggered maturity 
dates, which the trust funds redeem when needed to pay current benefits; further indicating 
that the prospect of paying off all these securities worries policy makers since Treasury 
would probably have to borrow to meet its obligations). 
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Security Trust Fund.351 In 2006, the Social Security surplus will be $160 
billion.352 That surplus is projected to continue to increase until 2009.353 
The CBO forecasts that such surplus will amount to $2.4 trillion from 2006 
through 2015.354 It also forecasts that if the 2001 Act and 2003 Act tax cuts 
were made permanent, the total increase in the deficit for the same period 
would amount to $1.318 trillion (plus $195 million in debt service), and if 
the AMT is reformed by extending and indexing for inflation the 2004 
extension, the deficit will be increased by $398 billion (plus $109 million 
in debt servicei55 for a total of$2.2 trillion. 
According to The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, if the sunsets 
of the 200 1 and 2003 tax acts are repealed as to all of these tax cuts, as the 
George W. Bush Administration intended from enactment,356 "the total 
351. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL DEBT AND THE COMMITMENTS OF FEDERAL 
TRUST FUNDS at 3 (Oct. 24, 2002, revised May 6, 2003), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/39xxJdoc3948/10-25-LongRangeBrief4.pdf 
([T]he Treasury securities held by federal trust funds are neither assets nor debts 
of the government as a whole. In an operational sense, most federal trust funds are 
simply accounting devices. As money is collected, it is deposited in the Treasury, 
and the appropriate trust funds are credited with federal securities to reflect the 
amounts. When payments are made, the trust funds' balances are reduced. Any 
amount not needed to cover the programs' current expenditures is used either to 
finance other governmental activities or to pay down the debt held by the public. 
What is in the trust funds is simply the government's promise to pay itself back at 
some time in the future.); 
63 CONG. Q. WKL Y. 1741 (2005). 
352. Unofficial Transcript Is Available of W&M Hearing on President's [2006] Budget, 
2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 56-28 (2005) (Colloquy OBM Director Joshua Bolton and Rep. 
Xavier Becerra). 
353. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director, Cong. Budget Office, The Role of the Economy in 
the Outlook for Social Security, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Social Security 
Committee on Ways & Means, U.S. House of Representatives (June 21, 2005) ("In 2009, 
the Social Security surplus-the amount by which the program's dedicated revenue in a year 
exceeds the benefits paid in that year-will start to diminish. In 2019, that surplus will 
disappear, and outlays for benefits will begin to exceed the system's annual revenue."), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=6492&sequence=O. See also Social 
Security: Budgetary and Distributional Aspects, supra note 351, at 2. 
354. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, supra note 290, at 2, 
Table l-1. 
355. !d. at 16, Table 1-6. 
356. Editorial, Tax-Cut Gimmicks Portend Return to Deficit Spending, USA TODAY, Jun. 
6, 2001, at A14 ("Bush and congressional Republicans are gambling that future Congresses 
won't have the stomach to let the cuts expire. . . . Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill claimed 
that 'All these things are going to become permanent. They'll all be fixed.' That, in turn, 
creates pressure to reduce the size of government and denies Democrats fuel for their 
agenda."); Editorial, House GOP Aims to Drop Tax Bill's "Sunset," WASH. POST, Jun. 7, 
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discounted revenue loss through 2080 would be roughly three to five times 
as much as the actuarial shortfall in Social Security over the same 
period."357 Brookings Institute and the Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities projected the cost of making the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts 
permanent to be roughly equal to two percent of the GDP over the next 
seventy-five years, while the Social Security shortfall is projected as only 
0.4% of GDP over the same period.358 Based upon these projections, the 
media reported that if the self-executing sunsets of these tax cuts are 
honored just as to the top one percent of households (reporting more than 
$350,000 a year), Social Security will remain solvent for seventy-five 
years.359 "In the year 2033, using Social Security projections, expenditures 
2001, at All; Juliet Eilperin, House GOP Resolves to Stay the Course; Despite Change in 
Senate, Leaders Vow "to Keep Moving" on President's Agenda, WASH. POST, Jun. II, 
2001, at A2 ("House Majority Leader Richard K. Arrney (R-Tex.) announced on 
Wednesday [June 6, 2001] the House would take up legislation to make permanent the Bush 
tax cut, which is slated to expire at the end of 2010."); David E. Sanger, President's 
Signature Turns Broad Tax Cut, and a Campaign Promise, into Law, N.Y. TiMES, Jun. 8, 
2001, at A22 (indicating that Lawrence Lindsey, the president's top economist, "expected 
that the tax cut would be made permanent, 'but not any time in the immediate future."'). 
357. See JOEL FRIEDMAN ET AL., CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, EXTENDING 
TAX CUTS WOULD COST $2.1 TRILLION THROUGH 2015 (2005), available at 
http://www.cpbb.org/12-2-05tax.pdf (calculating the direct cost at $1.8 trillion, including the 
costs of extending AMT relief associated with the tax act; $2.1 trillion included related 
interest estimates. Friedman also notes a CBO estimate that the Social Security short fall 
over the next 75 years is 0.4% of GDP and that the cost of making the 2001 and 2003 Act 
tax cuts permanent for same period is roughly equal to two percent of GDP); William G. 
Gale & Peter R. Orzag, Economic Effect of Making the 2001 and 2003 Tax Cuts Permanent 
8 (Urban Institute Discussion Paper No. 17, 2004). 
358. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE OUTLOOK FOR SOCIAL SECURITY (2004), available at 
http://www.cbo. gov/Ftpdocs/55xx/ Doc5530/06-14-Socia!Security.pdf (last modified June 
17, 2004); BDS. OF TRS., FEDERAL OLD AGE AND SURVIVORS INS. AND DISABILITY INS. TRUST 
FUNDS, THE 2004 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE 
AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS (2004), available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR04/tr04.pdf. 
359. Gene Sperling, Editorial, No Pain, No Savings, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005, at A23 
("[The] administration's tax cuts already save the richest 1 percent of Americans nearly 
$100 billion a year, an amount that over time would keep Social Security solvent for 75 
years." Sperling was President Bill Clinton's top economic adviser); E.J. Dionne, Jr., 
Opinion, Feeding the "Crisis," WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2005, at Al7; Congress of the United 
States Joint Economic Committee (Democrats), March 25, 2004, President Bush's 
Permanent Tax Cuts for the Wealthy Would Come at the Expense of Medicare and Social 
Security (reporting Medicare and Social Security trustees' reports estimating revenue loss 
from permanently extending the Bush II tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003 as comparable to 
the expected combined seventy-five year shortfalls in the two programs); 2004 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 59-37 (2004); Peter Orszag, The Administration's Economic "Stimulus" Proposals, 
Testimony Before the Democratic Policy Committee (Jan. 22, 2003), available at 
http://www. brookings.edu/views/testimony/ orszag/20030 121. pdf. 
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on benefits will exceed payroll tax revenues by a bit more than $300 billion 
.... In that same year, nearly $380 billion in income tax revenues will not 
be collected if the tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003 are permanently in 
place."360 This, of course, provoked populist rhetoric. As Barbara B. 
Kennelly (D-Conn.), former member of the House Ways & Means 
Committee, and president of the National Committee to Preserve Social 
Security and Medicare, put it: 
[T]he tax cuts will be paid for largely with the surpluses that Social 
Security and Medicare generate .... Baby Boomers are starting to retire in 
six years, the senior population will shortly double-to 77 million from 
44 million-and Medicare and Social Security need the surpluses to stay 
afloat. According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, half of the 
75-year cost of the tax cuts could make Social Security and Medicare 
completely solvent for a full 75 years. Yet instead of helping the country's 
vulnerable populations, the tax cuts callously trade the long-term stability 
of Medicare and Social Security for a break for the country's wealthiest I 
percent. Worse yet, beneath the numbers lurks a dangerous undertow that 
could pull Social Security and Medicare in a life-threatening direction. 
Draining money from these now-stable programs would leave them 
weakened and make them easy targets for privatizers. The privatizers 
would change the programs' "all-for-one and one-for-all" principle of 
social insurance to one of"sink-or-swim."361 
Social Security currently depends on revenue from current workers to 
finance benefits, but the number of workers per Social Security 
beneficiaries is projected to drop from 3.3 in 2005 to 2.0 in 2050.362 These 
demographics and the projected demands on the system from the wave of 
Baby Boomer retirements commencing in 2015 are why wages tax base 
and rate were increased in 1983 to build up a trust fund to take care of the 
future excess of promised payments over current wage taxes collected.363 
360. Thomas Oliphant, Opinion, Beyond Social Security, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 6, 2005, at 
E-ll (relying on the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities). 
361. Barbara B. Kennelly, Commentary, Save Social Security, Medicare Programs, CHI. 
TRIB., Apr. 7, 2003, at C-23. 
362. Social Security: Budgetary and Distributional Aspects, supra note 351, at 1. See 
Zelenak, supra note 16, at 91. 
363. Republican Senator Bob Dole and Democratic Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan 
headed the Social Security Commission in 1983, of which Alan Greenspan was the Chair. 
149 CONG. REc. S7089-90 (daily ed. May 23, 2003) (statement of Sen. Baucus) (indicating 
that the the Commission was established because "[ s ]ince at least the last year of the Carter 
Administration, it had been apparent to both Social Security experts and a growing number 
of policy experts that the [Social Security] system was drifting into deep trouble."). Forrest 
P. Chisman, Social Security Reserves and the Budget Deficit, SOCIAL SECURITY AND 
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That trust fund is currently invested in special Treasury bonds (and not 
counted as part of the deficit). 364 If the 2001 and 2003 Acts' sunsets were 
repealed so these tax cuts became permanent (which CBO forecasts would 
increase the Deficit by $1.318 trillion 2006-2015 plus $195,359,879 in debt 
service365), the Treasury would likely be unable to honor this debt plus 
interest, which Social Security will need to draw upon to pay annual 
benefits promised, which are projected to exceed the then-current year's 
wage tax collections commencing 2012 or so.366 (The much discussed 
ECONOMIC WELL-BEING ACROSS THE GENERATIONS 30, 42 (John R. Gist ed., 1988) ("The 
trouble arose primarily from the economic 'stagflation' of the 1970s and early 1980s, when 
inflation and recession occurred simultaneously. 'Stagflation'is precisely the type of 
economic environment that creates the greatest difficulties for Social Security."). In 1983, 
Congress addressed the short and long-term needs of Social Security, agreeing to "pre-
fund" the Social Security Baby Boom generation by allowing the program to take in more 
taxes than it needed to pay current benefits. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. 
98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (1983); 1983 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 218; 145 CONG. REC. S3162 (daily ed. 
Mar. 24, 1999) (statement of Sen. Kerrey) (indicating that when Treasury starts paying back 
the money it borrowed from the Trust Fund in 2013, it will pay these IOUs with general 
revenues. Thus, beneficiaries from the Baby Boom generation will have a claim on $6.85 
trillion of income tax revenues (the borrowed amounts plus interest) in addition to the 
payroll tax claim they already have on tomorrow's workers.). In Senator Kerrey's words, 
[w]hen the Congress voted to support the payroll tax increases to protect the 
integrity of the Social Security fund in 1983, it never intended for the surplus in 
the fund to mask the deficit. On the contrary, a vote cast in 1983 was a vote to 
ensure the soundness of the Social Security Program, not a vote for new revenues 
to fund non-Social Security Programs. Unfortunately, we all know that the 
surplus has not been used to assure the future of retirees. Nor has it been used to 
invest in the future of this country. Instead, it has been and continues to be spent 
on unrelated programs. With this in mind, the only right thing to do is to return 
some of the surplus from the payroll tax to working Americans. 
137 CONG. REc. S5113 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dodd). Senator 
Moynihan agreed. 144 CONG. REc. S9389 (daily ed. July 30, 1998) (indicating that, 
excluding interest, the Social Security Trust Funds will generate $698 billion over the next 
ten years, about enough to reduce regressive wage taxes by two percentage points). 
364. The federal securities held in the Social Security Trust Fund "represent the 
government's promise to pay money to itself." CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF 
TRUST FUND PROGRAMS ON FEDERAL BUDGET SURPLUS AND DEFICITS 1 (2002), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/39xx/doc3974/11-04-LongRangeBrief5.pdf. In 2003, the 
Social Security Trust Fund surplus was $171 billion. !d. at 2, Table 1. 
365. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE 17 
(2005), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6609/08-l5-0utlookUpdate.pdf. 
CBO forecasts that reforming AMT would increase the deficit $395 million (plus $109 
million in debt service) over the same period. !d. See also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
BUDGETARY PROJECTIONS INCORPORATING ASSUMPTIONS SPECIFIED BY RANKING MEMBER 
SPRATT (2005), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/66xx/doc6633/09-08-
S pra ttLetter. pdf. 
366. See Alan Greenspan, Testimony Before the Committee on the Budget, U.S. House 
of Representatives on Economic Outlook and Current Fiscal Issues (Feb. 25, 2004) 
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future actuarial shortfall assumes that the Treasury has been able to pay the 
Social Security Trust Fund amounts it borrowed plus interest and that such 
shortfall arises only after repaid Trust fund is exhausted). If Treasury is 
unable to pay that debt from general revenues, then in a real sense income 
has been redistributed from middle income and perhaps lower income wage 
taxpayers to top income taxpayers.367 How likely is such a Treasury 
default? 
To pay full benefits, the Social Security system will eventually have to 
rely on interest on government bonds held in its trust funds-and 
ultimately, on the redemption of those bonds. In the absence of other 
changes, bonds can continue to be redeemed until the trust funds are 
exhausted, which will occur in 2044, CBO projects. But where will the 
Treasury find the money to pay for the bonds? Will policymakers cut 
back other spending in the budget? Will they raise taxes? Or will they 
borrow more?368 
(indicating that (i) between 2008 to 2011 baby boomers will begin to retire; (ii) CBO budget 
scenarios show growing deficits in future years; (iii) federal outlays under Social Security 
and Medicare would increase from less than seven percent of GDP to twelve percent by 
2030; and (iv) if the longevity of the elderly continues to rise, so will the elderly proportion 
of population. Greenspan noted, "[i]f this fundamental change in the age distribution 
materializes, we will eventually have no choice but to make significant structural 
adjustments in the major retirement programs." Greenspan also mentioned the changing 
Social Security cost of living measure and retirement age, and Medicare.), transcript 
available at http://federalreserve. gov/board/docs/testimony/2004/20040225/default.htm; 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND MEDICARE ON THE FEDERAL 
BuDGET (2002), available at http:/ /www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/39xx/doc3982/11-14-
LongRangeBrief6.pdf; see also Joseph J. Schatz & Siobhan Hughes, Greenspan's Solutions 
Raise Eyebrows, 62 CONG. Q. WKLY. 527 (2004) 
(Democrats were displeased that the Fed chairman called for reducing Social 
Security benefits without addressing the role tax cuts played in widening the 
deficit. ... Politicians tend to pick and choose among Greenspan's statements, 
highlighting the parts that support their own positions. However, Republicans 
who exulted when Greenspan endorsed cutting taxes three years ago and 
Democrats who have used his recent warnings about deficits to attack GOP fiscal 
policies both wasted no time distancing themselves from the Fed chiefs statement 
about Social Security [to scale back benefits to help tame the deficit].); 
Edmund L. Andrews, To Trim Deficit, Greenspan Urges Social Security and Medicare Cuts, 
N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 26, 2004, at AI. 
367. Zelenak, supra note 16, at 91-92. 
368. Social Security: Budgetary and Distributional Aspects, supra note 351, at 2; CONG. 
BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL DEBT AND THE COMMITMENTS OF FEDERAL TRUST FUNDS, at 3 
(Oct. 24, 2002, revised May 6, 2003) 
(Nor will the balances in trust funds now and in the future by themselves provide 
resources to meet the government's future commitments. Indeed, the mechanisms 
of trust funds and the accumulation of federal securities in them do not mitigate 
the future strains that such programs as Social Security will impose on the federal 
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D. BETTER PRE-TAX RETURNS ON CAPITAL AND DECLINE IN PAY AT 
BOTTOM 
The most blatant example of a return on capital at the expense of labor 
is where Wall Street rewards, through value per share increases/69 a public 
company for downsizing, i.e., laying off permanent employees, whom it 
often hires back to the same desk as independent contractors with no 
benefits, job security, or withholding.370 The top management's 
compensation often reflects such value per share increases. 371 
budget and the economy. When trust fund balances are drawn down, the 
government will not be using resources that have been saved for a rainy day. It 
will be using resources generated at that time--either by running a surplus in the 
rest of the budget or by borrowing from the public.), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/ 39xx/doc3948/10-25-LongRangeBrief4.pdf; Alan 
Greenspan, Testimony Before the Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives 
on Economic Outlook and Current Fiscal Issues (Feb. 25, 2004), transcript available at 
http://federalreserve. gov/board/docs/testimony/2004/20040225/default.htrn. 
369 Frank Lalli, Why You Should Invest in Companies that Invest in Their Workers, 
MONEY, Mar. 1996, at II 
(The payoff [of investing in workers] may not be instantly obvious. At least, it's 
certainly eluded Wall Street, which continues to pump up the share prices of any 
corporation with a CEO who can spell 'downsize.' For example, AT&T's stock 
rose $2.50 a share to $67.25 in early January when the company announced its 
intention to discard 40,000 of its employees.). 
370. Jay Mathews, Their Riches Were Your Command; Demands That Executive Pay Be 
Tied to Performance Are What Led to Downsizers' Bonuses, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1996, at 
HI; Jay Mathews, For Love or Money?; Behaviorists Debate What Really Makes People 
Work Hard, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 1993, at HI; David Kirkpatrick, The New Executive 
Unemployed, TIME, Apr. 8, 1991, at 36 
(A new survey of I ,005 corporations conducted jointly by FORTUNE and the Wyatt 
Co. consulting firm has found that 86% of the companies have reduced their 
managerial ranks in the past five years, 52% of them in 1990. Managerial 
downsizing has taken even deeper hold in companies with more than 5,000 
employees-90% of these outfits have slashed the white-collar payroll over the 
past five years; 59% in 1990 .... In a relatively new wrinkle, after discharging 
managers, many companies will hire them back as part-time consultants.); 
Donald R. Doser, Distribute Wealth More Fairly, ENGINEERING NEWS-REC., Jan. 17, 2000, 
at 59 (indicating that widespread tactics to squeeze every possible dollar of profits from 
front-line workers include turning long-term employees into temps and independent 
contractors to avoid paying costs of health insurance and pensions.); Joseph Weber, et al., 
Chicago Blues, Bus. WK., Oct. 16, 2000, at 162; see generally Robert B Reich & Jim 
Hightower, Broken Faith: Why We Need to Renew the Social Compact; First Principles, 
THE NATION, Feb. 16, 1998, at 11 (noting that profitable companies routinely downsize their 
workforce or down-wage and down-benefit by replacing full-time workers with independent 
contractors, temporary workers and part-timers; they are bringing in new full-time workers 
at lower wage scales than current workers. The authors also indicate that layoffs in the 
current expansion are occurring at a higher rate than in the 1980's expansion. In the mid-
1990s, employees terminated on account of "downsizing" accounted for twenty percent of 
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A study of the compensation of the top five executives of public 
corporations reveals that their aggregate compensation grew from 4.8 
percent of the aggregate net income of corporations in 1993-1995 to 10.3 
percent of net income in 2001-2003.372 Growth in firm size and 
performance explains at most forty percent of the actual increase.373 
Equity-based compensation (restricted stock and stock options)374 grew 
from thirty-seven percent of total compensation to the top executives of the 
S&P 500 corporations in 1993 to fifty-five percent by 2003 (not 
surprisingly peaking in 2000 with the end of the stock market boom).375 
unemployment, exacerbated with the downsized corporation then 'renting' twenty percent to 
thirty percent of those laid off as "independent contractors" with perhaps higher wages but 
no benefits or security.); accord, Louis Uchitelle, More Downsized Workers Are Returning 
As Rentals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8. 1996, at 1-l. 
371. Ramon G. McLeod, CEOs Being Rewarded for Dropping the Ax; Study Says Layoffs 
Bring Big Bucks, S.F. CHRON., May 1, 1997, at AS (indicating that an executive with stock 
options does better when jobs are cut and that Wall Street rewards CEO for announcing 
layoffs). "For the top 30 companies that announced layoffs in 1996, the average CEO 
earned $4.6 million in direct compensation that included $2.1 million in salaries and 
bonuses and an additional $2.5 million in stock options. The 30 men who ran these 
companies oversaw the layoffs of209,000 people." ld. 
372. Lucian Bebchuck & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, I (Harvard John 
M. Olin Discussion Paper No. 510, 2005), available at http://www.papers.ssrn. 
com/abstract_id=648682. The authors' data set includes all S&P 500, Mid-Cap 400 and 
Small-Cap 600, which in the aggregate constitute more than 80% of the total market 
capitalization of U.S. public firms. !d. at 2. 
373. ld. at 8. 
374. The importance of stock options in the 1990s arose as an unintended consequence 
from the tax rule (I.R.C. §280A) that a corporation could not deduct more than $1 million in 
compensation of any executive unless it was performance-related. William J. McDonough, 
The Fourth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities & Financial Law, 9 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 583, 602-03 (2004). 
Stock options are performance-related, and so the stock option industry came in 
[saying:] 'Okay, here's a peer group, which just happens to be a group that is very 
well paid, and since you're just so damn smart, you've got to make in the top 25 
percent of the peer group.' That, I think, was more insidious than the instrument 
of the stock option. 
ld. McDonough is Chairman of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. 
375. Bebchuck & Grinstein, supra note 373, at 10 (indicating a Mid-Cap 400 increase 
from forty-one percent to fifty-one percent and a Small-Cap 600 increase from thirty-four 
percent to forty-one percent). 
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In the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley,376 the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board proposed in 2003 (and finalized in 2005) a new Statement of 
Financial Accounting Standards requiring corporations to report as an 
expense the value of options granted to employees, thus reducing revenues 
on their financial statement.377 This ended the stock option gold rush with 
restricted stock (a grant of stock that generally passes to the executive over 
a period of time) now often being used instead.378 
376. Pub. L. I07-204, II6 Stat. 745 (2003). 
The change was introduced after the collapse of the I990s stock market bubble, 
when it became clear that some executives had used share option schemes to loot 
their companies. One estimate is that more than Dollars I,OOObn (Pounds 550bn) 
was transferred to executives from shareholders in Standard & Poor's 500 
companies. Longer-term damage was wrought in many companies whose 
management was manipulated to maximise the gains from share options. 
Previously, share option details had to be disclosed in footnotes to financial 
statements. But few investors appeared to have understood the value of such 
options until it was exposed after the bubble burst. New accounting standards on 
both sides of the Atlantic have since been drafted that require the value of options 
to be deducted as an expense in the profit and loss account. 
Shrinking Share Options; Their Popularity Is Slipping as Their Cost Becomes Clearer, FIN. 
TIMES (London), Aug. 13, 2005, at 8. 
377. Joseph Nocera, Stock Options: So Who's Counting?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2005, at 
CI (noting that a surprising number of Wall Street analysts and companies believe that, 
despite the GAAP requirement to include them, they can persuade investors to look the 
other way); Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. I23(R) (Rev 2004) Financial Accounting Series No 263-C (FASB 2004), 
available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fasi23r.pdf; Floyd Norris, U.S. Rejects Cisco Plan on 
Options, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2005, at Cl. The SEC has agreed with the FASB. Staff 
Accounting Bulletin No. I 07, I7 CFR Part 2II (Mar. 9, 2005), available at 
http:/ /www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab I 07 .pdf. 
378. Shirleen Holt & Kristi Heim, 5 Years After the Bust, A Sober, New Reality; Dot-
cams and Tech Startups-"Web 1.0: Arrogance. Web 2.0: Humility," SEATILE TIMES, Aug. 
2I, 2005, at AI ("Microsoft, which minted millionaires by the thousands in the I990s, 
stopped granting employee stock options altogether, replacing them with outright stock 
grants given more sparingly."); FIN. TIMES, supra note 377 (indicating that the percentage of 
the largest firms issuing stock options decreased from thirty-six percent to twenty-one 
percent while the percentage granting restricted stock increased from fifty-seven percent to 
sixty-eight percent); Harry Wessel, Pinning Down the Big Bucks; Stock Options, Restricted 
Shares Gave Many Executives a Pay Windfall in '04, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 3, 2005, at 
HI; David S. Hilzenrath, A Popular Reward: Restricted Stock; Job Performance Link Is 
Debatable, WASH. POST, June 27, 2005, at DI2; Ross Kerber, Meet the New Stock Option; 
Stock Options Were once the Rage, but Now Companies Are Offering Executives Restricted 
Stock As a Way to Tie Compensation to Performance, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. I7, 2005, at EI. 
Restricted stock is subject to much the same policy criticisms as stock options. Claudia H. 
Deutsch, An Early Advocate of Stock Options Debunks Himself, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005, 
at 3-I. Moreover, assuming level amounts of say three year vesting restricted stock grants, 
by the last year of vesting the aggregate book expense would be the same as if the entire 
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Cash compensation for large, mid-size and small cap firms grew over 
forty percent between 1993 and 2003.379 The epitome of this trend has been 
the CEO superstar, in the widely quoted words of William McDonough, 
Chairman of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (mandated 
by Sarbanes-Oxley): 
We saw confusion about the role of the CEO. We saw the advent of the 
CEO superstar, and an explosion in compensation that made those 
superstar CEOs actually believe that they were worth more than 400 times 
the pay of their average workers. Twenty years before, they had been paid 
an average of forty times the average worker, so the multiple went from 
forty to 400--an increase of ten times in twenty years. That was 
thoroughly unjustified by all economic reasoning, and in addition, in my 
view, it is grotesquely immoral.380 
Compensation to other high level professionals increased far less during 
this period.381 
year three grant had been expensed, viz, in year one, one-third of the year one grant would 
be a book expense; in year two, one-third of year one grant and one-third of year two grant 
would be a book expense, and on year three, one-third of year one grant, one-third of year 
two grant, and one-third of year three grant would be a book expense. Thus, there is only a 
short-term accounting "advantage" to restricted stock grants. /d. 
379. Bebchuck & Grinstein, supra note 373, at 12, 18. 
380. McDonough, supra note 375, at 590; Art Pine, Corporate Profit Climbs 87% While 
Worker Pay Rises 4.5%, Cm. TRIB., May 11, 2004, at C4; 150 CONG. REc. H3690-91 (daily 
ed. June 2, 2004) (statement of Rep. Emanuel) (indicating that the economy has created the 
largest income disparity since the 1900s. Merrill Lynch chief economist said, 
[t]he income from the recovery has been locked up in the corporate sector. We 
have had a redistribution of income to the corporate sector." Emanuel further 
claimed that President George W. Bush's economic and tax policies accelerated 
concentration of wealth at the top: "[a] study cited by N.Y. Times found that 
Americans are being taxed more than twice as heavily from earnings from work as 
they are from investment income, even though more than half of all investment 
goes to the wealthiest 5 percent of taxpayers.); 
see Edmund L. Andrews, Big Gap Found in Taxation Of Wages and Investments, N.Y. 
TiMES, May 8, 2004, at C2 (relying on a study by Citizens for Tax Justice, a liberal 
nonprofit research organization, finding that federal income taxes on wages and other 
earnings average about 10.7% and wage taxes take another 12.7%, while federal taxes on 
investment income (not subject to wage taxes) average about 9.6%. Extrapolating from IRS 
data, the study estimated that 43% of all investment income goes to the top 1% of 
households and 60% goes to top 5%). The disparity is even greater in the case of the 
highest paid CEO's. "Thirty years ago the average real annual compensation of the top 100 
chief executives was $!.3m: 39 times the pay of the average worker. Today it is $37.5m: 
over 1,000 times the pay of the average worker." Ever Higher Society, Ever Harder to 
Ascend- Meritocracy in America, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 5. 2005, at 22. 
381. Bebchuck & Grinstein, supra note 373, at 24 n.6 (indicating that high-level lawyers 
saw an increase of 15%; high-level engineers, 18%; and high-level accountants, 3%). 
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National income growth in the current economic recovery also 
evidences increased returns on capital coupled with decreased returns on 
labor. The share of national economic growth (adjusted for inflation) for 
2000-2004 going to wages and salaries is twenty-three percent and to 
corporate profits is forty-four percent; in contrast, average post-World War 
II economic recoveries went forty-nine percent to wages and eighteen 
percent to corporate profits. 382 Half of the share going to wages and 
salaries was captured by corporate executives. The Federal Reserve Report 
to Congress discloses that for the first half of 2005 ( 1) corporate profits 
were up 13%, a slower rate than for 2003 and 2004, and (2) labor 
compensation per hour (excluding stock option income) rose 3.5% (about 
one half a percentage point less than the 2003-2004 averages), but, with 
stock option and bonus income, [largely payable to higher income workers] 
the increase was seven percent. 383 Thus, increase as to workers was 
382. DAVID KAMIN & ISAAC SHAPIRO, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, 
CORPORATE PROFITS CONTINUES TO RECENE RECORD SHARE OF GAINS FROM RECOVERY, 
WHILE WORKERS' SHARE LAGS FAR BEHIND (2003) (relying on Commerce Department 
data); ANDREW SUM ET AL., CENTER FOR LABOR MARKET STUDIES NORTHEASTERN 
UNIVERSITY THE UNPRECEDENTED RISING TIDE OF CORPORATE PROFITS AND THE 
SIMULTANEOUS EBBING OF LABOR COMPENSATION: GAINERS AND LOSERS FROM THE 
NATIONAL ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN 2002 AND 2003 10, 16-24 (2004), available at 
http://www.nupr.neu.edu/4-04/corporate-profits.pdf; ISAAC SHAPIRO, ET AL., CENTER ON 
BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, HOW DOES THIS RECOVERY MEASURE UP? (2005) 
(indicating that employment and wage and salary growth were especially slow-less than 
one half the average in other post World War II recoveries-whereas corporate profits 
experienced 15.1% average annual growth compared with 9.5% for other comparable post-
war periods); see also Economic Policy Institute, Economic Snapshots, Productivity Growth 
and Profits Far Outpace Compensation in Current Expansion (Apr. 21, 2005), available at 
http://www .epinet.org/printer.cfin?id=20 13&content_type= 1 &nicename=webfeatures_snaps 
hots_20050421. 
383. [C]ompensation per hour in the nonfarm business sector ... rose 7 percent 
over the four quarters ending in the first quarter of this year, having registered a 
particularly large bulge in the final quarter of 2004. Much of this sharp rise may 
be the result of the exercise of a large number of stock options late last year, a 
development perhaps induced by an increase in equity prices that boosted the 
number of options that were 'in the money' and by a proposed change in 
accounting regulations that led some companies to accelerate the vesting of 
options that had been previously granted. In addition, the strong performance of 
profits in 2004 may have been associated with sizable nonproduction bonus 
payments at the end of last year. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Monetary Policy Report to the 
Congress 8, 16 (July 20, 2005) "), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
boarddocs!hh/2005/july/fullreport.pdf; see also Alan Greenspan, Testimony Before the 
Senate Joint Economic Committee on Economic Outlook (Apr. 21, 2004) 
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equaled in the aggregate by bonuses and equity based compensation at the 
top. Economic growth is going "to corporate profits, to rising health care 
costs and to a surge in the salaries and other compensation of executives. 
(Forbes reports that the combined compensation of the chief executives of 
America's 500 largest companies rose 54% last year [2004].)"384 Even a 
resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative 
research group, concluded that "[i]t looks like the gains from the recovery 
haven't really filtered down .... The gains have gone to owners of capital 
and not to workers."385 As the Toles September 6, 2004, political cartoon 
inspired by the Census Report discussed below put it: "It's not trickle-down 
economics. We got the plumbing fixed."386 
Tellingly, the same week that a 2005 Census Report revealed that 
median family income in 2004 had failed to increase for a record fourth 
straight year (average income of middle class households fell 0.7 percent 
(Most of the recent increases in productivity have been reflected in a sharp rise in 
the pretax profits of nonfinancial corporations from a very low 7 percent share of 
that sector's gross value added in the third quarter of 2001 to a high 12 percent 
share in the fourth quarter of last year. The increase in real hourly compensation 
was quite modest over that period. The consequence was a marked fall in the ratio 
of employee compensation to gross nonfinancial corporate income to a very low 
level by the standards of the past three decades.), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/2004/20040 421/default 
.htm. 
384. Paul Krugman, Summer of Our Discontent, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 26, 2005, at A21. 
385. David Leonardt, Poverty in U.S. Grew in 2004, While Income Failed to Rise for 5th 
Straight Year, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005, at A 1 (noting the first time on record household 
incomes failed to increase for five straight years. "[E]conomists say technology and global 
trade appear to be holding down pay for many workers. The rising cost of health care 
benefits has also eaten into pay increases. . . . Last year, households kept income from 
falling by working more hours than they did in 2003."). See also Steven Greenhouse, 
Falling Fortunes of the Wage Earner, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2005, at Cl; Nell Henderson & 
Amy Joyce, U.S. Ended 2004 with Gains in Payrolls; Job Increase First Since Recession, 
WASH. PosT, Jan. 8, 2005, at AI; John Bound & George Johnson, Changes in the Structure of 
Wages in the 1980's: An Evaluation of Alternative Explanations, 82 AMER. ECON. REv. 371, 
381, 383-84, 388 (1992) (indicating that the disparity was primarily attributable to changes in 
technology, viz., the computer revolution.). "Skill bias" resulted in growing pay premium for 
the most skilled workers, particularly computer users. David M. Cutler & Lawrence F. 
Katz, Macroeconomic Performance and the Disadvantaged, 16~9, 48-50 (published in 
William C. Brainard & George L. Perry, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1991-
2) (indicating that labor's share of types of income that makes up types of income did not 
decline, but its share of personal income did over the 1980s as the percentage of all 
individual income attributable to dividends, capital gains and interest grew; wage shifts 
reflected "skill bias" resulting in young families, and particularly the Jess educated, faring 
worse during the 1980s than older, more educated families). 
386. WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2005). 
148 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:1 
while the top five percent rose 1.7 percent from 2000-2004),387 New 
Orleans flooded due to Hurricane Katrina and the whole world saw the 
387. Carmen DeNavas-Walt eta!, U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, P60-
229, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2004 (Aug. 
2005); see also News Release, Economy up, People down, Declining Earnings Undercut 
Income Growth (Economic Policy Institute Aug. 31, 2005) (relying on the Census Report to 
indicate that output per hour went up fifteen percent from 2000 to 2004, but these 
productivity gains failed to reach the typical household. 
While the average real income of middle-income households fell slightly (down 
$300 or 0.7%--from $44,759 to $44,455), that of households in the top 5% grew 
by over $4,000 (+1.7%), from $260,045 to $264,387 .... [T]he changes in the 
economy-globalization, fewer unions, lower minimum wages, shifting norms in 
taxation and regulation favoring investors over wage-earners, and recoveries 
without adequate job growth-have significantly increased the time it takes for 
working families to reap the benefits of growth.), 
available at http://www.epinet.org/content.cfrnlwebfeatures_econindicators_income20050 
831; Editorial, Life in the Bottom 80 Percent, WASH. PosT, Sept. 1, 2005, at A22 (stating 
that the Census Report showed income inequality was near all-time highs in 2004, with 
50.1% of income going to the top 20% ofhouseholds. 
[A]dditional census data obtained by the Economic Policy Institute show that only 
the top 5 percent of households experienced real income gains in 2004. Incomes 
for the other 95 percent of households were flat or falling. Income inequality is an 
economic and social ill, but the administration and the Congressional majority 
don't seem to recognize that. When Congress returns from its month long summer 
vacation next week, two of the leadership's top priorities include renewing the 
push to repeal the estate tax, which affects only the wealthiest of families, and 
extending the tax cuts for investment income, which flow largely to the richest 
Americans. At the other end of the spectrum, lawmakers have stubbornly refused 
to raise the minimum wage: $5.15 an hour since 1997. They will also be taking up 
proposals for deep budget cuts in programs that ameliorate income inequality, like 
Medicaid, food stamps and federal student loans. They should be ashamed of 
themselves.); 
William Neikirk, U.S. Poverty Rises for 4th Year in Row; Global Competition for Jobs and 
Corporate Resistance to Higher Pay Are Possible Causes, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 31, 2005, at Cl7 
("Analysts cited a number of possible reasons-such as intense global competition for jobs, 
the slow growth in employment from the 2001 recession and corporate resistance to higher 
wages and more hiring."); Ceci Connolly & Griff Wine, Poverty Rate Up 3rd Year in a 
Row, WASH. PosT, Aug. 27, 2004, at AI (citing the 2004 Census report (as to 2003)); Jared 
Bernstein & Lee Price, An Off-Kilter Expansion; Slack Job Market Continues to Hurt Wage 
Growth, EPI Briefing Paper # 164 (Sept. 2, 2005) (indicating that the job market continues 
to be too slack to generate the pressure needed to raise the wages of many to at least the 
level of inflation, if not inflation plus productivity. 
Since mid-2003, payrolls have been expanding on a monthly basis, but the rate of 
growth has been well below that of prior recoveries. This has led many analysts to 
note that a significant gap has developed between the actual number of jobs 
created and the number the labor market would have if it were operating closer to 
its full potential" (citations omitted). Unemployment rates remain low while job 
Winter 2006] CLASS WARFARE 149 
poor left behind, while many newspapers associated the two.388 "The 
Republicans profess belief in trickle-down, but what they've given us is the 
Flood. "389 
Stagnant wages appear attributable in part to immigrants contributing 
at least sixty percent of growth in labor force 2000-2004 (equal to the net 
job growth) with a very high percentage being relatively young, 
growth remains weak because millions have dropped out of the labor market and 
their absence has helped dampen the growth of unemployment.). 
388. Jason Deparle, Broken Levees, Unbroken Barriers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at 4-1 
(What a shocked world saw exposed in New Orleans last week wasn't just a 
broken levee. It was a cleavage of race and class .... Hydrology joined sociology 
... from the settling of the flood-prone city, where well-to-do white people lived 
on the high ground, to its frantic abandonment. ... 'a pretty graphic illustration of 
who gets left behind in this society-in a literal way.' 
New Orleans was unusually poor (27.4% below the poverty line in 2000 almost two and a 
half times national average) and disproportionately black.); Edward Alden, Comment & 
Analysis, Bush's Policies Have Crippled Disaster Response Capabilities, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Sept. 3, 2005, at 9 (indicating that (i) the "deep tax cuts enacted in 2001-which 
President George W. Bush now wants extended permanently-left no room for government 
initiatives that might have prevented the catastrophe and increased capacity to respond;" (ii) 
the military, and especially the National Guard, was stretched too thin; and (iii) 
the storm has ruthlessly exposed the poverty that still afflicts a substantial 
minority of Americans, and has grown worse since Mr. Bush pushed through tax 
cuts that overwhelmingly benefited the well-to-do. The US Census Bureau 
reported this week that another 1.1 m Americans slipped below the poverty line 
last year. After falling for most of a decade, since 2000 the number of Americans 
in poverty has grown from 11.3 per cent to 12.7 per cent of the population-a 
higher percentage than in the 1970s despite 30 years of generally robust economic 
growth.); 
Hurricane Exposes Issues of Class, Race, USA TODAY, Sept. 2, 2005, at A20; William 
Raspberry, Opinion, Two Storms, Ample Warning, WASH. PosT, Sept. 5, 2005, at A25; 
Editorial, Lagging Poor, WASH. PosT, Sept. 6, 2005, at A25; Nicholas D. Kristoff, Opinion, 
The Larger Shame, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2005, at A31 (claiming that it was not only that 
funds went to Iraq rather than to New Orlean's levees, "it's also that money went to tax cuts 
for the wealthiest rather than to vaccinations for children"). 
389. Harold Meyerson, Opinion, The "Stuff Happens" Presidency, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 
2005, at A25. 
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uneducated, and employed in low-wage occupations.390 Jobs created 2001-
2004 paid twenty-one percent less than the jobs that were lost during that 
390. ANDREW SUM ET AL., CENTER FOR LABOR MARKET STUDIES NORTHEASTERN 
UNIVERSITY, FOREIGN IMMIGRATION AND THE LABOR FORCE OF THE UNITED STATES: THE 
CONTRIBUTION OF NEW FOREIGN IMMIGRATION TO THE GROWTH OF NATION'S LABOR FORCE 
AND ITS EMPLOYED POPULATION, 2000-2004 !0, 16-24 (2004), available at 
http://www.nupr.neu.edu/7-04/immigrant_04.pdf [hereinafter SUM, FOREIGN IMMIGRATION]; 
ANDREW SUM ET AL., CENTER FOR LABOR MARKET STUDIES, NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY, 
THE IMPACTS OF THE RECESSION OF 2001 AND THE JOBLESS RECOVERY OF 2003 ON THE 
NATIVE BORN AND IMMIGRANT WORKFORCE OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (2003) [herinafter 
SUM, IMPACTS] (indicating that from 2000 to 2002, the native-born workforce increased by 
633,000; the foreign-born workforce increased by 1.057 million), available at 
http://www.nupr.neu.edu/3-03/immigration_march.pdf; accord, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, A 
DESCRIPTION OF THE IMMIGRANT POPULATION I (2004) [hereinafter IMMIGRANT 
POPULATION] 
(The skill distribution among the foreign-born population is bifurcated, with both 
a much larger fraction than natives lacking a high school diploma, yet a slightly 
higher than average percentage having an advanced degree. Immigrants from 
Asia more frequently possess a bachelor's or higher degree, while less than half of 
those from Latin America have completed high school. Nearly half of the growth 
in the labor force since 1995 is attributable to immigrants. Foreign-born men are 
active participants in the labor market, with those from Latin America more 
heavily represented in service and blue-collar occupations and those from Europe 
and Asia in professional occupations. However, foreign-born women are less 
likely to participate in the labor force than are women born in the United States. 
The earnings of foreign-born workers, particularly non-U.S. citizens, are on 
average well below those of natives. Immigrants from Latin America are 
predominantly at the low end of the earnings distribution. That circumstance 
translates into below-average incomes and a higher incidence of poverty in 
households with foreign-born heads.), 
available at http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=6019&sequence=O; Carolyn 
Lochhead, Immigration Hurts American Workers, Lawmaker Says; New Arrivals Account 
for All Job Growth in U.S. From 2000 to 2004, Studies Report, S.F. CHRON., May 5, 2005, 
at A4; David R. Francis, Why the New Jobs Go to Immigrants, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Mar. I 0, 2005, at 17; Robert J. Samuelson, Opinion, Discovering Poverty (Again), WASH. 
PosT, Sept. 21, 2005, at A23. 
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period.391 Moreover, compared to past recessions and recoveries, the 
current cycle has had an exceptionally poor job market.392 
The degree of pre-tax income inequality increased, especially over the 
previous forty years.393 The CBO recently reported that between 1979 and 
391. Jared Bernstein & Lawrence Mishel, Weak Recovery Claims New Victim: Workers' 
Wages, EPI Issue Brief, Feb. 5, 2004, available at http://www.epinet. 
org/issuebriefs/196/ib196.pdf; Lawrence Mishel, eta!., Less Cash in Their Pockets: Trends 
in Income, Wages, Taxes and Health Spending of Middle-Income Families, 2000-03, EPI 
Briefing Paper, Feb. 5, 2004, available at http://www.epinet.org/content.cfinlbpl54; Louis 
Uchitelle, It's Not New Jobs. It's All The Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29,2004, at 3-6 
(There were 9.86 million wage earners who lost full-time jobs from 2001 through 
2003, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported .... That dwarfs the recent job 
creation, and the survey captures only people who acknowledge having been laid 
off. It misses the disguised layoffs, like forced early retirements, which are 
proliferating. Forty-five percent of the 9.86 million were back in another full-time 
job by the time of the survey, or 4.4 million people. Of those, 52 percent earned 
less than they had at their last jobs. The 1994 and 1984 surveys covered similar 
periods of recession and recovery, yet the percentages of the re-employed earning 
less in their new jobs were lower-47 percent in 1994 and 42 percent in 1984. 
Losing ground is a disheartening experience. On a broader plane, it contributes to 
the wage stagnation and income inequality that have characterized the last 30 
years. Both are reappearing after a hiatus that started in the mid-1990's and lasted 
more or less until 2002.). 
392. Mark Schwitzer & Guhan Venkatu, Employment Surveys are Telling the Same (Sad) 
Story, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Research Department (May 15, 2004), available 
at http://www .clevelandfed.org!Research!Com 2004/05-15.pdf. 
393. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HISTORICAL EFFECTIVE FEDERAL TAX RATES: 1979 TO 2002 
(2005), available at http:/ /www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/61 xx/doc6133/03-0 1-EffectiveTaxRates. 
pdf; Isaac Shapiro, What New CEO Data Indicate About Long-term Income Distribution 
Trends, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (Mar. 7, 2005) (indicating that the average 
after-tax real income of the top one percent grew Ill% between 1979 and 2002; the middle 
twenty percent grew fifteen percent; and tne bottom twenty percent grew five percent); 
Eduardo Porter, How Long Can Workers Tread Water?, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2005, at Cl 
(noting that income gains go mostly to the affluent; wages for ordinary workers barely keep 
up with inflation, but the overall income went up sharply due to growing number of jobs and 
higher pay at the top); Jonathan Krim & Griff Witte, Average Wage Earners Fall Behind, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2004, at AI; see also DeNavas-Walt, supra note 388, at 3 Figure 1 
(indicating that the median family income remained unchanged since 2000); Leonhardt, 
supra note 386 ("[The] first time on record that household incomes failed to increase for 
five straight years"). Current trends are a continuation of the 1980s retreat from 
progressivity, first fueled by the 1981 tax cut at the top and the 1983 Social Security 
revisions at the bottom, which exacerbated the income gap effects of underlying economic 
growth at the top only. STAFF OF THE HOUSE WAYS & MEANS JOINT COMM., 102D CONG., 
TAX POLICY AND THE MACROECONOMY: STABILIZATION, GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION 55 
(Comm. Print 1991) ("[I]ncome growth in the United States has slowed considerably since 
the mid-1970s, in contrast to the rate of growth in the previous 25 years."); Marjorie 
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2002, the top one percent enjoyed a 111 percent increase in real income.394 
"The top fifth enjoyed a 48 percent gain during the same period while the 
bottom fifth got only a 5 percent income hike."395 Additionally, 
Republican administrations decreased the level of transfer payments to 
lower income individuals over this period?96 
Working spouses proved a two-edged sword: middle class families on 
the surface appeared to be keeping up for the 1980s and 1990s only 
because more and more women entered the work force producing second 
earners for many households.397 At the same time growth of two-earner 
high income households with rising correlation in the spouses' pay 
Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male -
Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REv. 465, 467 n.7 (identifying the three main causes of the reduction 
in progressivity as being: (1) the fact that rate reductions for the wealthy were not offset by 
base broadening, (2) increased social security taxes, and (3) large increases in real income 
for the wealthy). 
394. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HISTORICAL EFFECTIVE FEDERAL TAX RATES: 1979 TO 2002, 
supra note 394, at Table 1C (reprinted below). 
Avera2e Income (2002 dollars}_ 
1979 1990 1993 2000 2002 
Bottom 14,300 14,100 14,100 16,300 14,400 
20% 
Next 31,000 31,200 30,700 34,700 36,000 
20% 
Top 10% 157,700 199,900 200,700 298,700 244,500 
TopS% 214,500 281,500 280,800 483,000 350,700 
Top 1% 474,300 713,600 700,700 1,345,500 938,100 
Pre-tax Share of Income (percent, 2002 dollars) 
1979 1990 1993 2000 2002 
Bottom 5.8 4.8 4.5 4.0 4.2 
20% 
Next20% 11.1 10.0 9.8 8.6 9.3 
Top 1% 9.3 12.1 11.9 17.8 13.4 
395. David R. Francis, How Social Security Could Narrow Rich-Poor Gap, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 28, 2005, at 17; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HISTORICAL EFFECTIVE 
FEDERAL TAX RATES: 1979 TO 2002, supra note 394, at Table 1 C. 
396. KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR 86-9, 204-05 (Random House 
1990); see Sharon Parrot & Isaac Shapiro, House Budget Resolution Cuts Key Low-Income 
Programs Yet Budget Finds Room for Further Tax Cuts for the Wealthy, Center on Budget 
and Policy Priorities (Mar. 10, 2005). 
397. Leonhardt, supra note 386. The fact that immigrant wives are less likely to participate 
in the work force accordingly contributed to lower household income. IMMIGRANT 
POPULATION, supra note 391, at 1. 
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contributed about one-seventh of income disparity 1979-1996.398 Not 
surprisingly the poverty rate rose in 2004.399 
Nor are only the rich and poor affected. For example, the gap between the 
best- and worst-paid college graduates has increased. The same is true (to 
take one well-paid occupation) of lawyers; the gap between the top and 
bottom is growing. Something unplanned is happening on a massive scale. 
But what? Economists have yet to find a conclusive answer. One theory 
blames new technologies-mainly the computer. Computers have, it's 
said, thrown low-skilled workers out of jobs and made them a glut on the 
market. Meanwhile, the demand for highly skilled workers rises, and so 
do their wages. Another popular villain is global trade. Unskilled 
workers, competing against low-paid workers abroad, have their wages 
driven down.400 
398. Gary Burtless, Has Widening Inequality Promoted or Retarded US Growth? 29 
CANADIAN PUBLIC POLICY, Supplement Sl85 (2003), available at http://www.irpp.org/ 
events/archive/janO 1/burtless.pdf. 
399. David Leonardt, Poverty in U.S. Grew in 2004, While Income Failed to Rise for 5th 
Straight Year, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005, at AI. 
400. Robert J. Samuelson, Opinion, Clinton Needs ''Trickle Down Economics," WASH. 
POST, Dec. 9, 1992, at A23 (providing a simpler explanation-the "economic climate got 
rougher."); Louis Uchitelle, Like Oil and Water: A Tale of Two Economists, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
16, 1997, at 1 (noting that Paul Krugman focuses more on new technology, Lester Thurow 
focuses more on globalization as the cause of the growing gap in income); James P. Pinkerton, 
Op-Ed, When the GOP Has It All, Will It Be Enough?; Republicans Carving Up the Spoils 
of Victory Must Save More than Scraps for the Poor, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1994, at B5 
([The] vast expansion of the global market divides Americans into two groups, 
those who must compete with the world and those who can sell to the world."); 
see generally Martin McMahon & Alice Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing 
the Case for Progressive Taxation, 4 FLA. TAX REv. 1 (1998); Jonathan Krim & 
Griff Witte, Average-Wage Earners Fall Behind; New Job Market Makes More 
Demands but Fewer Promises, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2004, at AI; Ron Scherer, 
US Job Machine In High Gear, but Wages Move Slowly, CHRISTIAN Sci. 
MONITOR, Jan. 27, 1994, at I ("Labor economist Audrey Freedman says the 
economy can still see lower unemployment without inflation because companies 
no longer copy one another's labor pacts. 'They do raise wages when looking for 
a particular employee, or certain skills, but it does not mean it goes through the 
whole country,' says Ms. Freedman. Other factors she cites that are helping to 
keep wages in check include the 'flexible' hiring practices of many companies, 
such as using outside contractors or temporary workers."); Derrick Z. Jackson, 
Raging Bulls on Wall Street, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 2, 1999, at A21 ("Without a 
strong return on their labor, Americans are saving less to keep up with costs that 
have risen way beyond inflation for housing and college. Americans saved only 
0.5 percent of their income last year, compared to 8.6 percent in 1984.). 
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The premium in lifetime earnings for college graduates fell during the 
1970s, rose sharply in the 1980s, leveled off in 1990s and may be falling 
again in current decade; yet it is still forty-five percent more on average 
than with only a high school degree.401 These trends partially reflect losses 
of high wage jobs in manufacturing in 1980s and more recently a quarter of 
immigrants (principally Asians) having a college degree and concentrating 
in certain white collar jobs.402 Free trade agreement protections for 
domestic and foreign workers did not live up to the rhetoric.403 
401. Louis Uchitelle, College Degree Still Pays, but It's Leveling Off, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
13, 2005, at Cl. 
402. /d.; Louis Uchitelle, In This Recovery, a College Education Backfires, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 14, 2004, § 3, at 3 (identifying lower employment rates and wages among twenty-five 
to thirty-five year-old college graduates; factors the bursting of high tech bubble and off 
shoring); see CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, A DESCRIPTION OF THE IMMIGRANT POPULATION 13 
(2004) 
(Half of Asian immigrants possessed at least a bachelor's degree, including 19 
percent with an advanced degree, while the percentage lacking a high school 
diploma was comparable to that of the U.S.-bom population ..... Asians are 
significantly more likely than either those born in the United States or other 
foreign-born residents to be in professional occupations."); see also Sum, Foreign 
Immigration, supra note 390, at 23 (indicating that the heavy majority of new 
immigrants were undereducated and employed in low pay industries, but 28.4% of 
new immigrants had bachelor's degree and higher and largely the same new 
immigrants "tended to obtain an above average share of jobs in a few professional 
specialties, including computer and math sciences and life/physical science 
occupations.). 
403. President Clinton initially relegated environmental and labor standards to 
unenforceable side agreements to win Congressional approval of NAFT A, but later 
incorporated them into the treaty itself. Louis Uchitelle, It's the Economy, Right? Guess 
Again, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2005, at 3-1 ("President Bush has put limits on the enforcement 
of Nafta [sic] and of the treaties that his administration has negotiated."); see also Louis 
Uchitelle, Challenging the Dogmas of Free Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2002, at B7 
(The Bush administration's goal is to 'take care of business first, second and last, 
and not do enough to make sure workers are getting their fair share,'[Rep. Adam] 
Smith [(D-Wash), co-chairman of House New Democrat Coalition] said. Rep. 
Ellen Tauscher (D-Calif.), another co-chairman, said 'the promise of trade 
liberalization has not lived up to the rhetoric, certainly not for American workers.' 
... Both ... accused House Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Tex.) and Majority 
Whip Roy Blunt (R-Mo.) of supporting the weak labor and environmental 
provisions in CAFT A in an effort to build the case with business donors that they 
should abandon the Democratic Party altogether.); 
Thomas B. Edsall, 'New Democrat' Bloc Opposes Trade Pact; Hi-Tech Industry's Support 
at Risk, WASH. POST, May 21,2005, at A4. 
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Furthermore, white collar jobs are beginning to be offshored or 
outsourced. 404 
Regardless of the explanation, the result is clear: decreasing returns on 
labor (except at top) and increasing returns on capital. Some conclude that 
the two are linked. Some studies indicate that rising income inequality 
404. Lael Brainard, et a!., A Fairer Deal for America's Workers in a New Era of 
Ojfshoring 2, (Sept. 14, 2005); EPI ISSUE GUIDE: OFFSHORING, available at 
http://www.epi.org/issueguides/offshoring; L. Josh Bivens, Truth and Consequences of 
Offshoring (EPI Briefing Paper #155 Aug. 2, 2005) 
([A] number of studies have been released by various organizations touting large 
economic benefits that will accrue to the American economy through the 
offshoring of white-collar work. A closer examination of these studies, however, 
shows that the promised benefits of offshoring are far overstated, while the likely 
economic costs are not addressed at all. Further, even the potential benefits to the 
American economy from offshoring are likely to be concentrated in the incomes 
of a relatively select percentage of American households.); 
Louis Uchitelle, Maybe It's Time for Another New Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11,2004, § 3, at 
3 (noting public skepticism that just ending the Bush II tax cuts will result in job creation 
due to "[y]ears of layoffs, wage stagnation, outsourcing and now offshore contracting."); 
David Nather, GOP's Supportfor Bush Showing Signs of Strain, 62 CONG. Q. WKLY. 412 
(2004) 
(A statement by one of his [Bush's] top economists-N. Gregory Mankiw, 
chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers-that praised 
outsourcing as a 'new way to do international trade' was slapped down in a rare 
rebellion by the House's top Republican, Speaker J. Dennis Hastert of Illinois. 
Hastert said the statement 'fails a basic test of real economics. An economy 
suffers when jobs disappear.'); 
see also N. Gregory Mankiw, Chaiman, Council of Econ. Advisers, White House Special 
Briefing (Feb. 7, 2004), in FED. NEWS SERV., at~~ 21-23. 
([O]utsourcing is a growing phenomenon, but it's something that we should 
realize is probably a plus for the economy in the long run .... When we talk about 
outsourcing, outsourcing is just a new way of doing international trade. We're 
very used to goods being produced abroad and being shipped here on ships or 
planes. What we're not used to is services being produced abroad and being sent 
here over the Internet or telephone wires. But does it matter from an economic 
standpoint whether values of items produced abroad come on planes and ships or 
over fiberoptic cables? Well, no, the economics is basically the same. More 
things are tradeable than were tradeable in the past and that's a good thing. That 
doesn't mean there's not dislocations; trade always means there's dislocations. 
And we need to help workers find jobs and make sure to create jobs here. But we 
shouldn't sort of retreat from the basic principles of free trade. Outsourcing is sort 
of the latest manifestation of the gains from trade that economists have talked 
about at least since Adam Smith.); 
Stephen J. Norton, For Democrats Blasting Bush on Jobs, Outsourcing Is in, 62 CONG. Q. 
WKLY. 620 (2004). 
156 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 2:1 
contributed to rapid growth in the United States economy which benefited 
high income households the most.405 
The Clinton 1993 tax increase on the rich was a significant factor in the 
ensuing twelve fat years in which the top one percent disproportionately 
benefited.406 Thus they did not merit a roll back of their 1993 tax increase. 
"During the Bush years, the tax rate on wages and on income from 
investments has declined, but the decline for investment income is roughly 
4 percentage points while that for workers is 2 points, according to 
estimates by the Congressional Budget Office."407 
VI. STARVE THE BEAST 
There is evidence that one of the purposes of the Bush II tax cuts was 
to restrain spending by taking money out of the government coffers408 (in 
405. Gary Burtless, Has Widening Inequality Promoted or Retarded US Growth? 29 
CANADIAN PUB. PoL'Y Sl85, Sl89 Table 2, (Supp. 2003) (indicating that one-third of 
change in personal income inequality between 1979 and 1996 reflects increasing inequality 
of wage earnings, particularly among men; thirteen percent is attributable to a higher 
correlation between married couples' earnings, viz.,. high earners are increasingly likely to 
be married to high earners; and twenty-one percent is attributable to fewer people living in 
married-couple households and more living in single parent households). 
406. See supra note 395. President Clinton's actions raising the maximum ordinary 
income rate to 39.6% in 1993 (retaining the OBRA 1990 phase-outs) played a positive, 
indirect role in the ensuing economic good times. President Clinton redistributed some of 
the revenue increases from the ordinary rate increases to the working poor (by increasing 
EITC benefits), and then under Congressional pressure devoted much of the remaining 
revenues to reducing otherwise increases in the deficit. 146 CONG. REc. Sll362-63 (daily 
ed. Oct. 30, 2000) (statement of Sen. Gramm). These "deficit reduction" efforts led to 
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan's campaign of lowering interest rates as 
proponents of rate increases at the top hoped. Proponents of retaining a capital gains 
preference had denigrated any such interest rate cut as "mythical." 
407. Louis Uchitelle, Bush Plans Could Raise U.S. Deficits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2004, at 
Al3. 
408. Janet Hook, Budget Plan Handcuffs Democrats, L.A TIMES, June 8, 2001, at AI; 
Gary S. Becker, The Real Reason We Need A Tax Cut, Bus. WK., Mar. 19, 2001, at 28 
("[T]he most important effect of a tax reduction is to curtail government spending, not to 
stimulate private spending. In his address to the House of Representatives, President Bush 
did claim that tax cuts help to keep a lid on government spending by reducing the fiscal 
surplus."); Gebe Martinez, The GOP's Internal Divide, 62 CONG. Q. WKLY. 166 (2004) 
(indicating that many liberals say the real GOP agenda is to cut taxes to point out to 
Congress through the increasing deficit that it must cut domestic spending-a view held by 
conservative Grover Norquist, president of Americans for Tax Reform and adviser to 
President Bush's re-election team). 
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addition to re-energizing the GOP's tax cutting-base409). Considering these 
regressive Bush II 2001-2003 tax cuts, "[c]ombined with his stated desire 
to eliminate virtually all taxes on capital income and to privatize Medicare 
and Social Security, it's not much of an exaggeration to say that Bush 
would like to roll back the federal government to something resembling its 
pre-New Deal state."410 George W. Bush's true reasons for the 2001 and 
2003 tax cuts seem to have been to reward the rich and at the same time to 
starve the government of revenues, forcing it to downsize, i.e., reverse the 
New Deal and Great Society social welfare programs.411 "The key date 
409. Edward Walsh, Will the Tax Cut Benefit the GOP?; Potential Impact on 2002 Vote 
Debated, With 2 Sides Citing Course of Economy, WASH. POST, June 10, 2001, at AS. 
410. Jonathan Chait, Mad About You, NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 29, 2003, at 20. Janet Hook, 
The Nation; Senate GOP Supports a Temporary End to Taxes on Dividends; Party 
Divisions Remain, with Bill's Author Admitting He Doesn't Have Votes for Approval, L.A. 
TIMES, May 7, 2003, pt. I, at 22 
('The truth of the matter is that this has nothing to do with the growth of the 
economy.' said Rep. Charles B. Rangel ... 'But it has everything to do with 
getting rid of the resources that support the programs that a lot of people believe 
should be supported by this Congress.'); 
David Firestone & Richard W. Stevenson, House Republicans Retreat from Ending 
Dividend Tax, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2003, at A26 (indicating that the Senate majority leader 
preferred even a temporary repeal of the dividend tax to the House approach, in the hopes 
that the repeal would later be made permanent). 
411. Adriel Bettelheim, Going Beyond Social Security, 63 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1556 (2005) 
(reporting that the savings incentives being considered by Ways & Means Chair Bill 
Thomas, according to many Democrats, constitute "a convenient rationale for shrinking 
Social Security. 'The real goal here is to set in motion changes that will eventually 
completely replace Social Security,' said Sander M. Levin of Michigan, the ranking 
Democrat on the Ways and Means Social Security Subcommittee."); Robert Scheer; 
Commentary, Social Security Ain't Broke, so Bush Is Obsessed With Fixing It; He Hates 
Government Programs No Matter How Much Good They Do, L.A. TiMES, Mar. 8 , 2005, at 
B 11 ("The country is being led by a group of ideologues who fanatically reject the notion 
that government has a role to play in ameliorating the harshest aspects of capitalism."); 
Adam Posen, The Economics of a Second Term, FIN. TiMES, Nov. 9, 2004, at 19 
(These 'permanent' tax cuts will provide no short-term stimulus but will convince 
high-income voters that any shift away from Republican majorities will come at 
their expense. The cuts are also part of the multi-pronged 'starve the beast' 
strategy to limit any future non-defence government programmes that might aid 
the Democrats or their voters.); 
Craig Gordon, Analysis: Budget Tabulations Are a Numbers Game, NEWSDAY, Feb. 8, 2005, 
atA6 
(Bush hopes to appeal to the 'starve the beast' contingent-those who want to cut 
federal taxes so much that there is little left over for what they see as big-
government social spending programs. Bush wants to make his tax cut proposals 
permanent, at a 10-year cost of$1.1 trillion.); 
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probably will be 2027, when payroll taxes and interest income paid to the 
Social Security trust funds are expected to no longer cover program costs. 
That means the Treasury Department will be required, in essence, to start 
repaying the $7.5 trillion or so it will have borrowed to help finance the rest 
of the government since Social Security was overhauled in 1983. And 
unless something is done, the trust funds will be empty by 2042, according 
to the latest estimate."412 
As long as foreigners continue to invest so heavily in Treasury 
securities, the deficit will not have such a corrosive effect on the economy 
by driving up interest rates.413 At the end of 2004, international investors 
Martin Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Getting Serious About Starving The Beast, 107 TAX 
NOTES 822, 822 (2005) (indicating that "starve the beast" is now the explicit rationale for 
tax cuts: deficits will force government to shrink); Warren Rojas, News Analysis: Norquist 
Sees Antitax Crusade As Cornerstone Of GOP Domination, 102 TAX NOTES 307 (2004); Jay 
Soled, Refinancing America: The Republican Antitax Agenda, 101 TAX NOTES 1235 (2003); 
see also Editorial, Mr. Bush's Budget Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2001, at A18 (reporting 
that polls indicate public recognition that Bush's tax cut was weighted toward the rich and 
jeopardizes paying down the debt, fending off deficits, and financing education, retirement 
and health). Professor Shaviro shows that, in fact, government has grown under Bush II. 
See Shaviro, supra note 183. 
412. Andrew Taylor, Next Presidency: A Future of Shortfalls, 62 CONG. Q. WKLY. 2230 
(2004). 
413. !d. (indicating that foreign investment avoids competition between Wall Street and 
the Treasury for investment dollars running up interest rates); see Michael R. Crittenden, 
30-Year Bonds: An "Old" Solution for the New Deficit, 63 CONG. Q. WKLY. 1425 (2005) 
(indicating that foreign central banks are some of largest buyers of Treasury instruments); 
Andrew Taylor, With Half-Trillion in Red Ink, U.S. Inc. Looks Bad on Paper, 62 CONG. Q. 
WKLY. 132 (2004) (reporting that former Treasury Secretary Rubin argued that 
large deficits could bring on a cavalcade of other economic problems, including 
lower stock prices and a sharp decline in the value of the dollar. [He] warned that 
fmancial markets and foreign investors will lose confidence in the ability of the 
U.S. political system to control the deficit and will demand higher interest rates to 
protect against the risk of inflation.); 
John Cranford, Political Economy: The Long and Short of It, 63 CoNG. Q. WKLY. 2018 
(2005) (indicating that Greenspan concluded that the disconnect between federal reserve 
rates and interest rates was 
the result of an excess of global savings combined with a dearth of global 
investment. In short, foreign savers are looking for a place to park their money-
other than putting it into businesses at home-and Treasury securities and U.S. 
mortgages are perfect spots, with reasonable yields and almost absolute security. 
If Greenspan's right, that spells trouble because one thing the Fed cannot change 
is the savings rate in China or Japan or Europe. Nor can it induce investment in 
those countries, either. Heck, the Fed can't even do much about U.S. savings and 
investment rates.). 
As of June 2003, foreign and international investors owned 20.3% of public debt (but the 
Federal Reserve and government accounts held 52.6%); Daniel J. Parks, How Much Debt Is 
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held more than $5.7 trillion in U.S. stocks, corporate bonds and Treasury 
securities, while U.S. investors held about $2.5 trillion in foreign securities, 
leaving America in debt to the rest of the world in the amount of roughly 
$3.1 trillion.414 At this date, the Treasury had more than $3.9 trillion in 
outstanding tradable long-term notes and bonds and short-term bills with 
forty-nine percent held in accounts owned by foreigners, approximately 
$1.2 trillion (or sixty percent of foreign holdings) was held by foreign 
central banks to maintain stable currency reserves.415 "International 
investors increased ... Treasury holdings by $436 billion [in 2004] while 
the total marketable debt sold by the U.S. government grew by $369 
billion.""116 Japanese investors held about thirty-seven percent of all foreign 
held marketable Treasury securities; China, ten percent; British investors, 
almost nine percent; and investors in the Caribbean, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Germany and the oil-exporting countries of OPEC, more than fifteen 
percent.417 The Treasury asked a formal advisory committee of bond 
market traders for its opinion as to the risk of such foreign holdings. "The 
answer: There are plenty of U.S. investors ready to step into the market if 
foreigners flee."418 Then, however, the stage would be set for a drive up of 
Too Much?, 62 CONG. Q. WKLY. 141 (2004); John Cranford, The Deficit's Hard Truths, 
CONG. Q. WKLY. 2554 (2005) 
([T]he federal government now imports almost every dollar that it borrows on 
Wall Street to pay its daily bills. That makes the country even more reliant on 
foreign capital than it is on foreign oil-and, in theory at least, that money could 
dry up quickly if foreign investors suddenly decided to invest elsewhere. Since 
George W. Bush became president, the budget surplus has disappeared, and four 
years of deficits-including a record $412.1 billion in fiscal 2004-have required 
the government to borrow $1.1 trillion in financial markets. In that same period, 
overseas investors have lent the federal government a bit more than $1 trillion .... 
Japan is by far the largest investor in Treasury securities, and China is a fast-rising 
No. 2. If those two countries, plus investors in Britain and elsewhere, decide to 
stop lending to the Treasury, Americans will have to pick up the slack. That would 
drive up Treasury's interest rates-less demand requires a bigger incentive to 
buy-but also interest rates in general, since U.S.-backed Treasury notes provide 
the safest investment and thus form a benchmark for all private borrowing. The 
upshot would limit the amount that Americans could invest in their own 
businesses and families.). 
414. John Cranford, Political Economy: Ownership Societies, 63 CONG. Q. WKLY. 606 
(2005). 
415. /d. 
416. /d. 
417. /d. 
418. /d. 
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interest rates as Treasury and Wall Street compete for the same interest 
dollars.419 
Several commentators show that, historically, income tax cuts have 
proven ineffective in restraining spending.420 While this appears to be the 
case short-term, long-term is another story (holding all else even) and 
having the Bush II tax cuts a permanent fixture.421 The Government 
Accountability Office has concluded that "[a]bsent policy changes on the 
419. Gale & Samara, supra note 173, at 158 ("Under the conventional view of fiscal 
policy, increased public debt and deficits raise the overall supply of debt relative to demand, 
and thus reduce the price-that is, raise the interest of yield--on such debt."); Crawford, 
supra note 287; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC AND BUDGET OUTLOOK: FISCAL 
YEARS 1988-1992 Part I, 97-102 (Jan. 1987), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs 
/6lxx/doc 6196/docOlb-Entire.pdf. See supra note 411. 
420. Gale & Samara, supra note 173, at 165 
(It is not difficult to see why tax cuts may prove ineffective in restrammg 
spending. About 70 percent of spending in 2000 was for social security, medicare, 
medicaid, defense, and net interest (CBO, 200la). A significant reduction in 
spending would require substantial cuts in these programs or massive cuts in 
others, both of which seem difficult politically. As a result, tax cuts represent a 
fiscal gamble: if the cuts do not effectively restrain spending, the government 
could find itself in a difficult fiscal position, as it did after 1981.). 
This was another "Riverboat Gamble" that Congress lost. 
421. Matthew Miller, Opinion, A Democratic counter to the "7.2," SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Nov. 6, 2003, at Bl5 
(The real problem is that Bush has used the legitimate need for short-run stimulus 
to enact long-term tax cuts aimed mostly at the best-off. This strategy is a 
nefarious twofer because it's also designed to create long-term deficits that 
conservative ideologues can use to 'starve the beast' of government. Bush's 
perverse harnessing of short-run need to sell long-run insanity is what Democrats 
need to make the public understand. . . . Democrats are in a tizzy over news that 
the economy grew 7.2 percent in the last quarter, the fastest such growth since 
1984.); 
Mitchell Rofsky, Opinion, The Liberal Legacy (and the Myth of Conservative Primacy), 
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 22,2004, at Dl 
(Bush's tax cuts may well be part of a long-term strategy to 'starve the beast' and 
force huge cuts in social programs. But if the Republicans really believed that 
their free-market ideology was popular, wouldn't they openly propose getting rid 
of all regulatory and social programs and reducing government spending by 50 or 
75 percent? ... For all the damage conservatives can do to the federal budget with 
tax cuts, or to environmental and corporate regulations with lax or subversive 
administration, the truth is they can't swing America back to even the 
conservatism of the 1970s, much less earlier. It's frequently said that the political 
spectrum has moved to the right, but it would be more legitimate to assert that it 
has shifted left. Not only have conservatives accepted an earlier liberal policy 
agenda, but what once may have been seen as anti-establishment cultural extremes 
have become societal norms.). 
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spending and/or revenue sides of the budget, a growing imbalance between 
federal spending and tax revenues will mean escalating and ultimately 
unsustainable federal deficits and debt. For example, ... if discretionary 
spending grows at the same rate as the economy and all expiring tax 
provisions are extended, federal revenues could be adequate to cover little 
more than interest on the federal debt by 2040."422 In that event, the 
Government would be truly starved. 
Consider this from the perspective of a not atypical GOP voter-say, a 
young married woman with three small children living in Ohio. She voted 
for Bush because he promised to vigorously defend her family against 
terrorists and because he shares her values. But she has material interests 
too. She would like to raise her kids full time, but the money isn't there. 
Her husband is working long hours, but it's not nearly enough, and the tax 
cuts barely made a dent in their debts. At some point, she has to wonder, 
what has President Bush done for me lately? 
Precious little is the right answer, and GOP politicians would do well to 
take note. Liberals like Thomas Frank, author of"What's the Matter With 
Kansas," have long argued that populist conservatism is nothing more 
than a con. Conservatives sell values to the working class, but they deliver 
economic ruin. It's a view that is overheated, under-informed and more 
than a little condescending. Unfortunately, it contains a grain of truth. 
This wasn't always the case. In 1980, the federal tax burden was a serious 
problem, and slashing taxes for the middle class was genuinely populist 
because it was genuinely popular. But after President Reagan closed 
countless loopholes and lowered rates, and President Clinton shifted the 
tax burden onto those most able to pay, the most pressing problems faced 
by working families weren't too-high taxes; rather it was the rising costs 
of healthcare and of raising children. 
Somehow, K Street conservatives-the revolving-door clique of high-
powered lobbyists, congressional staffers, administration officials and 
think-tank true believers that defines the Republican agenda-never got 
the memo. Slashing taxes and "starving the beast" of government 
remained the order of the day.423 
422. UNDERSTANDING THE TAX REFORM DEBATE, supra note 6, at 17. 
423. Reihan Salam Commentary; The Crisis of 'Sam's Club' Republicans, L.A. Times, 
Jan. 11. 2005, at Bl3. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Karl Marx quipped about Louis Napoleon:424 "history repeats itself, but 
the first time was tragedy, and the second time was farce."425 Farce 
describes the first phase of the capital gains story (1921-1986) both as to 
progressivity and, in the case of the Reagan 1981 tax cuts, as to "trickle 
down" economics (the political philosophy that lower taxes at the top 
resulted in economic benefits for taxpayers of lesser incomes as well). For 
pre-tax income at the bottom decreased adjusted for inflation while 
effective tax rates increased, and pre-tax income at the top exploded while 
effective rates decreased. Similarly, the supply side argument that tax cuts 
would pay for themselves was disproved as to the Reagan tax cuts when the 
deficit exploded. Exactly the same results are occurring under the Bush II 
tax cuts (particularly as they are fully phased in and if made permanent). 
Given that this record was pointed out to the Republican majority in 
Congress, the Bush II tax cuts go beyond a farce. Income redistribution 
from middle and lower income taxpayers to higher income taxpayers426 
through raiding Social Security, lowering effective rates at the top and 
increasing effective rates at the bottom, and cutting funding of programs 
aimed at the bottom make the Bush II tax cuts a tragedy. 
Tax policies should ameliorate by restoring progressivity. Whether the 
resulting increases in revenue should be used on education, health care, or 
424. Following the abdication and flight of King Louis Phillippe in the French 
Revolution, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, nephew and heir to the throne of Napoleon I, was 
elected President of France in December 1848 on a platform of strong government, social 
consolidation and national greatness. Louis Napoleon twice withdrew earlier in 1848 from 
the political arena and returned several times from exile in England, which had been the 
result of two prior abortive coup attempts. In 1851, he overthrew the Second Republic and 
and seized dictatorial powers as Napoleon III. All this appears the source of Marx's quip. 
Under Napoleon III, France scored several military victories in Europe and abroad, 
becoming again the largest military power in Europe. But Napoleon III's blunders in 
Mexico, not supporting Austria in its war with Prussia, and starting and then losing the 
Franco-Pussian War in 1870, resulted in his being deposed (after capture by the Prussians) 
and being exiled again to England. Now that was a farce. 
425. Keith R. Fisher, The Higher Calling: Regulation of Lawyers Post-ENRON, 37 U. 
MICH. J. L. REF. I 017 (2004) (citing Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte, in KARL MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, SELECTED WORKS 97 (Progress Publishers 
reprint 1968) (1852)). 
426. 147 CONG. REc. H2212 (daily ed. May 16, 2001) (statement of Rep. Matsui) 
(indicating that sixty percent of the projected surplus was from Social Security taxes; thus, 
the income tax cut skewed to the top constitutes "redistributing this tax cut in a way that 
takes from the average taxpayer or the average worker and gives to the super-rich."). 
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for paying down the deficit (or some combination) is the more difficult 
question. I believe that the bottom line is that the tax system should not 
make the gap between the after tax income of the top and the rest of 
Americans greater than the pre-tax gap, as it has under President George 
W. Bush's 2001 and 2003 tax cuts. 
Ideally the tax cuts should be reversed now. Given the narrowness of 
the victory of the Clinton 1993 tax increases at the top when the Democrats 
had majority control of both Houses, this is unlikely. Even ifthe GOP lost 
control of Congress in the upcoming mid-term elections, a reversal is 
unlikely under President George W. Bush since he surely would veto any 
reversal of his tax cuts and opponents of the cuts would not likely be able 
to override any such veto. 
The second best alternative is for these cuts to expire pursuant to their 
various sunsets. A better alternative would be to narrow the gap between 
the pre-Bush II tax cuts maximum individual capital gains (20%) and 
ordinary income tax rates (approximately 42% taking account of the PEP 
and Pease phase-outs). Given that at the top, on average, amounts of 
capital gains and ordinary income reported are roughly equal, raising the 
capital gains rate eight percentage points back to 28% (which may be the 
revenue maximizing rate anywa/27 and lowering the ordinary income rate 
by eight percentage points to 34 or say 35% and eliminating the phase-outs 
looks about right. As many have suggested, the estate tax rates should be 
lowered somewhat, and the exemption raised between $5 million to $10 
million or so.428 The ideal alternative would be to repeal the corporate 
income tax, individual capital gains tax at least for stock, and the estate tax, 
while at the same time taxing the owners annually on the entity's profits-
in the case of public corporations, through the easier to administer proxy of 
mark-to-market (difference between traded value on (a) first of tax year or 
when acquired if later and (b) last of tax year or when disposed of if earlier 
427. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, NO. JCS-12-90, EXPLANATION OF 
METHODOLOGY USED TO ESTIMATE PROPOSALS AFFECTING THE TAXATION OF INCOME FROM 
CAPITAL GAINS (1990) (estimating a revenue maximizing over the long-term capital gains 
tax rate of28.5%). 
428. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum & Jonathan Weisman, The 1% Split Over Estate Taxes; The 
Few at the Top of the Heap Disagree on How to Keep the Most, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 
2005, at Dl (reporting that small businesses favor $10 million floor and rate equal to capital 
gains rate; the very wealthy oppose anything other than total repeal); Dustin Stamper, Frist 
Still Promising Estate Tax Repeal Vote; Grassley Outlines Compromise, 2005 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 169-2 (2005); Dustin Stamper, Thomas's Tax Agenda Includes Estate Tax 
Compromise, 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 86-2 (2005). 
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is taxed as ordinary gain or loss), and in the case of private firms as if they 
were partners taxed directly on the entity's earnings or loss.429 
If, however, President George W. Bush is able to make these cuts 
permanent and the Treasury is unable to pay its debts to Social Security-
the principal of which consists of wages upon which, in many cases, 
income taxes were paid but the wages were not received by the workers-
then I sincerely advocate that the Treasury default on all of its obligations. 
In that case, by analogy to the priority in bankruptcy for unpaid wages, 430 I 
think the Social Security trust funds should have a priority, and if necessary 
Government buildings, etc., should be transferred to the funds. When I 
propounded this notion to my father, a retired ironworker, he pointed out 
that many pension funds hold Government securities. Since employer 
contributions to qualified retirement plans are conceptualized as deferred 
wages earned by participants and not employer gratuities,431 Treasury 
securities held by qualified retirement plans should also have a priority. 
Of course, our foreign lenders would not lend us any more (recycled 
U.S dollars from our imbalance of payments paying for imports from 
them), so it is likely that we would not import as much from them. Then 
we would have to manufacture here again and run our economy on 
consumer spending by better paid workers. While I would hope workers 
would earn a greater portion of national income, I would expect that the 
owners of capital would do less well. 
429. Professor Dodge has written an excellent exposition of such dual-track integration 
and I earlier sketched this proposal. Joseph M. Dodge, A Combined Mark-to-Market and 
Pass-Through Corporate-Shareholder Integration Proposal, 50 TAX L. REv. 265, 266-67 
(1995) (providing a rigorous and elegant application of these ideas). I fully agree with this 
two tier model. John W. Lee, President Clinton's Capital Gains Proposals, 59 TAX NOTES 
1399, 1414, 1418 (1993) (indicating that (a) the critical difference between public and 
closely held corporations is the separation of ownership and control and (b) at the current 
graduated inside corporate rates where most owners materially participate violate horizontal 
and vertical equity). 
430. II U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (2005) (providing priority for 
unsecured claims, but only to the extent of $10,000 for each individual or 
corporation, as the case may be, earned within 180 days before the date of the 
filing of the petition or the date of the cessation ofthe debtor's business, whichever 
occurs first, for- (A) wages, salaries, or commissions, including vacation, 
severance, and sick leave pay earned by an individual .... ). 
Obviously, I would not limit the priority to $10,000 per Social Security beneficiary. 
431. John W. Lee, ERISA's "Bad Boy": Forfeiture for Cause in Retirement Plans, 9 
LOY. U. OF CHI. L. J. 137, 146-47 (1977); Ashenbaugh v. Crucible, Inc., 1975 Salaried 
Retirement Plan, 854 F.2d 1516, 1537 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1105 (1988) 
("[T]he legislative history of ERISA leaves no doubt that Congress considered pensions to 
be the deferred wages of employees."). 
